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This study addresses three questions: (1) how Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
performs in economic and social indicators relative to Southeast Asia (SEA); 
(2) whether and how abundance in natural resources and institutional quality 
influence patterns of socioeconomic performance across and within the two 
regions; and (3) to what extent interactions between institutional quality and 
abundance in natural resources determine economic and social outcomes. It 
covers the period from 1990 to 2015 for a set of forty-five SSA and nine SEA 
countries.  
 The analysis applies three measures to capture socioeconomic 
performance: (1) per capita GDP growth; (2) foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows; and (3) infant mortality rate. It uses the World Bank’s Regulatory 
Quality (RQ) indicator as the institutional quality measure; and the share of 
natural resource exports in percentage of total merchandise exports as a 
measure for resource abundance. Further, the analysis controls for a range of 
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variables that may potentially influence per capita GDP growth, FDI, and infant 
mortality. These variables include inflation rates, government expenditure, 
official development aid (ODA), population growth, and the share of urban 
population in percentage of total population.  
The interest in such analysis originated in the observation that poor 
institutional quality or governance and abundance in natural resources, often 
argued to explain SSA’s development problems, are in fact also present in a 
large part of SEA. For instance, many countries in both regions are among the 
world’s most corrupt according to the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) and are similarly richly endowed in natural resources 
such as oil and gas. Another motivation for this analysis is that no empirical 
work has been done using cross-national longitudinal statistics to address the 
question on how certain factors, in particular institutions and natural resources, 
influence economic and social outcomes in the two regions. 
 For that purpose, the study draws upon two analytical perspectives: (1) 
the institutional perspective (institutions as the fundamental cause of good 
economic performance); and (2) the resource curse perspective (abundance or 
dependence on natural resources, especially minerals and oil, adversely affects 
economic performance). In addition, the study accounts for the explanation 
according to which socioeconomic performance, especially in SSA, may be 
linked to physical or geographic causes.  
 The main findings can be summarized as follows: first, keeping 
constant institutional quality, abundance in natural resources, and other 
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variables, a country located in SSA has lower per capita GDP growth, lower 
flows of inward FDI, and higher infant mortality relative to a country located 
in SEA. In other words, despite similarities in the measured institutional level 
in both regions, SEA experiences better economic and social outcomes 
compared to SSA.   
 Second, a country that improves its institutional quality—RQ—is 
likely to experience higher per capita GDP growth, larger FDI inflows, and 
lower infant mortality, irrespective of whether it is located in SSA or SEA. 
Better-performing-countries in both regions tend to have higher RQ scores 
compared to the poor-performing-countries. Among the countries with better 
RQ, however, those located in SEA perform somewhat better than their 
counterparts located in SSA.  
Finally, abundance in natural resources does not necessarily have 
adverse effects on economic outcomes. In SSA for instance, per capita GDP 
growth and FDI inflows are greater for resource-abundant countries than for 
their resource-scarce counterparts. Further, resource-abundant countries with 
good RQ have higher economic growth and receive more FDI than either 
countries with abundant natural resources and poor RQ, or no resources with 
good RQ, or non-resources with poor RQ. 
  Overall, these findings have important implications for empirical 
research on the role of institutional quality in explaining differences in 
economic and social outcomes across countries. This study’s main contribution 
is to understand how countries that display similar measured level of 
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institutional quality or governance may experience different economic and 
social outcomes.  
Key words: Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia, Regulatory Quality, institutions, 
resource abundance, panel data 
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1.1. Background, objectives, and significance 
 
It is recognized that since about 1995 economic and social indicators 
have improved in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Arndt et al 2016). Improvements 
in institutional quality or governance have been suggested as the drivers of such 
performance (Fosu 2015). It has also been reported that SSA countries richly 
endowed with natural resources have on average outperformed their resource-
poor counterparts on a range of economic and social indicators (Lundgren et al 
2013). Concerns remain, however, about SSA socioeconomic performance 
relative to other developing regions, and more importantly, about the actual role 
of natural resources and institutional quality.  
This study’s main contribution takes the form of an analysis of 
socioeconomic performance in SSA and Southeast Asia (SEA). It addresses the 
following questions: (1) how SSA performed compared to SEA in the post-
1990 period; (2) how natural resources and institutional quality influence 
economic and social outcomes across and within the two regions; and (3) 
whether and how the impact on socioeconomic performance of natural 
resources is conditioned by institutional quality; or similarly, whether the 
impact on socioeconomic performance of institutional quality is moderated by 
natural resources. 
To address the first two questions, the study draws on three analytical 
perspectives: the institutional perspective, which emphasizes institutions as the 
 
 ２ 
fundamental cause of good economic performance (Acemoglu et al. 2005; 
Rodrik et al. 2004) and its other variants (Chang 2011; Khan 2012); the 
resource curse perspective, according to which abundance in or dependence on 
natural resources, especially minerals and oil, adversely affects economic 
performance (Sachs and Warner 1995; 2001; Auty 2002); and the geographical 
perspective, which links development problems to physical or geographic 
causes such as the distribution of inland waterways and coastlines, and endemic 
diseases (Bloom et al. 1998; Collier and Gunning 1999; Gallup et al 1999).  
On the other hand, to address the third question, the study draws on a 
strand of the resource curse literature that establishes that institutional 
development determines the extent to which natural resources affect economic 
and social outcomes (Mehlum et al. 2006a; Robinson et al. 2006; 
Brunnschweiler 2008).  
In utilizing these analytical approaches, the study aims to explain 
causalities between natural resources, institutional quality, their interactions, 
and socioeconomic performance. Another aim is to examine whether and how 
the effects on performance of natural resources and institutional quality are 
influenced by geographic factors (i.e., regional location). 
The focus on SSA and SEA is motivated by two factors: first, the two 
regions are not fundamentally different in terms of their institutional 
development. A comparison of performance in some of the major institutional 
indicators reveals that countries in both regions perform poorly compared to 
more advanced parts of the world (i.e., OECD countries). For instance, most of 
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the countries in SEA perform equally poorly in the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) or the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI).  
Second, no work has been done using cross-national longitudinal 
statistics to address the question on how certain factors, in particular institutions 
and natural resources, influence economic performance in the two regions. The 
existing few studies on the differential performance between SSA and SEA are 
generally narrative or based on comparative case studies.  
For instance, Henley (2015) compares two countries in SEA (Indonesia 
and Malaysia) with two in SSA (Kenya and Nigeria) to explain the role of 
differences in policy choices in the diverging development path between the 
two regions. Similarly, Berendsen et al. (2013) investigates the role of policies 
in explaining differences in economic performance between the two regions. 
Their analysis is based on comparative case studies of four SEA countries 
(Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam) and four SSA countries (Kenya, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda). Another major study proposed by Kelsall 
(2013), and based on a qualitative comparative analysis of ten high-growth 
performers in SSA (Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, and 
Mozambique) and SEA (Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam), 
suggest no evidence that good institutions such as the rule of law, the absence 
of corruption, and property rights explain performance in the two regions. 
Overall, existing studies, all based on comparative case studies, argue that 
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institutional constraint is not the key to explaining the development success and 
failure in SEA and SSA, respectively.     
 The current study uses panel data for forty-five SSA and nine SEA 
countries over the period from 1990 to 2015. It applies three measures to 
capture socioeconomic performance, including GDP per capita growth, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and one aspect of human development, namely infant 
mortality. 
The choice for these three variables was motivated by the fact that per 
capita GDP growth is a well-accepted economic performance indicator in the 
governance or the resource curse literature (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Arezki and 
van der Ploeg 2011; Lederman and Maloney 2007; Rodrik et al 2004). On the 
other hand, the ability for a country to attract large flows of FDI can be 
suggestive of improvement in other economic and social indicators such as 
know-how and technology diffusion, employment generation, and expansion of 
access to infrastructure and social services (Borensztein et al, 1998; Lim, 2001). 
FDI can thus be thought of as a proxy for employment, technology diffusion, 
access to infrastructure, and so forth.1  
                                            
1 Perhaps this argument is more relevant for SEA than for SSA. It has been argued that 
FDI has played a leading role for major changes in economic structure of most SEA 
countries (Thomsen 1999). Foreign firms have fueled export-led growth and 
contributed to changes in economic structures of countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines. In most of SSA countries, however, FDI is mostly 
directed to extractive industries. Whether FDI in extractive industries generates 
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Conversely, it has been suggested that an analysis of economic 
performance should consider other variables beyond economic growth (Stigitz 
et al 2009). A country can grow rapidly without making significant 
improvement in terms of social welfare. For instance, in a country like 
Equatorial Guinea the main indicators of human development such as child 
mortality, primary school enrolment, and fertility rates have not improved in 
spite of the sustained growth of per capita income over two decades (Daniele 
2011: 566). 
 The analysis may suffer from problems with data and methodology. 
As for the former, secondary data such as those used in the current study (i.e., 
institutional indicators, GDP growth, population, FDI, and so forth) are likely 
to suffer from problems of approximation and errors in their collection. These 
may in turn lead to measurement errors in empirical specifications. With regard 
to methodology, one of the main problems in the empirical literature relates to 
the search for a satisfactory statistical model. As Durlauf et al (2005: 609) put 
it, “The basic problem in developing statistical statements is that there do not 
exist good theoretical reasons to specify a particular model”. With these two 
concerns in mind, findings from this analysis should be interpreted with caution.   
However, this study is significant in three ways: first, it claims to be 
the first analysis applying panel data to compare performance in economic and 
social indicators in SSA and SEA; second, it contributes to understanding how 
                                            
employment, or promotes technology diffusion in SSA is beyond the scope of the 
current analysis. It is assumed, however, that it does. 
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regions that somewhat have similar measured levels of institutional quality may 
experience different economic and social outcomes; finally, it adds to the 
debate on the factors explaining socioeconomic performance in SSA in the 
post-1990 period.  
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter II 
discusses how the current study differs from the existing research, and 
elaborates the extent to which natural resources and institutions may influence 
economic and social outcomes in SSA and SEA. It is organized as follows: it 
first discusses the theoretical as well as the empirical literature on the links 
between institutions, natural resources, and socioeconomic performance; and 
then reviews the existing studies comparing economic and social outcomes 
between SSA and SEA. 
Chapter III offers some observations about the patterns of performance 
in a range of economic and social variables across countries in the SSA region. 
Specifically, the analysis focuses on 45 SSA countries classified into two 
groups—resource-abundant and resource-scarce. The analysis is based on 
annual data for the period from 1990 to 2015, and covers a range of economic 
and social variables, including GDP (growth and level), FDI, and infant 
mortality, adult literacy rate, poverty rates, and other macroeconomic variables, 
including inflation, trade, debt, and others. It then attempts to describe whether 
and how institutions shape patterns of performance within SSA.  
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Similarly, chapter IV explores some of the major features of economic 
performance in SSA and SEA, and describes the role of institutions and natural 
resources. The core of the chapter is divided into five sections. The first section 
compares aggregates of the two regions as well as the behavior of individual 
countries on an array of economic and social variables, including growth, 
inflation, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade diversification, and progress on 
the Millennium Development Goals. The second section compares 
performance in some composite institutional indicators between SEA, SSA, 
and some advanced economies of Asia and other regions. It then looks at the 
association between performance in institutional indicators and other variables 
including growth, FDI, and a broad measure of development progress—infant 
mortality rates. The third section describes differences in economic 
performance between resource-abundant and resource-scarce countries in the 
two regions. The fourth section then explores the extent to which natural 
resources and institutional quality influence measures of socioeconomic 
performance, including growth, income, FDI, and infant mortality. The last 
section draws some general conclusions about the differential economic 
performance between SSA and SEA and the role of institutions and natural 
resources. 
Chapter V discusses how the three main concepts of interest in the 
current study—natural resources, institutional quality, and socioeconomic 
performance—are measured. The other main focus of this chapter is to present 
the empirical models employed to address the research questions.  
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Chapter VI empirically tests the hypotheses formulated in the current 
study. It proposes a more detailed presentation of the empirical specifications 
and then discusses the findings. The chapter is divided into three parts: the first 
part the proposition on whether under-performance is severe in SSA relative to 
SEA when institutional quality and abundance in natural resources are not 
accounted for; and whether this effect is reversed or sustained when the quality 
of institutions and abundance in natural resources are taken into consideration. 
The analysis here is based on a panel of forty-five SSA and nine SEA countries 
over the period from 1995 to 2015. The second part in turn tests the proposition 
on whether natural resources, institutions, and their interactions contribute to 
better socioeconomic performance in SSA. The analysis here focuses on the 
SSA sample comprising forty-five SSA countries.  
Finally, chapter VII concludes the study by discussing the findings and 
their implications for public policy and research. In terms of the implications 
for research in particular, the chapter emphasizes the importance of 












2. Review of Related Literature  
 
2.1. Description 
As noted in the introductory chapter, studies that compare economic 
and social indicators between the two regions are too scarce. The existing few 
ones are generally based on case studies. This study contributes by looking at 
the impact of two variables, namely natural resources and institutional quality 
on economic and social outcomes in the two regions. The analysis is based upon 
panel data.   
The aim in this chapter is to review the existing studies comparing 
socioeconomic performance between SSA and SEA. Such discussion is 
essential in order to understand the extent to which the current study differs 
from the existing ones. The other focus of this chapter is to elaborate how 
institutional quality and natural resources may influence socioeconomic 
performance in the two regions.  
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.2 
discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of institutions 
on socioeconomic performance. Section 2.3 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the resource curse and on the interactions between 
natural resources and institutions. Section 2.4 then reviews the existing 
literature comparing socioeconomic performance between SSA and SEA, and 
also highlights some key studies comparing SSA with other developing regions. 
Section 2.5 sums up the key implications from the literature review.  
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2.2. Institutions and socioeconomic performance 
 
 As complete time series of institutional indicators have become 
available for many countries, the debate over the relationship between 
institutional quality and economic performance has spurred much research. A 
complete review of such research lies outside the scope of the current study. 
This subsection instead discusses some of the major issues in the empirical 
literature establishing a link between institutions and economic performance, 
including endogeneity, conceptualization, measurement, and sampling 
problems. 
 To begin with, it has been argued that institutional variables are 
generally endogenous (Aron 2000). For instance, causality can run from 
improved institutions to growth and from good economic growth to institutional 
enhancement. This is well illustrated by Kurtz and Schrank (2007), who 
estimate various cross-section regressions for all countries for which data on 
the World Bank’s governance effectiveness is available from 1996 to 2006 and 
present some important findings: ex ante measure of governance shows little 
capacity to predict subsequent patterns of economic performance, but 
antecedent economic conditions strongly predict perceptions of the quality of 
public institutions. They explain these patterns by the fact that perceptions of 
immediate economic conditions affect perceptions of government effectiveness, 
which in turn biases performance in the governance effectiveness index. With 
these findings, Kurtz and Schrank (2007) question the assumption that 
improvements in the institutional quality will drive broader socioeconomic 
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development. Further, they advocate for more caution about how good 
governance, and more generally, good institutions are defined and 
conceptualized. 
 With respect to issues relating to the conceptualization of good 
institutions, Rothstein and Teorell (2009) argue that it is impossible at the 
conceptual level to generalize what good institutions are without considering 
differences in the type of institutional arrangements across countries. 
Specifically, if one considers that good institutions significantly address 
economic and social problems, then one should also note that institutional 
arrangements that cause growth and development in one country may be very 
different from that of other counties. As Eicher and Leukert (2009: 197) put it, 
“it is unclear whether the identified institutions matter to the same degree across 
all countries, or whether perhaps an altogether different set of institutions 
matters in advanced countries”.  
 Sampling has been argued as another major problem with empirical 
studies showing positive effects of institutions on economic performance 
(Chang 2011a). As previously noted, findings based on heterogeneous samples 
are likely to be misleading. As Chang (2011a: 481) puts it, “Even the same 
institutions in the same dose may be good for one country but bad for another”. 
For instance, a level of protection of property rights that may bring net benefit 
to a rich country may be harmful for a developing country. The issue of 
differential effects of institutions on economic performance in different 
countries was discussed by Andrews (2010), arguing that ‘good government 
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means different things in different countries’. Andrews (2010) analyzes public 
financial management practices—budget practices—across 38 OECD and non-
OECD countries over the period from 1990 to 2006. He finds that even 
countries labeled as reflecting ‘good governance’ according to prominent good 
governance indicators such as the World Bank’s Governance Indicators have 
varying characteristics which are not captured by these indicators. These 
include for instance (1) policy choices, (2) outcomes, and (3) institutional 
characteristics. 
 These differentiations may in turn explain why countries with the 
same measured levels of institutional quality may experience diverging 
economic performance (Khan 2010). Figure 2.1, borrowed from Khan (2010: 
5), shows the relationship between good governance and growth rates between 
three groups of countries: (1) diverging countries (lower growth rates); (2) 
converging countries (higher growth rates); and (3) advanced countries. The 
figure reveals that advanced countries have better good governance scores than 
both the diverging and converging countries. Also, and more interestingly, the 
figure shows no significant difference in good governance scores between the 









Figure 2.1: Mushtaq Khan’s comparison of governance and economic growth 
between three groups of countries 
 
Source: Khan (2010: 5), Figure 4. 
 
2.3. Natural resources and socioeconomic performance 
 
 
2.3.1. The resource curse thesis 
 
The resource curse thesis posits that natural resource endowments, in 
particular fuels and minerals, might be harmful for economic development 
(Auty 1993; Sachs and Warner 1995). The basic claim is that natural resources 
produce windfall gains for resource-owning states; yet these gains fail to be 
turned into long-term and growth generating investments. Instead, states suffer 
from various unwanted negative results of their resource windfalls and 
experience in the long run lower rates of growth, higher income inequality, or 
poverty, in comparison with countries with no or little resource endowments.  
Four major channels can potentially explain the negative impact of 
natural endowments on economic performance: first, countries with abundant 
 
 １４ 
natural endowments are likely to display cronyism, corruption, or less 
accountability, which in turn lead to poor economic performance. It has been 
suggested that ‘natural resources foster rent seeking behavior of all sorts, so 
there is no effective government will to use resources to improve economic 
performance or to benefit the citizenry at large’ (Venables 2010: 341). In effect, 
‘rents entice government officials to engage in politically rational but 
economically inefficient decision-making’ (Stevens and Dietsche 2008: 59).  
Second, natural resource endowments might also serve as an instigator 
for armed conflict. This is particularly pronounced in societies that suffer from 
ethnic, religious or other politically relevant divisions, which might become 
entrenched due to the ability of state actors and insurgents to sustain conflicts 
based on the extraction of revenue from natural resources (Collier et al. 2009). 
In particular, resources which are more ‘appropriable’, that is resources which 
are ‘very valuable, which are easy to transport, and which are easily sold—i.e. 
gold or alluvial diamonds —are more attractive for anyone interested in short-
term illegitimate gains and are, therefore, potentially more problematic than 
agricultural products’ (Boschini et al. 2007: 595). Hence, a greater availability 
of resource rents from such resources increases the vulnerability of the state to 
organized predators—i.e. guerrillas and armed groups—in particular as a result 
of a weakened bureaucratic capacity (Costello, 2016). Similarly, Collier and 
Venables (2010) points out that resource abundance increases the risk of state 
fragility, which in turn hinders opportunities for economic progress.  
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Third, it has been established that countries with abundant natural 
resources and whose exports are largely based on natural resources, suffer from 
boom-bust cycles resulting from rapid changes in commodity prices. Boom-
bust cycles affect the exchange rate and inflation, the price of non-traded goods 
(real estate, services, non-traded agricultural and manufacturing goods), and 
patterns of government spending (Frankel 2010: 19). Large cutbacks in the 
level of government spending resulting from changes in commodity prices in 
turn explain the negative impact on economic performance (Gelb and Grassman 
2009). In addition, volatility can induce ‘shortsighted planning policies that can 
result in debt over-hang as revenues fail to recover’ (Manzano and Rigobon, 
2013: 44). Specifically, Manzano and Rigobon argue that in the 1970s 
commodity prices were high, which led developing countries to use them as 
collateral for debt. However, the fall in those prices in the 1980s left developing 
countries with a considerable amount of debt and a low flow of foreign 
resources to pay them. 
Finally, countries with abundant natural resources and whose exports 
are largely based on natural resources suffer from the Dutch disease—adverse 
effects on non-mineral sectors resulting from a boom in minerals exports. 
Specifically, a sharp rise in minerals exports causes a currency appreciation, 
which in turn increases domestic prices—making exports more expensive 
relative to world market prices, and resulting in the crowding out of investment 
in the agricultural and manufacturing activity (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). 
Hence, a lack of economic diversification can contribute to declining growth 
rates over time, in particular because sectors that are crowded out are associated 
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with more positive spillovers—economies of scale and learning by doing—on 
the rest of the economy (Krugman 1987). 
Based on cross-sectional or panel data analysis, numerous studies have 
established evidence of the resource curse (for a review of this literature, see, 
Gamu et al. 2015).  Sachs and Warner (1995) are the first to show empirical 
evidence of a resource curse. They base their analysis on a cross-sectional 
growth regression on the period 1970-1989 to examine the impact of natural 
resources (measured in terms of the share of primary product exports to GNP) 
on per capita GDP growth. They find that natural resources impede long-term 
growth rate for a country. Furthermore, they include some institutional 
measures in their specifications in an attempt to find whether institutional 
quality plays a role in explaining the link between resource abundance and 
growth. They, however, conclude that institutional quality does not explain the 
resource curse. 
2.3.2. Institutional quality and the resource curse 
 
The idea that good institutions may turn the resource curse into a 
blessing can be attributed to (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006a), who argued 
that countries with abundant natural resources can turn the curse into a blessing 
if they have strong institutions. Their empirical analysis is based on the data set 
used by Sachs and Warner (1995), and they include an independent variable 
capturing the interaction between natural resources and institutional quality. 
They find that resource-abundant economies with ‘producer-friendly’ 
institutions—measured as an unweighted average of five indexes including rule 
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of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption in government, risk of appropriation, 
and government repudiate of contracts—experience greater economic growth 
than both resource-scarce economies and resource-abundant economies with 
bad institutions. In a similar vein, Robinson et al. (2006) develop a model 
suggesting that countries with institutions that promote accountability and state 
competence—good political institutions—experience better economic 
performance.  
The view that the quality of institutions determines the impact of 
natural resources on economic performance is not corroborated by Arezki and 
van der Ploeg (2007). They estimate various OLS regressions for 96 countries 
over the period from 1965 to 1990 to examine the impact of institutions versus 
openness on economic growth. They include two types of interaction terms: 
between natural resources and institutions; and between natural resources and 
trade openness. They find that the interaction term between natural resources 
and institutions is not robust to changes in econometric specification, whereas 
the coefficient for the interaction term between natural resources and trade 
openness remains significant and positive. They therefore conclude that the 
presence of less restrictive trade policies have primacy over the quality of 
institutions in explaining differential economic performance across resource-
abundant countries.  
Nevertheless, it has now become well established that institutions do 
contribute to better economic performance as shown in various other studies. 
Kolstad (2009) tests the impact of the ‘private sector institutions’ (measured by 
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a rule of law index) versus ‘public sector institutions’ (measured by a 
democracy index) on economic performance (measured as the average GDP 
growth in the period 1970 and 1990). He uses the Sachs and Warner (1997) 
data set, and controls for variables such as initial income level of countries, 
openness to trade, and the investment rate. He also includes two interaction 
terms (between natural resources and, respectively, rule of law and democracy). 
He concludes that countries with better private sector institutions have better 
economic performance. Appendix 2.1 briefly presents findings from Sachs and 
Warner (1995) in comparison with revised cross-country regressions by 
Mehlum et al. (2006) and Kolstad (2009). In Sachs and Warner (second column) 
institutions are neutral. They do not reverse the negative impact of natural 
resources. In Mehlum et al. (third column), institutions play a significant role 
in reversing the negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. In 
Kolstad (fourth column), only economic institutions—rule of law—can reverse 
the negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. Moreover, it is 
worth noting that the natural resource variable has negative and significant 
coefficients in all three specifications in Appendix 2.1.  
In line with Kolstad (2009), the literature has increasingly 
differentiated between two types of institutions, namely the economic or private 
sector institutions (for example, protection of property rights disputes 
resolution, among others), and the political or public sector institutions (for 
example, accountability, transparency, political regime, and the like) (Keenan 
2014).   
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For instance, Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) focus on the impact of 
political institutions, arguing that differences in economic performance across 
countries is determined by the constitutional arrangements. They estimate a 
cross-sectional model of 90 countries including democracies as well as 
nondemocratic regimes. They find that parliamentary regimes experience a 
better economic performance than do presidential regimes. Furthermore, they 
find that the negative impact of resource abundance on economic growth is 
larger in countries with proportional electoral systems than in countries 
majoritarian systems.  
In turn, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) have argued that the type of 
political regime does not affect economic performance in resource-abundant 
countries. They estimate a panel of resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
developing countries for the period from 1970 to 2001. Their results suggest 
some interesting patterns. First, in developing countries the combination of 
resource abundance and democracy—understood in terms of competitive 
elections or how a government acquires power—has been significantly growth-
reducing. Specifically, resource-scarce countries that are democracies 
outperform their autocratic counterparts, whereas resource-abundant countries 
that are autocracies perform better than resource-abundant countries that are 
democracies. Second, the negative impact of natural resource on economic 
performance is reversed in countries where there is strong system of checks and 
balances—understood in terms of constraint on how a government can use 
power. Brückner (2010) also suggests that ‘constraints on politicians through 
strong checks and balances on political decision-making are the key to whether 
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countries suffer from a resource curse or not’ (p. 462). Specifically, he finds 
that the negative impact of resource abundance on income growth is more 
pronounced in countries with high levels of corruption. These findings provide 
empirical evidence to the model developed by Robinson et al. (2006) and 
mentioned earlier. Robinson and his colleagues have argued that national 
income is higher in resource-abundant countries where institutions limit the 
possibility of politicians to clientelism purposes and to corrupt elections.  
Other studies have focused on economic and political institutions. For 
instance, Béland and Tiagi (2009) use the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom 
Index as a measure for institutional quality. They estimate various models 
including ordinary least squares (OLS), two stage least squares (2SLS) for a 
sample of 76 countries over the period from 1970 to 2006 to examine the impact 
of natural resources and institutions on economic growth. They include an 
independent variable capturing interactions between natural resources and 
institutional quality. They find a positive and significant association between 
their interaction term and economic growth, and conclude that strong economic 
freedom is crucial for economic growth in resource-abundant countries. 
Similarly, in an effort to explain how Botswana has succeeded in escaping from 
the resource curse, Iimi (2006) estimates a cross-sectional model for a sample 
of 89 countries to examine the relationship between natural resources, 
governance, and economic growth. He includes a set of interaction terms 
capturing the relation between resource abundance and each of the six WGI 
governance indicators—voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
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corruption—in six different specifications. His results show negative 
correlation between natural resources and growth in all the six specifications. 
On the other hand, he finds no significant association between all the six 
governance indicators and growth, but finds that three interaction terms 
between natural resources and voice and accountability, governance 
effectiveness, and regulatory quality, respectively, are positively and 
significantly associated with growth. He therefore attributes the poor economic 
performance in resource-abundant countries to a lack of good business 
regulations, accountability, and poor quality of the public sector. Similarly, 
Boschini et al.(2013) include two types of institutions in their estimating 
specifications—rule-based (democracy) and contracting (index of formality in 
legal procedures and index of procedural complexity). In various specifications 
(different time spans and different econometrics techniques), they include 
independent variables capturing interactions between natural resources and 
these institutions measures. They also find positive and significant coefficients 
for interaction variables, although not robust across specifications.    
Finally, other studies have attempted to switch the focus from 
economic (GDP) growth to other economic performance indicators. For 
instance, Farhadi et al. (2015) use five components of the Fraser Institute’s 
economic freedom index—government size, property rights, access to sound 
money, freedom to trade, and setting proper regulations. They estimate a panel 
of 99 countries over the period from 1970 to 2010 to examine whether free 
market institutions can reverse the adverse effect of natural resources on 
economic performance—measured in terms total factor productivity. They also 
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find that economic freedom can harness the contribution of natural resources to 
economic success. Similarly, El Anshasy and Katsaiti (2013) look at the impact 
of natural resources and institutions—corruption, good governance, democracy, 
transparency in budgetary institutions—on fiscal performance. They estimate a 
yearly panel data of 79 resource-abundance and resource-scarce countries for 
the period from 1984 to 2008, and find a positive association between these 
institutional measures and fiscal performance. They therefore conclude through 
that good institutions, better fiscal performance, can help resource-abundance 
achieve economic success. Botlhole et al. (2012) look at the domestic resource 
mobilization performance of SSA countries. They estimate a panel model of 46 
SSA countries over the period from 1990 to 2007 and show that in the absence 
of good institutions—instrumented by European settler mortality rate as in 
Acemoglu et al. (2001)—natural resources are detrimental to tax revenue 
mobilization in SSA. 
2.4. Existing comparative studies on SSA and SEA (and 
other regions) 
 As noted earlier, studies that compare economic and social outcomes 
in SSA and SEA are too scarce. The existing few ones are generally narrative 
or based on comparative case studies. For instance, Henley (2015) compares 
two countries in SEA (Indonesia and Malaysia) with four in SSA (Kenya and 
Nigeria) to explain the diverging development path between SEA and SSA. He 
argues that the differential economic performance between the two regions lie 
in pro-poor agricultural and rural development (i.e., substantial public 
investment in rural infrastructure and smallholder agriculture), while also 
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ensuring macroeconomic stability and economic freedom. He argues that SSA 
is poor relative to SEA because it failed to implement such policies. Similarly, 
a pairwise comparative study of Indonesia and Nigeria and Malaysia and Kenya 
supports the idea of rural development as a key factor explaining divergent 
development trajectories between SSA and SEA (van Donge et al 2012). Further, 
the study emphasizes the importance of macroeconomic stabilization and 
economic freedom for small entrepreneurs and peasant farmers in SEA.  
 One major study that explicitly focuses on an analysis of economic 
performance in the two regions is based on a series of comparative case studies 
of four SEA countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam) and four 
SSA countries (Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) (Berendsen et al 2013). 
The study’s main finding is that governance matter less than the content of 
policy in explaining the differential performance between the two regions. It 
thus concludes that “SSA does not need good governance before, and as a 
precondition for, development success” (p.500).  
 Similarly, Booth (2012) concludes that good governance, as advocated 
by western donors, should not be regarded as a prerequisite to economic 
development. His analysis is based on a series of case studies including 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, with 
certain reference to SEA’s experience. He argues that “in SSA, the most 
relevant dimension of variation among regimes is between more and less 
developmental forms of neopatrimonialism” (p. 25). Specifically, the most 
successful countries in SSA tend to have a combination of the following factors: 
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(1) a strong and visionary leader, with centralized management of the main 
economic rents in support of a long-term vision; (2) a single or dominant party 
system; (3) a competent and confident economic technocracy; (4) consensual 
decision-making; and (5) a sound policy framework. In some of the successful 
countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, central leaderships have been able to 
pursue a national development vision and steer rent creation into areas with 
high economic potential. He further argues that neopatrimonial regimes have 
contributed to economic transformation in SEA countries such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam.  
 Another major study examines variables that influence economic 
performance in ten high-growth performers in SSA (Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Kenya, Malawi, and Mozambique) and SEA (Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam). The study concludes that inclusive institutions such as 
the rule of law, the absence of corruption, and property rights do not explain 
performance in the two regions (Kelsall 2013). Instead, the study found a 
combination of three factors to be the main determinants of good performance 
in SSA and SEA: (1) regulations that promote the private sector development, 
in particular foreign direct investment and industrial development; (2) 
resilience to external shocks; and (3) sound policy-making either through an 
effective bureaucracy insulated from political pressure or through a tradition of 
consensual decision-making and leadership succession.   
 As can be observed, all of the existing studies on development 
processes and outcomes in SSA and SEA countries tend to strongly support the 
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idea that differences in the policies pursued explain the differential performance 
between the two regions. The current paper indirectly corroborates these views 
by arguing that one needs good policies to make institutions right. What 
constitute good institutions or government is actually a mixture of policy 
choices that may not be identical in different environment (Andrews 2010). 
Economic and social outcomes are in turn influenced by such policy choices, 
not by measured levels of institutional quality per se. It is thus possible that the 
effects on performance of institutions are different for SSA and SEA. 
 On the other hand, abundant natural resources might offer greater 
development potential to SSA compared with SEA (Smith 2012). Unfortunately, 
evidence suggests that abundance in natural resources actually explains SSA’s 
underperformance. For instance, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013) take 
the case of Nigeria as an illustration of how natural resources, through 
corruption and institutional weakness, lower economic growth in the SSA 
region. Similarly, Lee and Gueye (2015) examine whether resource windfall 
deteriorates the standard of living—income (GDP) and inequality (Gini 
coefficient) of Sub-Saharan African countries. They use a sample of 130 
countries which they divide into three different groups: 130 developed and 
developing countries, 28 SSA countries, and nine fragile SSA countries. They 
estimate a panel data for the period from 1963 to 2007 and find a positive and 
significant association between resource windfall and welfare in the whole 
sample, but an insignificant or even negative correlation when the sample is 
restricted to countries.  
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 Studies that focus on the post-1990 period show SSA has been 
experiencing recovery. For instance, Young (2012) shows how SSA’s living 
standards, in terms of the quality of housing, the health and mortality of children, 
the education of youths, the allocation of female time in the household, or the 
ownership of durable goods, has improved since the early 1990. In a similar 
vein, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2014) show that during the same period 
poverty fell SSA countries, regardless of differences in institutional quality or 
abundance in natural resources. Another study by the United Nations University 
World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) reveals 
that since about 1995 SSA experienced recovery and acceleration of economic 
growth (Arndt et al. 2016). Among the five factors identified as the main 
determinants of SSA’s growth recovery, the study points out the institutional 
improvements (more democratic and accountable governments). Conversely, 
Fosu (2015) conclude that improvements in institutions or governance, in 
particular business regulations for private sector development, have contributed 
to economic recovery in the post-1990 period in SSA. Yet another study reports 
that since SSA countries richly endowed with natural resources have 
experienced better economic and social outcomes compared with their 
resource-scarce counterparts (Lundgren et al 2013). These findings suggest that 
it is not whether recent economic performance in SSA can be explained by 







 Overall, seven implications can be drawn from the preceding 
discussion: first, institutional quality matters for economic performance but 
caution is needed as to how institutional quality is conceptualized; second, 
countries with similar measured levels of institutional quality can experience 
diverging economic and social outcomes (see Figure 2.1); third, abundance in 
natural resources can impede economic performance: developing countries 
richly endowed with natural resources tend to experience lower economic and 
social outcomes; fourth, institutional quality can reverse the negative effects of 
natural resources on economic performance: resource-abundant countries with 
good institutions tend to have better economic performance then countries with 
poor institutions; fifth, there is no agreement as to which factors explained 
economic performance in SSA since the early 1990s—natural resources, 
institutions, or policies?; sixth, studies that examine development processes and 
outcomes in SSA and SEA countries are scarce, and nearly all of these studies 
are narrative or based on comparative case studies: no work has been done using 
cross-national or panel data regressions; Finally, on the differential economic 
performance between SSA and SEA, existing studies emphasize the role of 
policy differences.  
With these implications in mind, the current study contributes to the 
literature in three respects: first, it contributes to understanding how regions 
that somewhat have similar measured levels of institutional quality have 
different economic and social outcomes. As previously noted, a number of 
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studies have established that policy differences in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilization, rural development, regulations for small business, among others, 
explain the differential performance between SSA and SEA. The current study 
indirectly corroborates these views by arguing that one needs good policies to 
make institutions right. As pointed out earlier, institutional quality actually 
embeds a mixture of policy choices that may differ from one environment to 
another (Andrews 2010). Economic and social outcomes are in turn influenced 
by such policy choices, not by measured levels of institutional quality per se. It 
is thus possible that the effects on performance of institutions are different for 
SSA and SEA. In consequence, this study argues that institutions are likely to 
have more appreciable effects on performance for SEA than for SSA. This is 
because SEA countries are claimed as having good policies compared with their 
SSA counterparts.  
Second, it adds to the debate on the factors explaining economic 
performance in SSA in the post-1990 period. Aside from institutions, SSA’s 
abundant natural resources can potentially contribute to ameliorate the region’s 
performance in comparison with SEA. Further, good institutions can harness 
the contribution of natural resources for economic performance.  
 Finally, the study proposes the first panel data analysis to examine the 
extent to which natural resources and institutions explain the differential 
socioeconomic performance between SSA and SEA. It makes the following 
propositions: (1) natural resources and institutional quality promote or hinder 
 
 ２９ 
good socioeconomic performance in SSA relative to SEA; (2) institutional 



























3. Natural Resources, Institutions, and 






Between 1990 and 2015, and particularly since 1995, SSA 
experienced remarkable improvements in economic and social indicators. 
Growth rates were high, child mortality fell, and there has been a surge in the 
flow of FDI into the region. During the same period, natural resources 
considerably contributed to increases in government revenues in many 
countries of the region (Lundgren et al 2013). At the same time, efforts toward 
more democracy, more accountability, less corruption, and better business 
regulations have been achieved by many countries in the region (Fosu 2015). 
Since revenues from natural resources can offer a significant pool of finance 
for governments to invest in development and poverty reduction (World Bank 
2015), it is fair to ask if countries with abundant natural resources have 
benefited more from the recent economic and social improvements. Similarly, 
because institutions are ‘the underlying determinant of the long-run economic 
performance’ (North 1990: 107), it is enlightening to investigate whether 
countries that have improved their institutional quality have performed better 
comparing with countries that have not improved their institutions.  
To address the first question, this chapter compares socioeconomic 
performance across two groups of countries: (1) resource-abundant and (2) 
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resource-scarce. It applies the three performance measures considered in the 
current study, namely GDP per capita growth, FDI inflows, and infant mortality. 
With regard to the second question, the chapter explores socioeconomic 
performance across individual countries. Specifically, it investigates whether 
countries that have improved their institutions in the period between 1990 and 
2015 have also experienced superior performance compared to countries that 
have not improved their institutional quality. The analysis covers the period 
from 1990 to 2015.  
Further, the classification into resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
is based upon a strategy that has been subsequently employed in the resource 
curse literature (see, e.g., Collier and Hoeffle, 2009: 298; Lee and Gueye, 
2015:11): resource-abundant countries are those whose average total natural 
resource rents for the period 1990-2015 exceeds 10 percent of GDP; and 
resource-poor countries are those whose average total natural resource rents is 
less than 10 percent of GDP.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 
briefly explores the aggregate performance in GDP, FDI, infant mortality, and 
institutional indicators in SSA. Section 3.3 explores the differences in 
socioeconomic performance between resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
countries in SSA. Section 3.4 compares socioeconomic performance across 




3.2. Economic growth, FDI, and infant mortality in SSA 
 To put things in perspective, this section provides an overall picture of 
economic growth, FDI inflows, infant mortality, and institutional improvement 
in SSA in the period from 1990 to 2015.  
3.2.1. Growth performance, 1990-2015 
 
 Figure 3.1 shows economic growth in SSA in the period from 1990 to 
2015. It can be observed that since the mid-1990s, the region as a whole has 
experienced a per capita GDP growth of above 3 percent, with only a drop to 
below 3 percent in the period between 1998 and 1999—perhaps corresponding 
to the financial crisis in Asia.  
 There is a debate on whether the growth performance since about 1995 
has delivered development in the region. Some studies provide a more 
pessimistic answer, arguing that the 1995-2015 growth performance has not 
contributed to creating sustainable jobs, or reducing inequality (Obeng-Odoom 
2015), and ‘can never deliver development (Pillay 2015). A recent collection of 
16 country case studies on the growth experience in SSA since 1995, shows that 
some countries have experienced a rapid economic growth and substantial 
improvement in welfare and living conditions (e.g., Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, 
Rwanda, and Uganda); others have not been able to channel the benefits of 
economic growth into social welfare (e.g., Burkina Faso, DR Congo, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, or Zambia); and finally, others have 
experienced little (or no) economic growth or social development (e.g., 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, or South Africa).  
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The following section explores whether the growth performance has 
been better for resource-abundant countries or for countries that have been able 
to ameliorate their institutions.  




3.2.2. Foreign direct investment 
 As already mentioned, FDI is recognized as a powerful driver of 
development as it can create and maintain productive growth, bring together 
know-how and technology diffusion, employment generation, and expansion of 
access to infrastructure and social services in host economies (Borensztein et 
al, 1998; Lim, 2001). As shown in Table 3.1, FDI is the largest source of 
international capital flow in SSA. For instance, in 2013, FDI as a share of total 
international capital flows amounted to 65 percent; much larger comparing with 































Table 3.1: International Capital Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa in  
2013 (as % of total flows) 
 Resource type Share in % 
Short-term debt flows 1 
Banks 3 
Bonds 8 
Portfolio equity inflows 16 
ODA & OOF 6 
FDI Inflows 65 
Other Private flows 1 
Source: World Bank 
  
 Figure 3.2 shows that there has been a surge in FDI inflows into SSA, 
from less than US$ 2 billion in 1990 to over US$ 40 billion in 2015. There is 
no agreement as to which factors explain such an increase in the flow of inward 
FDI. A number of studies emphasize the role of institutional improvements (i.e., 
Asiedu 2013), while others focus on natural resources. Again, the next section 
explores the extent to which FDI inflows are distributed across resource-
abundant and resource-poor, and across countries with good and poor 
institutions.  









































3.2.3. Infant mortality 
 Although still lagging behind other developing regions, SSA 
experienced noticeable improvements in social indicators. As shown in Figure 
3.3, infant mortality dramatically decreased from nearly 200 under-five deaths 
per 1000 live deaths in 1990 to around 80 deaths in 2015. Again, the next 
section compares performance in this indicator between resource-abundant and 
resource-scarce countries. It also explores performance among countries with 
good institutions compared with countries with poor institutions.   
Figure 3.3: Infant mortality rate in SSA (1990-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank, WDI 
  
 Overall, this section has shown that SSA experienced good 
performance in economic and social indicators, especially since 1995. The 
region on average had a higher economic growth, attracted larger FDI, and 
registered a drop in the infant mortality rate (number of under-five deaths per 




















































 The next task is to investigate whether and how performance in 
socioeconomic indicators differs across countries, based on the level of 
intensity in natural resources, on the one hand; and on the institutional quality, 
on the other. 
3.3. Resource-abundant versus resource-scarce 
countries 
 The disaggregation according to abundance in natural resources 
generates two groups: (1) resource-abundant and (2) resource-poor.  
 Table 3.2 reports this grouping, using average data for the 1990-2015 
period. Of the 46 SSA countries, 18 are classified as resource-abundant and 28 
are resource-scarce. Further, nine of the resource-abundant countries are oil 
producers (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan), and nine others are minerals producers (Botswana, 
DR Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
and Zambia).  
 To allow for a better comparability between the two groups, countries 
for which consistent data on socio-economic indicators are not available are 























































Source: World Bank: WDI; Author’s calculation 





3.3.1. Per capita GDP growth 
 Table 3.3 provides means of per capita GDP growth in five different 
periods extending from 1990 to 2015 for the two groups. It can be observed that 
resource-abundant countries as a whole have experienced a better growth 
performance in each period since 1995, which also corresponds to the upward 
trajectory to above 3 percent illustrated in Figure 3.1. Put simply, growth 
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performance is better for resource-abundant countries compared with their 
resource-scarce counterparts.  
Table 3.3: Mean of GDP per capita growth for SSA resource-abundant and 
resource-scarce countries in 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 
and 2010-2015 
Period Resource-abundant Resource-scarce 
1990-1994 -1.74 0.02 
1995-1999 4.33 2.43 
2000-2004 3.76 1.37 
2005-2009 3.44 2.42 
2010-2015 2.58 2.38 
Source: World Bank: WDI; Author’s calculation 
Notes: Eritrea and Sao Tome and Principe are excluded from the sample due to 
insufficient data 
 
As noted earlier, however, there are several limits to GDP as an 
indicator of economic performance (Stigitz et al 2009). For instance, GDP 
growth may not capture some phenomena which have an impact on the quality 
of life, including for example, the distribution of income, health, employment, 
access to clean water, nutrition, education, and so forth. A country may 
experience high growth rates without registering progress on social indicators.  
3.3.2. Infant mortality 
Table 3.4 shows that infant mortality fell nearly by half between 1990 
and 2015 in both groups. The table also shows that in spite of such improvement, 
resource-abundant countries perform relatively poorly in terms of infant 





Table 3.4: Infant mortality per 1,000 live births in resource-abundant and 
resource-scarce countries  
Year Resource-abundant Resource-scarce 
1990 102.46 89.78 
1995 98.49 86.14 
2000 91 78.20 
2005 78.35 66.06 
2010 66.15 54.55 
2015 56.68 46.65 
Source: World Bank: WDI 
 
 
3.3.3. Foreign direct investment 
FDI inflows are highly asymmetric across SSA resource-abundant and 
resource-scarce countries. Table 3.5 reports the mean distribution of FDI 
inflows between the two groups over five different periods starting from 1990. 
First, one can note the dramatic surge in the FDI inflows in SSA in particular 
since 2000. Second, resource-abundant countries have consistently attracted 
more FDI inflows than did their resource-scarce counterparts.  
Table 3.5: Mean of FDI inflows in million US$ for SSA resource-
abundant and resource-scarce countries in 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 
2005-2009, and 2010-2015  
Period Resource-abundant Resource-scarce 
1990-1994 391.09 110.36 
1995-1999 625.82 270.19 
2000-2004 563.57 267.71 
2005-2009 1803.23 555.27 
2010-2015 2983.15 976.76 
Source: UNCTAD: FDI statistics database 




Moreover, a look at the performance of the individual SSA countries 
suggests that between 2000 and 2015 much of the FDI inflows were directed to 
a handful of resource-abundant countries. As Table 3.6 illustrates, Nigeria and 
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South Africa alone, received on average approximately 39 percent of the total 
share of FDI inflows in SSA over the period 2005-2014. Other major FDI 
recipients, with the exception of Tanzania, are all resource-abundant 
(Mozambique, Ghana, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, and 
Zambia). Based on the ten-year average, these ten countries shared 
approximately 75 percent of the total FDI inflows in SSA.  
 
Table 3.6: Top 10 FDI recipients (average 2005-2014) and Share of China’s 
FDI (percent of regional total) 
Country Average FDI in million 
US$: 2005-2014 
Share of FDI inflows 
(average 2005-2014) 
1. Nigeria 6530.445 19.37% 







5. Congo  1958.846 5.58% 
6. DR Congo 1702.134 5.04% 
7. Eq. Guinea 1389.473 4.12% 







Region’s average 674.175 - 
Source: calculations based on data from UNCTAD, http://unctadstat.unctad.org 
 
It is also worth noting that resource-abundant countries are among the 
largest recipients of China’s FDI in SSA. This is particularly instructive because 
China’s rapid demand for SSA’s natural resources has been argued to have 









Table 3.7: Top 10 Chinese FDI recipients in SSA (in millions, US 
dollars), 2005-2012  
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Nigeria 94 216 630 796 1,026 1,211 1,416 1,950 
Zambia 160 268 429 651 844 944 1,200 1,998 
DRC 25 38 104 134 397 631 709 970 
Angola 9 37 78 69 196 352 401 1,245 
Mauritius 27 51 116 230 243 283 606 701 
Tanzania 62 112 111 190 282 308 407 541 
Ethiopia 30 96 109 126 283 368 427 607 
Zimbabwe 42 46 59 60 100 135 576 875 
Kenya 58 46 55 78 120 222 309 403 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database 
 
 Overall, this section gives evidence that resource-abundant countries 
on average had higher GDP growth and received greater FDI inflows. However, 
performance in social progress, measured here in terms of infant mortality, is 
somewhat poorer compared with resource-poor countries.  
 Aggregate data, however, might mask a wide diversity in performance 
across countries within the two groups. For instance, in the resource-abundant 
group, one can differentiate between a well-performing Botswana and a lagging 
DR Congo. Similarly, in the resource-scarce group there is a considerable 
contrast between Mauritius and Burundi. Hence, the next section explores 
whether performance across individual countries is influenced by the level of 









3.4. Comparing performance across individual countries 
 To begin with, recall that the RQ indicator has scores ranging from -
2.5 (poor quality) to +2.5 (good quality). Hence, countries with scores closer to 
-2.5 are considered as having poor institutions.  
3.4.1. Per capita GDP growth 
 Figure 3.4 plots the log of per capita GDP against RQ scores for 2015. 
It can be observed that most of the countries with poor institutions are 
concentrated in the lower-left area of the figure. On the other hand, countries 
that score highest on RQ, including Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, 
and South Africa, locate themselves at the upper-right area of the figure. At the 
same time, resource-abundant countries (i.e., Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
Congo, and Gabon) with lower RQ scores also have higher per capita GDP. 
Figure 3.4 thus suggests that performance in per capita GDP in SSA is 









Figure 3.4: GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) and RQ score in SSA (2015) 
 
Source: World Bank, WDI; WGI 
 
3.4.2. Foreign direct investment 
 Figure 3.5 plots FDI inflows against the RQ score. It gives no 
indication that countries with higher RQ scores also attract larger FDI inflows. 
Instead, most of the largest FDI recipients in SSA are resource-abundant (i.e., 
Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Sudan). Interestingly, it shows also 
that resource-abundant countries such as the DRC and Equatorial Guinea are 
among the laggards in terms of attracting FDI in 2015. Note also that these 
countries score lowest on the RQ indicator. On the other hand, countries scoring 
highest on RQ such as Mauritius, Botswana, and Rwanda attracted as few FDI 
as countries scoring lowest such as the Zimbabwe, Guinea, or Chad. This is 
suggestive that institutional quality is not a strong determinant of FDI in SSA. 
For instance, it has been suggested that the share of outflows FDI from China 
into SSA is higher in the weak governance states (Chen, Dollar, and Tang 2015). 





































































openness to trade, government consumption expenditure, and remittances have 
been suggested as strong determinants of FDI inflows to SSA (Anyanwu 2011). 
 
Figure 3.5: FDI inflows in million US$ and Regulatory Quality score (2015) 
 
Source: World Bank, WDI; WGI 
 
3.4.3. Infant mortality  
 Finally, Figure 3.6 plots infant mortality against the RQ scores. The 
figure somewhat indicates that better institutional quality is associated with 
lower infant mortality. Specifically, there are less than 40 under-five deaths per 
1,000 live births in countries that score highest on the RQ indicator (i.e., 
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Mauritius, and Seychelles). By contrast, infant 
mortality is highest in countries that score lowest on the RQ indicator (i.e., 
Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, and Sierra Leone). Note also 
that most of the countries where infant mortality is above 60 deaths per 1,000 
live births are resource-abundant countries (i.e., Angola, Chad, DRC, 




































































abundance in natural resources does not contribute to social progress, in spite 
of improving economic indicators (i.e., GDP growth). In a country like 
Equatorial Guinea, for instance, it has been pointed out that the main indicators 
of human development such as child mortality, primary school enrolment, and 
fertility rates have not improved in spite of the sustained growth of per capita 
income over two decades (Daniele 2011: 566). 
 
Figure 3.6: Infant mortality rate versus Regulatory Quality score in 2015 
 
Source: World Bank, WDI; WGI 
 
3.5. Summary 
The descriptive analysis provided in this chapter focused on SSA in 
the period between 1990 and 2015. The aim was to compare aggregates of two 
groups, namely resource-abundant and resource-scarce countries. The analysis 
applied the three performance measures considered in the current study, namely 
per capita GDP, FDI inflows, and infant mortality. The second focus of this 






















































































across countries based on their level of institutional quality. 
Overall, the analysis has shown that in SSA abundance in natural 
resources is associated with higher per capita GDP growth and FDI inflows, but 
has no appreciable effect on infant mortality. In fact, most of the resource-
abundant countries in the region tend to have higher under-five mortality rates 
compared with resource-poor countries.  
On the other hand, comparing performance across countries on the 
basis of institutional quality reveals three noticeable points: first, higher 
institutional quality is not necessarily associated with higher per capita GDP; 
second, institutional quality does not determine FDI; and third, higher 
institutional quality is associated with lower infant mortality. This is suggestive 
that SSA countries need good institutions if they are to achieve social progress 
SSA.  
Finally, in spite of increasing per capita GDP and FDI, abundance in 
natural resources does not contribute to achieving social progress in SSA. 










4. Natural Resources, Institutional Quality, and 
Socioeconomic performance in Sub-Saharan 





 If SSA and SEA countries are compared on one basic variable—per 
capita GDP growth—one can find enormous variation across the two regions 
(Table 4.1). Between 1990 and 2015, most of the SEA countries experienced 
per capita GDP growth exceeding 3 percent per annum, while several countries 
in SSA (Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, DR 
Congo, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, and Zimbabwe) had negative growth rates 
or stagnated. This inter-regional contrast is similar in a wider range of other 
variables. For instance, by 2015, progress on the Millennium Development 
Goals was largely satisfactory in SEA, while none of these goals was achieved 
in SSA (United Nations Development Program 2015).  
 It has been argued that policy features, including macroeconomic 
stability, economic freedom (especially for small entrepreneurs and farmers), 
and rural sector development in SEA, and the lack thereof in SSA, explain the 
observed variations in economic and social outcomes across the two regions in 
recent decades (Berendsen et al 2013).  
 Along with these policy distinctions, there are other respects in which 
one could explain the heterogeneity across the two regions, in particular the 
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presence of good institutions and abundance in natural resources. These factors 
are essential as they can influence patterns of economic and social outcomes. 
Little, however, is known about the extent to which institutional quality and 
abundance in natural resources can help account for recent variations in 
economic performance across the two regions.  
Moreover, while from a simple cross-regional comparison one can 
derive useful general findings that can be applied across countries, one may 
also find it instructive to take into account intra-regional diversity. An 
interesting fact about SSA and SEA is that they do not differ substantially with 
respect to their institutional landscape. For instance, a comparison of 
performance in one widely used indicator of the extent of corruption—the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index—suggests that both 
SSA and SEA are home to some of the most corrupt governments in the world. 
Further, many countries in both regions are ruled by non-democratic regimes, 
and lack political freedom.  
In fact, SSA and SEA encompass countries that differ widely in terms 
of institutional development, natural endowments, and economic performance. 
For instance, although on average SEA outperforms SSA on economic 
performance, not all SSA countries perform badly. More interesting is that the 
better-performing-countries in both SEA and SSA tend to have good institutions 
and score higher in terms of institutional quality.  
 The central goal in this chapter is to put things in perspective, by 
exploring some of the major features of socioeconomic performance in SSA 
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and SEA, and describing the role of natural resource resources and institutional 
quality. It addresses three specific questions: (1) to what extent is 
socioeconomic performance better in SEA compared with SSA? (2) Are 
institutions more developed in SEA compared with SSA? (3) Can natural 
resources and institutional quality explain the observed variations in 
socioeconomic performance between the two regions? The analysis is based on 
the period from 1990 to 2015 for a set of forty-five SSA and nine SEA countries.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 
describes some general facts about differences in socioeconomic performance 
between the two regions. It compares aggregates of the two regions as well as 
the behavior of individual countries on an array of economic and social 
variables, including growth, inflation, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade 
diversification, and progress on the Millennium Development Goals. Section 
4.3 then focuses on the role of institutional quality in explaining patterns of 
socioeconomic performance across SSA and SEA countries. It starts by 
comparing the level of institutional development between SEA, SSA, and some 
advanced economies of Asia and other regions. It then looks at the association 
between performance in institutional indicators and other variables including 
growth, FDI, and a broad measure of development progress—infant mortality 
rates. Section 4.4 identifies differences in economic performance across 
resource-abundant and resource-scarce countries in the two regions. Section 4.5 
extends the discussion by looking at the combined impact of natural resources 
and institutions on measures of economic performance, including growth, 
income, FDI, and infant mortality. Section 4.6 draws some general conclusions 
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about the differential socioeconomic performance between SSA and SEA and 
the role of institutions and natural resources.  
Table 4.1: Growth, GDP per capita, and population in SSA and SEA 
Country Average annual 
growth in GDP per 
capita, 1990-2015 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constant 
2011 





Angola 1.71 6,958.25 25.02 
Benin 1.31 2,112.56 10.88 
Botswana(**) 2.57 16,415.20 2.26 
Brunei(**) -0.61 79,507.60 0.42 
Burkina Faso 2.37 1,727.49 18.11 
Burundi -1.54 831.085 11.18 
Cabo Verde(+) 5.23 6,502.47 0.52 
Cambodia(+) 5.53 3,498.26 15.58 
Cameroon -0.07 3,147.98 23.34 
Central Af. Republic -1.55 627.639 4.9 
Chad 2.39 2,639.63 14.04 
Comoros -0.39 1,521.76 0.79 
Congo, Dem. Rep.* -2.24 767.488 77.27 
Congo, Rep. 0.49 6,722.44 4.62 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.01 3,358.70 22.70 
Equatorial 
Guinea(**)(+) 
17.20 43,522.10 0.85 
Eritrea 1.51 1,299.88 n.a. 
Ethiopia*(+) 3.49 1,804.39 99.39 
Gabon(**) 0.03 18,676.90 1.73 
Gambia, The 0.17 1,649.79 1.99 
Ghana 2.86 4,291.06 27.41 
Guinea 0.03 1,238.34 12.61 
Guinea-Bissau 0.03 1,510.71 1.84 
Indonesia*(**)(+) 3.64 11,148.50 257.56 
Kenya 0.83 3,218.10 46.05 
Lao PDR(+) 4.86 5,351.47 6.80 
Lesotho 2.93 3,003.04 2.14 
Liberia -0.15 874.528 4.50 
Madagascar -0.62 1,466.23 24.24 
Malawi 1.75 1,126.45 17.22 
Malaysia(**)(+) 3.76 26,211.20 30.33 
Mali 1.47 2,190.57 17.59 
Mauritania 1.01 4,311.44 4.07 
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Mauritius(**)(+) 3.93 19,572.70 1.26 
Mozambique(+) 4.40 1,192.18 27.98 
Myanmar(+) 7.80 5,479.88 53.89 
Namibia(**) 2.05 11,224.40 2.46 
Niger -0.13 1,077.18 19.89 
Nigeria*(+) 2.95 6,120.83 182.20 
Philippines* 2.17 7,282.27 100.69 
Rwanda(+) 3.46 1,810.17 11.61 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
2.74 3,250.42 0.19 
Senegal 0.67 2,456.28 15.13 
Seychelles(**) 2.66 26,677.30 0.09 
Sierra Leone 0.76 1,592.96 6.45 
South Africa(**) 0.63 13,208.70 54.96 
Sudan(+) 3.07 4,393.57 40.23 
Swaziland 2.15 9,712.13 1.29 
Tanzania(+) 2.23 2,909.71 53.47 
Thailand*(**)(+) 3.71 16,130.10 67.96 
Togo 0.10 1,488.65 7.30 
Uganda(+) 3.25 2,002.43 39.03 
Vietnam*(+) 5.37 6,036.60 91.70 
Zambia 1.67 3,852.14 16.21 
Zimbabwe -1.12 1,983.68 15.60 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database 
Notes: (*) Population larger than 60 million; (**) per capita GDP (PPP) greater than 
10,000 US$; (+) Average per capita GDP growth greater than 3 percent between 1990 
and 2015.  
Data for Eritrea are based on averages for the period 1993-2015. 
 
 
4.2. Performance in some selected economic and social 
indicators 
 
As previously indicated, this section describes some of the major 
features of cross-region and cross-country economic and social data on SSA 
and SEA. Sub-section 4.2.1 explores the growth performance in the two regions, 
and makes some general observations on the role that other variables such as 
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inflation, population, and dependency ratio may exert. Sub-section 4.2.2 
describes general facts about differences between SSA and SEA in attracting 
FDI. It also looks at patterns of associations between FDI and trade 
diversification, and development of the manufacturing industry. Sub-section 
4.2.3 discusses progress on the Millennium Development Goals, and looks at 
differences on government expenditure across the two regions.  
 
4.2.1. Economic growth 
 
Between 1990 and 2015, there has been a great contrast in economic 
performance between SSA and SEA. Table 4.2 provides a brief comparison of 
selected economic indicators for the two regions. In terms of GDP growth, it 
shows that SEA consistently grew at an average of approximately 5.6 percent 
between 1990 and 2015. By contrast, SSA grew at an average of more than 3 
percent per annum between 1995 and 2010, before declining to below 3 percent 
between 2010 and 2015. In per capita terms, the contrast between the two 
regions is even bigger. The table provides a simple comparison of mean and 
median per capita GDP adjusted for PPP of the SEA countries compared with 
that of SSA countries. Medians are interest due to the skewed nature of the 
observations resulting from the inclusion of countries like Brunei, Equatorial 
Guinea, or Mauritius. Table 4.2 shows that in each period, income per capita in 
SSA has consistently remained about one-third that of SEA. 
Many factors can explain the poor per capita performance of SSA 
relative to SEA. First, it is widely recognized that higher inflation has 
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detrimental effects on long-term economic growth. It has been argued that 
inflation rates exceeding 17 percent have more distortional effects on economic 
performance in non-industrialized countries (Kremer et al 2013). One can thus 
suggest that higher inflation rates in SSA, in particular between 1990 (17.21 
percent), 1995 (more than 90 percent) and 2000 (more than 20 percent), have 
significantly contributed to the poor performance in the region. By contrast, 
SEA experienced relatively lower inflation rates, except the pick in the early 
1990s (22.36 percent). This also can be suggestive of the presence of better 
macroeconomic policies in SEA compared with SSA (van Donge et al. 2012).    
 Table 4.2: Selected economic indicators in SSA and SEA (all incomes) 
 Region 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Mean GDP 
per 




























SSA  17.21 92.14 25.70 7.66 5.84 4.95 




SSA 1.20 4.96 3.70 5.50 3.66 2.89 
SEA 5.44 7.27 6.73 6.87 6.83 5.14 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook; 
World Bank, WDIs  
  
Second, it is instructive to note that three of the largest countries in 
SSA by population size (the DR Congo, Nigeria, and Ethiopia) have grown 
relatively slowly compared to their SEA counterparts (Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam). Table 4.3 reports the average GDP per capita growth 
for the period from 1990 to 2015 of SSA and SEA countries with a population 
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size larger than 50 million. Aggregating growth rates of the most populous 
countries in each of the two regions, one can observe average growth rates of 
less than 2 percent and more than 3.5 percent in SSA and SEA, respectively. 
This corroborates Ndulu (2007), who attributes the larger divergence between 
SSA and other developing regions to the slow growth in the large countries in 
the region in contrast with the relatively rapid growth of very populous 
countries such as Indonesia and India in Asia.  
 
Table 4.3: Real GDP per capita growth in most populous countries 
(population above 60 million) 
Group Country GDP per capita 
growth (annual %), 
average 1990-2015 
Sub-Saharan Africa DR Congo -2.23 
Ethiopia 3.64 
Nigeria 2.95 




Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook; Author’s calculations 
 
Furthermore, the growth literature suggests that higher population 
growth may have adverse effect on real incomes per capita through several 
channels, and in particular the dependency ratio. It has been suggested that 
higher population growth is associated with increased dependency ratio (ratio 
of dependents to working-age population), which in turn reduces the 
productive capacity per worker (Bloom et al. 1998). In the context of SSA and 
SEA, data suggests that dependency ratio is higher in the former. To further 
illustrate this, Figure 4.1 plots the average ratio of dependents to working-age 
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population against the average GDP per capita growth for SSA and SEA 
countries. It shows that most of the SSA countries tend to have higher 
dependency (more than 80 percent) compared with SEA countries (less than 
80 percent). In addition, lower dependency ratio is associated with average per 
capita GDP growth exceeding 3 percent per annum in most of the SEA 
countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam), while the 
higher dependency ratio is associated with lower GDP per capita growth in 
most of the SSA countries.   
Figure 4.1: Scatter plot dependency ratio vs. GDP per capita growth, in SSA 
and SEA (1990-2015) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators; Author’s calculations 
  
 As previously mentioned, higher dependency ratio tends to impede 
SSA’s ability to achieve improvement in income per capita. This can be further 
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the 55 SSA and SEA countries considered in this study has grown in 2015 
relative to the 1990 level. Performance in per capita GDP for each country is 
computed as the share of per capita GDP in 2015 in percentage of that in 1990. 
Figure 4.2 thus plots the performance in per capita GDP against the average 
growth rate for the period 1990-2015. It can be observed that over the period 
from 1990 to 2015 seven of the nine SEA countries (Cambodia, Lao, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) grew at more than 5 percent per 
annum and improved substantially their income level in 2015 relative to 1990. 
In addition, improvement in income level in several SEA countries can be 
explained by the shared growth, which according to Lewis (2013: 54), 
‘increased employment and improved livelihoods across many sectors, notably 
the rural majority’.  
By contrast, most of the SSA countries with growth rates of above 3 
percent per year performed badly in terms of improving their income level 
relative to their 1990 position. One can thus conclude that SSA has stagnated 
in spite of higher growth rates registered in the period 1990-2015. Higher 
growth rates in SSA have not contributed to improve the per capita income 
levels in 2015 relative to 1990. This corroborates Page and Shimeles (2015: 17) 
who argue that high growth rates in SSA have not been well shared and have 
not contributed to poverty reduction. In SSA, only Equatorial Guinea—
observation at the upper-right area of Figure 4.2—has achieved substantial 




Figure 4.2: Performance in GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) in 2015 
relative to the 1990 level 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF, WEO 
Note: To allow for a clearer visibility of the graph the observation for Equatorial 
Guinea was dropped. In effect, Equatorial Guinea’s 2015 GDP per capita level 
relative to the 1990 level was more than 20.   
 
 
4.2.2. Foreign direct investment 
As already noted in chapter 3, FDI is the primary source of 
international capital to the SSA countries. Yet the region’s performance in 
attracting FDI flows remains poorer compared to other developing regions, and 
in particular SEA. As Table 4.4 illustrates, in spite of a dramatic surge in the net 
inflows of FDI between 2000 and 2015, SSA received much smaller amounts 
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In addition, a comparison of the index of export concentration—
Hirschman Herfindahl Index—between the two regions suggests that SSA has 
not succeeded in diversifying its economy. In fact, SSA still heavily depends on 
the export of natural resources, particularly minerals and fuels. By contrast, 
SEA countries ‘have succeeded in developing other exports and diversifying 
their economies into manufacturing, agro-industries, value-added services, and 
other activities that enable them to move up the value chain in the global 
economy’ (van Donge et al 2012: 9). This is particularly instructive, because 
many countries in SEA including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam have significant natural endowments, yet their exports dependent less 
heavily on them.  
 It is argued that FDI has played a leading role for major changes in 
economic structure of most SEA countries (Thomsen 1999). Foreign firms have 
fueled export-led growth and contributed to changes in economic structures of 














Table 4.4: Foreign Direct Investment and Trade in SSA and SEA 





SSA 25.57 100.27 150.39 432.67 617.25 908.41 








SSA - 0.210 0.341 0.424 0.420 0.304 
SEA - 0.124 0.182 0.152 0.127 0.116 
       
Source: UNCTAD 
Notes: The Hirschman Herfindahl Index is the sum of squared shares of each product 
in total export. A country with a perfectly diversified export portfolio will have an index 
close to zero, whereas a country which exports only one export will have a value of 1 
(least diversified). See World Bank’s Trade Indicators available at:  
http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/Content/Utilities/e1.trade_indicators.htm 
 
This can also explain the small size of the manufacturing sector in 
most of the SSA countries compared with their SEA counterparts. Figure 4.3 
plots the FDI inflows (in million US$) against the share of manufacturing in 
GDP for SSA and SEA countries. It also provides a visual comparison of the 
share of manufacturing in GDP between SSA and SEA countries for which data 
is available between 1990 and 2015 (observations are based on averages for 
available years between 1990 and 2015). It shows that countries that attract 
larger inflows of FDI tend to have higher shares of manufacturing in GDP. Also, 
and perhaps more importantly, SSA countries are mostly located on the lower 
left-hand side of the figure, suggesting that they attract smaller FDI and are less 
industrialized. By contrast, SEA countries are mostly located on the upper right-
hand side of the figure, suggesting that they receive larger inflows of FDI and 
are more industrialized. The share of the manufacturing industries exceeds 15 
percent of GDP in most of the SEA countries, whereas it represents less than 10 
percent in most of the SSA countries. 
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Figure 4.3: FDI (million US$) and the share of manufacturing in GDP in SSA 
and SEA, 1990-2015  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the World Development Indicators. 
 
4.2.3. Social development  
As illustrated in the previous sections, SSA and SEA diverge widely 
in terms of income per capita growth, competitiveness in attracting FDI, and 
economic diversification. Along this divergence, this section shows that even 
in terms of social development, SEA countries on average outperform their SSA 
counterparts. In order to compare the differential social development between 
the two regions, one can rely on a comparison of the overall performance in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Specifically, Table 4.5 reports the 
performance in the eight MDGs in 2015 relative to 1990: (1) eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achievement of universal primary education 
by 2015, with equal access for boys and girls; (3) promotion of gender equality 
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thirds between 1990 and 2015; (5) reduction of maternal mortality by three-
quarters between 1990 and 2015; reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other disease by 2015; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop 
a global partnership for development. 
  Table 4.5 shows that the overall performance in the MDGs has been 
widely satisfactory in SEA compared with SSA. For instance, the target of 
halving the proportion of people who live in extreme poverty has been 
successfully achieved in SEA as the regional population living on less than 
US$1.25 fell from 46 in 1990 to 7 in 2015. In SSA, by contrast, more than 40 
percent of the population still remained in extreme poverty in 2015 (57 percent 
in 1990).  
In terms of the goal of ensuring universal primary education by 2015, 
SSA (85 percent) still lags behind SEA (94 percent), in spite of a relatively good 
progress. And with regard to one variable of interest in the current study, namely 
the infant mortality, Table 4.5 shows the same divergence between the two 
regions. SSA registered a relatively good progress, with under-five mortality 
rate falling by more than two-thirds between 1990 and 2015. This proportion, 
however, remains much higher compared to 33 per 1,000 live births in SEA in 
2015.  In addition, maternal mortality rate remains much higher in SSA (510 
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births for women aged 15-49) than in SEA 
(140 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births for women aged 15-49) in 2015.  
Moreover, according to the 2015 Human Development Report of the 
United Nations Development Program, twenty-seven of the thirty countries that 
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rank lowest, and nineteen of the bottom twenty, are in SSA. Further, of the 
forty-six SSA countries included in the current analysis, thirty-seven are in the 
bottom fifty of the 2015 Human Development Index (HDI), except Equatorial 
Guinea, Congo, Namibia, Cabo Verde, South Africa, Gabon, Botswana, 
Mauritius, and Seychelles. On the other hand, three SEA countries that rank 
lowest in the 2015 HDI, namely Lao (141), Cambodia (143), and Myanmar 
(148), actually rank above the bottom forty. In other words, even the poorest 
SEA countries perform relatively well compared to the majority of SSA 
countries.  
 
Table 4.5: Performance in the Millennium Development Goals in SSA and 
SEA 
Goal Target Sub-Saharan Africa Southeast 
Asia 
1990 2015 1990 2015 
1 (A)Halve, between 1990 and 
2015, the proportion of people 
whose income is less than $1 a 
day 
(Proportion of people living on 
less than $1.25 a day) 
57 41 46 7 
(B)Achieve full, productive, and 
decent employment for all 
(Employment-to-population 
ratio, %) 
63 65 67 
 
67 
(C)Halve the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger 
between 1990 and 2015. 
(Proportion of undernourished 
people, %) 
33 23 31 10 
2 Ensure full and equal access to 
primary education for boys and 
girls by 2015. Adjusted net 
enrolment rate in primary 
education (%) 
52 80 93 94 
3 Promote equal access to paid 
employment 
(Share of women in wage 
employment in the non-
agricultural sector, %) 
24 34 35 39 
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Promote women’s political 
representation 
(Proportion of seats held by 
women in single or lower houses 
of national parliament, %) 
13 23 12 18 
4 Reduce by two thirds, between 
1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate. (Under-five 
mortality rate, deaths per 1,000 
live births) 
179 86 71 33 
5 Reduce by three quarters, 
between 1990 and 2015, the 
maternal mortality ratio. 
(Maternal mortality ratio, 
maternal deaths per 100,000 live 
births, women aged 15-49) 
990 510 320 140 
Achieve universal access to 
reproductive health by 2015 
(Proportion of women aged 15-
49 attended four or more times 
by any provider during 
pregnancy, %) 
47 36 45 84 
6 Halt by 2015 and reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS 
(Estimated number of new HIV 
infections, thousands) 
1370 700 120 120 
7 Reduce biodiversity loss, and 
achieve a significant reduction in 
the rate of loss by 2010. 
(Terrestrial areas protected, %) 
10.6 15.3 8.4 14.0 
Halve, by 2015, the proportion of 
the population without 
sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic 
sanitation 
(Proportion of population using 
an improved drinking water 
source, %) 
48 56 72 90 
Achieve improvement in the 
lives of at least 100 million slum 
dwellers. (Proportion of urban 
population living in slums, %) 
65 55 40 27 
















4.3. Institutional quality and socioeconomic performance 
 
 As demonstrated in the previous sections, SEA experienced better 
economic and social outcomes during the period between 1990 and 2015. SEA 
had higher growth rates, lower inflation, more diverse economic structures, and 
received larger inflows of FDI compared with SSA. In addition, social 
development as measured by MDGs has been largely satisfactory in SEA 
compared with SSA. And as noted in chapter 1, numerous studies have 
attributed the overall poor economic performance in SSA to the lack of good 
institutions such as those that promote the private sector competitiveness, and 
improve the accountability of governments (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010; 
Acemoglu et al 2004; Fosu 2010). This section thus describes the importance 
of institutions in explaining the differential economic performance in SSA and 
SEA. The section is divided into two parts. Section 4.3.1 discusses performance 
in some composite institutional indicators in order to find whether on average 
SEA countries have better institutions than their SSA counterparts. Section 
4.3.2 extends this discussion by examining whether better institutional quality 
is associated with better economic performance in the two regions.   
 
4.3.1. Performance in institutional indicators 
 In order to address the question of whether institutional quality is 
higher in SEA than in SSA, Figure 4.4 compares performance in one widely 
used measure of the extent of corruption, namely the Transparency 
International’s Corruption perception index (CPI), between SSA, SEA, and 
other more advanced economies in Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korean, 
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Singapore, and Taiwan) and others (Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). Poor performance in the CPI 
can be suggestive of a lack of accountability and bad practices in the public 
sector. The CPI has scores ranging from 0 (highest level of perceived corruption) 
to 100 (lowest level of perceived corruption). In descending order, scores from 
49 to 0 represent moderately to highly corrupt economies, while in ascending 
order, scores from 50 to 100 indicate moderately clean to very clean economies.  
Figure 4.4 shows that both SSA and SEA are home to some of the most 
corrupt countries (CPI scores below 40). Only one SEA country (Malaysia) 
scored above 50, while the remaining eight countries scored less than 40. 
Cambodia, Lao, and Myanmar are the most corrupt SEA countries on the list, 
with scores below 30. In SSA, six countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Rwanda, and Seychelles) scored above 50, while the majority scored 
less than 30. Figure 4.4 thus gives no indication that institutions are better in 
SEA than in SSA.  
To further illustrate the overall poor institutional quality in both SSA 
and SEA, countries are now compared on the main institutional variables 
considered in the present study, namely the WGI Regulatory Quality and Voice 
and Accountability. As already mentioned in previous chapters, Regulatory 
Quality gives an indication of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development (Kaufmann et al 2010). Voice and Accountability, on the 
other hand, captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are 
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able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media (Kaufmann et al 2010). 
Both indicators have scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with scores below 0 
representing poor quality, and above 0 representing good quality. 
Figure 4.4: 2015 Corruption Perception Index Scores in SSA, SEA, 
and other regions 
 
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2015 
 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the 2015 WGI Regulatory Quality scores for 55 SSA 
and SEA countries and other advanced countries (also included in Figure 4.4). 
Again, the overall picture provides no indication that SEA has better institutions 
than SSA. In fact, countries in SSA as well as in SEA have poorer Regulatory 
Quality compared with the more advanced economies. Three SEA countries 
(Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand) and four SSA countries (Botswana, Mauritius, 
































































































score in the below zero space, indicating that they lack sound policies and 
regulations for private sector development. It should be noted, however, that 
four other SEA countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam) 
score in the zone between -0.5 and 0. This suggests that they perform relatively 
better compared with most of the SSA countries (scoring below -0.5). Finally, 
the Central African Republic, the DR Congo, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, 
and Zimbabwe have the poorest Regulatory Quality in SSA, while Myanmar 
has the lowest score among the nine SEA countries in the list.      
 
Figure 4.5. Regulatory Quality score, 2015 (-2.5 to +2.5) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 in turn, shows the 2015 WGI Voice and Accountability 
scores for 55 SSA and SEA countries and other advanced countries. Again, it 
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compared with those in the more advanced economies. However, more 
countries in SSA (Botswana, Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, and South Africa) score 
higher on this indicator compared with countries in SEA (Indonesia, 
Philippines).  
Figure 4.6: Voice and Accountability score, 2015 (-2.5 to +2.5) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
 
 
4.3.2. Institutional quality and socioeconomic outcomes 
 
As shown in the previous discussion, there is no indication that 
institutions are particularly better in SEA than in SSA. There are, however, 
countries in the two regions that do have good institutions and score highest on 
composite institutional indicators. One question of interest is on whether 
countries scoring highest on these indicators have better economic and social 









































































































focuses on the WGI Regulatory Quality indicator as a measure for institutional 
quality. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the extent to which countries with 
good Regulatory Quality have good economic and social outcomes, measured 
here in terms of three variables—per capita GDP, infant mortality, and FDI. 
To begin with, Figure 4.7 shows average real per capita GDP 
(expressed in logarithm) and average Regulatory Quality score for the period 
2000-2015 across 55 SSA and SEA countries. It shows that countries with good 
Regulatory Quality (right-hand side of the figure) tend to have higher per capita 
GDP over this period, compared with many of the countries with poor 
Regulatory Quality (left-hand side). Figure 4.7 somewhat gives an indication 
that having sound policies and regulations for private sector development can 
contribute to better economic outcome.  
Figure 4.7: Per capita GDP (constant 2005 US$) and Regulatory 
Quality (1990-2015) 
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Figure 4.8 in turn shows average infant mortality and Regulatory 
Quality score over the period 2000-2015 for the list of SSA and SEA countries. 
Countries located in the lower-right area of Figure 4.8 have good Regulatory 
Quality and lower infant mortality. More specifically, countries scoring above 
zero have less than 50 deaths out of thousand live births, while most of the 
countries scoring below zero have higher mortality rates. The Figure thus 
suggests a lower infant mortality in countries with good institutions compared 
with many of the countries on the left-hand (poor institutions). One could 
therefore argue that countries with good institutions have characteristically 
better social outcomes. 
Figure 4.8: Infant mortality and Regulatory Quality Score, average 
1995-2015 (-2.5 to +2.5) 
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Finally, Figure 4.9 shows average FDI inflows in million US$ and average 
Regulatory Quality score for the period 2000-2015. There seems to be no clear 
pattern describing the relationship between FDI and regulatory quality. Perhaps 
one needs to take into account differences across countries in other factors such 
as abundance in natural resources or the level of income. This issue is further 
discussed in section 4.6. However, using other measures of the regulatory 
quality such as the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators, numerous studies 
suggest that countries with more effective business regulations benefit more 
from the FDI flows (see, for example, Bayraktar 2013; Busse and Groizard 
2008; Jayasuriya 2011; Katoka and Kwon, forthcoming; Nnadozie and Njuguna 
2011).  
 
Figure 4.9: Foreign direct investment versus Regulatory Quality 
Score, average 1995-2015 (-2.5 to +2.5) 
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4.4. Resource-abundance and socioeconomic performance  
 
As will be discussed later, numerous studies have pointed to the 
abundance in natural resources as a major factor explaining poor economic and 
social outcomes in developing regions. This section explores some patterns 
describing the relationship between abundance in natural resources and 
socioeconomic performance in SSA and SEA. Specifically, it compares 
resource-abundant countries to countries that are not resource-abundant in both 
regions. 
To begin with, it is worth noting that there is no established convention 
for the designation of “resource-abundant” and “resource-scarce” countries. 
The literature on the resource-curse proposes different classification strategies 
(see, for example, Collier and Hoeffler 2009: 298; Davis 1995: 1770; IMF 2015: 
66; Lundgren et al 2013: 4). The approach adopted in this chapter classifies a 
country as resource-abundant if its average total natural resource rents for the 
period 1990-2015 represent at least 10 percent of its GDP. Similarly, a country 
is classified as resource-scarce if its average total natural resource rents for the 
period 1990-2015 represent less than 10 percent of its GDP. Accordingly, the 
grouping is as follows: 
 On the one hand, the resource-abundant group consists of twenty-six 
countries, including Angola, Botswana, Brunei, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, DR 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Lao, Liberia, 
Malaysia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Vietnam, and Zambia. Second.  
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 On the other hand, thirty-nine countries are in turn classified as 
resource-scarce, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritius, Philippines, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).  
 As in the previous sections, resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
countries are then compared on economic and social measures, including GDP 
growth, income, infant mortality, and FDI. 
 First, Table 4.6 classifies resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
countries according to their growth performance, using average data for 1990-
2015. The table shows that fourteen countries grew at an average of at least 3 
percent per annum. Of these countries, eight are resource-abundant (Equatorial 
Guinea, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sudan, and 
Vietnam) and six other are resource-scarce (Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Ethiopia, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, and Thailand). Eleven other countries grew at an average 
of 2 to 3 percent per annum, among which five are resource-abundant 
(Botswana, Chad, Ghana, Namibia, and Nigeria) and six are resource-scarce 
(Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Philippines, Seychelles, Swaziland, and Tanzania). 
One resource-abundant country (Angola) and five resource-scarce countries 
(Benin, Eritrea, Malawi, Mali, and Zambia) grew at an average of 1 to 2 percent 
per annum. Among the countries that grew at an average of 0 to 1 percent, five 
are resource-abundant (Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Mauritania, and South Africa) 
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and six are resource-scarce (Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo). The remaining eleven countries experienced negative per 
capita growth, among which five are resource-abundant (Brunei, Cameroon, 
DR Congo, Liberia, and Niger) and six are resource-scarce (Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe). 
Against the idea that abundance in natural resources may be detrimental to 
economic performance, Table 4.6 suggests that resource-scarce countries did 
not outperform their resource-abundant counterparts. Furthermore, when one 
looks at the group of laggards (countries with negative per capita GDP growth), 
one can observe that many of the resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
countries performed poorly. Table 4.6, however, shows that most of the 
resource-abundant countries that grew at more than 3 percent per annum are 
SEA (four out of six). By contrast, most of the countries that experienced 
average negative growth rates are SSA, of which six are resource-scarce (out 
ten countries).  
 Overall, Table 4.6 shows that abundance in natural resources tends to 
be associated with the good growth performance of many of the SEA and SSA 
countries, although many other countries performed poorly. It is also instructive 
to look at the extent to which abundance or scarcity in natural resources 















Gr < 0 
percent 
Brunei, Cameroon, DR 
Congo, Liberia, Niger 
Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Comoros, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Zimbabwe 
0< Gr <=1 Congo, Gabon, Guinea, 
Mauritania, South Africa.  
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
1< Gr <=2 Angola Benin, Eritrea, Malawi, Mali, 
Zambia 
2 < Gr <= 3 Botswana, Chad, Ghana, 
Namibia, Nigeria 
Burkina Faso, Lesotho, 
Philippines, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Tanzania 
Gr>3 Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, 
Lao, Malaysia, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Sudan, Vietnam 
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Ethiopia, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Thailand 
Source: Author’s classification based on data from WDI and UNCTAD. 
  
 Table 4.7 shows average infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) for the 
period 1990-2015. It arbitrarily classifies the list of twenty-four resource-
abundant and thirty-one resource-scarce countries into three distinct groups. 
The first group consists of countries with the highest average infant mortality 
rate (more than 80 deaths out of 1000 live births). Twenty-three countries are 
in this group, among which twelve are resource-abundant (Angola, Chad, DR 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Sudan) and eleven 
are resource-scarce (Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Rwanda). The 
second group consists of countries with moderate infant mortality (between 50 
and 80 deaths out of 1000 live births). The group has twenty-one countries, of 
which eight are resource-abundant (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Lao, 
Mauritania, Myanmar, and Sudan) and thirteen are resource-scarce (Cambodia, 
Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). Finally, the last group consists of 
 
 ７６ 
countries with the lowest infant mortality (less than 50 deaths out of 1000 
births). Seven of these countries are resource-abundant (Botswana, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Namibia, South Africa, and Vietnam) and five others are 
resource-scarce (Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Philippines, Seychelles, and Thailand). 
Again, the classification in Table 4.7 shows no indication that resource-
abundant countries had a bad social development compared with their resource-
scarce counterparts. In fact, most of the countries with the lowest infant 
mortality are resource-abundant (seven out of twelve countries).  
 







IMRT > 80  Angola, Chad, DR Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, 
Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Zambia 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda 
50 < IMRT <= 
80 
Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, 
Ghana, Lao, Mauritania, 
Myanmar, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Sudan 
Cambodia, Comoros, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Senegal, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe 
IMRT < 50 Botswana, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Namibia, South 
Africa, Vietnam 
Cabo Verde, Mauritius, 
Philippines, Seychelles, Thailand 
Source: Classification based on data from the WDI.  
  
 An alternative way of showing the extent to which natural resources 
influence economic performance in SSA and SEA is to show the diversity of 
experience between resource-abundant and resource-scarce countries in terms 
of FDI competitiveness. Figure 4.10 shows average FDI inflows in million 
US$ across twenty-six resource-abundant and twenty-nine resource-scarce 
countries, based on averages for the period 1990-2015. The figure shows that 
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larger amounts of FDI inflows are almost exclusively reserved for the resource-
abundant countries. In fact, of the six countries that have received FDI inflows 
averaging more 2 billion US$, five are resource-abundant (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Vietnam) and only one (Thailand) is resource-scarce. 
Most of the resource-scarce countries appear to be concentrated at the bottom 
of the figure (close to zero). The figure thus suggests that abundance in natural 
resources increases the competitiveness of countries in attracting FDI in SSA 
as well as in SEA.  
Figure 4.10: Foreign direct investment inflows (million US$), average 1990-
2015 
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4.5. Institutional quality versus resource-abundance  
 This section extends the preceding discussion on whether institutional 
quality (section 4.3) and abundance in natural resources (section 4.4) explain 
patterns of socioeconomic performance in SSA and SEA. It looks at the 
combined impact of resource-abundance and institutional quality on measures 
of socioeconomic performance, including growth, income, FDI, and infant 
mortality. For this purpose, the list of countries is split into four groups based 
on abundance in natural resources and performance in the WGI Regulatory 
Quality scores. The first group—resource-abundant and good-institutions 
(RAGI)—consists of resource-abundant countries with average Regulatory 
Quality scores of above zero. The second group—resource-abundant and poor 
institutions (RAPI)—consists of resource-abundant countries with average 
Regulatory Quality scores of below zero. The third group—resource-scarce and 
good institutions (RSGI)—consists of resource-scarce countries with average 
Regulatory Quality scores of above zero. And the last group—resource-scarce 
and poor institutions (RSPI)—consists of resource-scarce countries with 
average Regulatory Quality scores of below zero. Means and medians for 
economic performance measures (GDP growth, income per capita, FDI inflows, 
and infant mortality rate) are then computed for each of these four groups based 
on available data for the period from 2000 to 2015. If the resource-abundant 
group with good institutions performs better than the resource-abundant group 
with poor institutions, then this would be suggestive evidence that good 
institutions matter in resource-abundant countries. Similarly, if the resource-
scarce group with good institutions performs better than the resource-scarce 
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group with poor institutions, then this would suggest that institutional quality 
matters for resource-scarce countries. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, if 
there is large differential economic performance between groups with good 
institutions and those with poor institutions, then this would be suggestive that 
the quality of institution matters for economic performance regardless of 
whether a country is resource-abundant or –scarce.  
 This grouping is reported in Table 4.8, which shows some interesting 
patterns: first, countries with good institutions (RAGI and RSGI) on average 
have higher income per capita, attract larger inflows of FDI, and have lower 
infant mortality (which measures social development) than countries with poor 
institutions. By contrast, countries with poor institutions (RAPI and RSPI) on 
average have higher infant mortality, lower income, and receive less inflows of 
FDI compared with countries with good institutions. Second, resource-
abundant countries with good institutions (RAGI) have higher income, lower 
infant mortality, and receive larger inflows of FDI compared with resource-
abundant countries with poor institutions (RAPI). By contrast, RAPI have the 
highest GDP growth among the four groups, but perform badly in terms of 
income per capita and infant mortality. Third, resource-scarce countries with 
good institutions have the highest income and the lowest infant mortality, and 
also receive larger amounts of FDI compared with the other three groups. 
Finally, resource-scarce countries with poor institutions have higher infant 
mortality and perform poorly in terms of income per capita and competitiveness 
in attracting FDI. At the same time, when comparing countries with poor 
institutions, those abundant in natural resources tend to have better economic 
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outcomes compared with their resource-scarce counterparts. Table 4.8 thus 
gives the following evidence with regard to SSA and SEA countries: first, the 
quality of institutions is associated with better economic and social outcomes 
regardless of whether a country is resource-abundant or –scarce; second, in 
countries with poor institutions, those abundant in natural resources perform 
relatively better compared with their resource-scarce counterparts; finally, 
resource-abundant countries that have poor institutions can experience high 
output growth rates but at the same time experience low level of income and 
poor social development. Perhaps one can argue that the latter case properly 
describes recent high economic growth rates experienced by many resource-
abundant countries in SSA. In effect, it has been argued that since 2000 GDP 
per capita growth has been higher for many SSA resource-abundant countries, 
but the translation into higher living standards for the population as a whole has 
been slow, due to poor governance (Lundgren et al York 2013).  
 
Table 4.8: Resource-scarce countries with good institutions vs. resource-













rate, infant  
(per 1,000 
live births) 
Abundant Good Mean 3.67 9945.63 1949.62 29.03 
Median 4.2 5848.10 374.24 41.53 
Poor Mean 6.18 1884.66 1071.83 71.28 
Median 6.22 790.56 341.01 72.85 
Scarce Good Mean 4.21 4558.79 3061.95 13.90 
Median 4.21 4558.79 3061.95 13.90 
Poor Mean 4.14 1136.92 221.94 60.37 
Median 4.04 510.47 82.54 61.1 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Notes: Calculations are based on averages for the period 2000-2015. (1) GDP growth is based on 
the average annual GDP growth obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO); (2) 
GDP per capita is based on per capita GDP in constant 2005 prices, obtained from UNCTAD; (3) 
FDI inflows is based on the annual net inflows of FDI in million US$, obtained from UNCTAD; 





This chapter has provided a descriptive analysis of the differential 
socioeconomic performance between SSA and SEA over the period from 1990 
to 2015. It compared the two regions in terms of their performance in an array 
of social, economic, and institutional variables. It then looked at the influence 
of institutions and natural resources in shaping patterns of economic 
performance across and within the two regions. The main lessons from this 
analysis can be summarized as follows: 
1. Over the period from 1990 to 2015 on average SEA experienced 
better economic performance than SSA. Comparing aggregates of 
the two regions, data suggest that growth rates, per capita GDP, 
and FDI inflows, have been higher in SEA than in SSA. Also, SEA 
experienced lower inflation—indicating better macroeconomic 
policies—and characteristically lower dependency ratio, which in 
turn may have positively affected other economic outcomes (e.g. 
per capita growth). Also, comparing growth rates in the most 
populous countries of the two regions, data suggest that unlike in 
SEA, the large countries in SSA on average experienced slow 
growth. Finally, large inflows of FDI tend to be associated with a 
large manufacturing sector in most of the SEA countries, whereas 
the largest FDI recipients in SSA tend to have smaller 
manufacturing sector.  
2. Comparing social development progress in terms of the 
Millennium Development Goals, SEA experienced better 
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performance compared with SSA. For many of the SEA countries, 
progress on the eight MDGs has been largely satisfactory. By 
contrast, SSA has not achieved any of the MDGs: for instance, the 
proportion of people living on less than 1.30 US$ per day, the 
maternal as well as infant mortality are still very high. 
3. When it comes to comparing the quality of institutions, there is no 
clear regional pattern showing that SEA countries have better 
institutions compared with their SSA counterparts. In both regions, 
the institutional landscape is dominated by corrupt governments, 
more restrictive regimes, and poor business regulations. In this 
analysis, SSA and SEA countries’ performance in institutional 
composite indicators such as the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the WGI Regulatory Quality, 
the WGI Voice and Accountability, has been compared with that 
of some advanced economies (e.g. China, Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and other economies of the OECD). Figures 
suggest that SSA and SEA countries lag behind the more advanced 
economies. Some SSA and SEA countries, however, score higher 
on these indicators. Those countries with good institutions tend 
also to have good economic and social outcomes. 
4. Abundance in natural resources is not necessarily associated with 
better economic and social outcomes in both SSA and SEA. 
However, and more importantly, resource-abundant countries that 
have good institutions tend to have better economic and social 
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outcomes compared with those with poor institutions.  
All in all, this analysis reveals the complexity of the differential 
economic performance between SSA and SEA. On the one hand, comparing 
simple aggregates of the two regions suggests that the former does poorly 
compared with the latter. When looking at individual countries, however, data 
show that not all SEA countries performed better compared SSA countries. On 
the other hand, when taking into account the presence of good (or poor) 
institutions and abundance (or scarcity) in natural resources, data suggest a 
wide intra-regional diversity of experiences. More importantly, the better-
performing-countries in both SSA and SEA tend to have good institutions. This 
analysis thus suggests that an appropriate analysis of economic performance of 
the two regions requires deeply examining the extent to which both natural 
resources and institutions influence patterns of performance. The next step 
consists in empirically examining the extent to which resource abundance and 
institutional quality influence performance in three indicators, including per 












5. Concepts and Empirical Methodology 
 
 5.1. Background and Structure of the Chapter  
 
 The preceding chapters, especially chapters 3 and 4, have compared 
countries in SSA and SEA on a range of economic, social, and institutional 
indicators. Findings from this descriptive analysis allows making the following 
propositions: (1) natural resources and institutional quality promote or hinder 
good socioeconomic performance in SSA relative to SEA; and (2) institutional 
quality moderates the effects of natural resources on socioeconomic 
performance in SSA.  
 In order to empirically test these propositions, it is essential to have a 
clear understanding of how the three main concepts of interest in the current 
study are measured. The other main objective in the current chapter is to present 
data briefly present the empirical specifications to be employed in order to test 
the propositions formulated above. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 
proposes clear-cut definition and measurement of the concepts under 
investigation. It addresses the following questions: (5.2.1) how to measure 
natural resources or resource abundance (dependence); (5.2.2) what is the 
meaning of ‘institutions’ and how are they measured; and (5.2.3) how to 





5.2. Concepts  
 
5.2.1. Measuring natural resources and resource 
abundance/dependence 
 To begin, it might be helpful to define what is generally understood 
by natural resources. Natural resources are natural since they are present 
without human intervention—gifts of nature—and are not produced (Basedau 
2005: 8). Thus they must be differentiated from other forms of resources such 
as physical (roads or machines), human (well-educated or skilled individuals), 
social (interpersonal relations), and institutional (formal and informal) capital. 
In its quantification of the wealth of nations, the World Bank (2006) includes 
natural resources along with these other forms of capital. And it is well 
established that if properly managed, natural resources can be an important 
source of economic development (Arezki, Gylfason, and Sy, 2011).  
 From an economic perspective, it is significant to differentiate 
between different types of resources. For instance, Auty (2001) differentiate 
between ‘point’ and ‘diffuse’ resources. The former refer to resources that are 
concentrated in certain areas—for example, gold, diamond—and the latter refer 
to resources that are dispersed over a country’s territory. Similarly, Le Billon 
(2005) introduces the concepts of ‘proximate’ or ‘distant’ resources, whereby 
resources are differentiated on the basis of whether or not they can be easily 
controlled by a country’s central government. This form of differentiation is 
further extended by Boschini et al. (2007) who introduce the concept of 
‘appropriability of resource’—how easy it is to realize large economic gains, 
within a relatively short period of time, from having control over it. 
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Accordingly, natural resources such as diamond, gold, or other precious metals 
are likely to attract interest from various sorts of actors than fertile land or 
agricultural products. Numerous studies have established that different 
categories of primary commodities tend to have different effects on the GDP 
growth rate (Boschini et al., 2013; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013; 
Murshed et al., 2015).    
 From an empirical perspective, there is no consensus on the 
appropriate proxy for measuring resource abundance (Lederman and Maloney, 
2007). For example, measures used in empirical literature include, among 
others, natural resource exports as a share of GDP (Sachs and Warner, 1995) or 
as a share of total merchandise exports (Boschini, 2013), the ratio of resource 
rents to GDP (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003), natural resource exports per labor 
force (Barro, 1991), or mineral reserves in US$ (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 
2008).  
 Many have pointed to the endogenous features of resource measures 
based on exports or rents, suggesting that measures based on ‘actual resource 
endowments’ or ‘proven reserves’ are more exogenous, therefore, suitable for 
empirical research (Stijns, 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). This 
argument, however, has been contested. For instance, it has been argued that 
the industrialized and countries with well-functioning institutions may have 
explored and found more of their reserves than other countries. Consequently, 
empirical studies using mineral reserves are likely to find a positive correlation 
between resource-abundance and growth. That is because, as Torvik (2009: 245) 
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puts it, 'Other things equal, advanced and well-functioning countries may be 
measured as more resource-abundant than less well-functioning countries'. 
Moreover, when it comes to studying different dimensions of the interaction 
between resources and institutions, measures of resource exports or rents are 
more suitable because they offer a more homogenous measure of resources over 
time for a larger number of countries (Boschini et al., 2013: 21).    
 Consequently, the primary resource measure employed in the present 
thesis is the total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP (see chapters 3-
4). In chapters 3 and 4, a country is considered resource-abundant if its average 
share of natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP for years for which data 
is available in the period 1990-2015 is higher than 10 percent. Note that 
Botswana is classified as resource-abundant although its resource rents data is 
not provided by the World Bank. This is due to Lee and Gueye (2015).  
The alternative resource measure to be used in this study is the share 
of natural resource exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports (EXP). 
Data for resource exports is obtained from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics database. EXP is specifically 
constructed from data on fuels and minerals exports, as comprised in section 
A00.3 (mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials) and section A17 (ores, 
metals, precious stones and non-monetary gold) of the UNCTAD product 
groupings and composition. EXP is then obtained as follows: 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 100 ∗






Where 𝐸𝑋𝑃 denotes the share of natural resource (oil and minerals) exports in 
total merchandise exports of country i for the year t; 𝑂𝑖𝑙 represents the average 
oil exports in current US$ of country i for the year t; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠 represents the 
average minerals exports of country i for the year t; and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 
represents the average total merchandise exports in current US$ of country i for 
the year t.  
Table 5.1: Natural resource exports as a share of total 
merchandise exports, average 1995-2015 




Cameroon; Chad; Congo; 
DR Congo; Equatorial 
Guinea; Gabon; Ghana; 
Guinea; Liberia; 
Mauritania; Mozambique; 
Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; 
Sierra Leone; South 






Benin; Burkina Faso; 
Burundi; Cabo Verde; 
Comoros; Cote d’Ivoire; 
Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gambia; 
Ghana; Guinea-Bissau; 
Kenya; Lesotho;  
Madagascar; Malawi; 
Mali; Mauritius; Senegal; 
Seychelles; Swaziland; 
Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; 
Zimbabwe 
Cambodia; Lao;  
Philippines; Thailand 




 In the following empirical estimation, resource exports (EXP) is the 
favored resource measure. This is because, unlike for total rents, annual data 
for exports are available not only for all of the 55 SSA and SEA countries, but 
also for the entire period extending from 1995 to 2015.   
5.2.2. Measuring institutions 
According to North (1990: vii), “The specification of exactly what 
institutions are, how they differ from organizations, and how they influence 
transaction and production costs is the key to much of the analysis”.  
To begin with, institutions can be regarded as “agreed-upon rules that 
people impose on themselves to structure their interactions” (North, 1995: 35), 
or to organize interactions within organizations, which may be families, 
neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, 
schools, political parties, regulatory agencies, or governments at all scales 
(Ostrom, 2004: 4). Ostrom (1990: 51) also defines institutions as “the sets of 
working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in 
some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules 
will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must 
not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on 
their actions”.  
Accordingly, one can note that institutions include both “the rules of 
the game and the mechanisms by which those rules are developed, contested, 
and enforced” (Keenan, 2014: 225). These rules are commonly known and are 
endowed with a sanctioning mechanism (Voigt, 2013).  
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Institutions can therefore be classified in various ways, depending on 
the degree of embeddedness or formality, and subject category—action arena 
(Ostrom, 2005) or institutional matrix (North, 1993). For instance, Joskow 
(2008) categorizes between four types of institutions—social, legal, political, 
and economic institutions—which have important effects on economic 
performance.  
First, social institutions provide the basic social and cultural 
institutional foundations. They encompass informal institutions, customs, 
traditions, ethics and social norms, religion, and some aspects of language and 
cognition. They tend to vary very slowly over time—no shorter than a hundred 
years.  
Second, legal institutions include defined constitutions, political 
systems, human rights, property rights, courts, and other arrangements that 
define formal rules of the game be they social, political, or economic.  
Third, political institutions refer to institutions that determine the 
political system and electoral competitiveness, identification of/to political 
parties, checks and balances, tenure and stability of a government, electoral 
rules, the role of the legislature, or subnational political structure (Beck et al., 
2001). Political institutions are important for economic performance because 
they include settings that limit the political abuse of power, for example, 
accountability, quality of the bureaucracy control of corruption, or the type of 
political regime, among others (Collier and Hoefler, 2009), and they determine 
how state institutions are developed away from “patrimonial practices towards 
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the use of rational and meritocratic criteria in allocating public sector resources” 
(Robinson et al., 2006: 450). Political institutions “limit the discretion of 
politicians and define their policy space” (Cabrales and Hauk, 2011: 59).  
Finally, economic institutions are those “that shape the incentives of 
key economic actors in society, in particular, they influence investments in 
physical and human capital and technology, and the organization of production” 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005: 389). In other words, economic institutions are 
enabling—they enable private actors to achieve their goals by using institutions 
as tools—whereas political institutions are constraining—they tell politicians 
what to do (Voight, 2013: 7).     
  According to North (1990: 107), institutions are “the underlying 
determinant of the long-run economic performance”. Substantial empirical 
research has suggested that institutions are the fundamental determinant of 
economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2001; 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2008), and have primacy over geography in explaining differential economic 
performance between countries (Rodrik et al., 2004).  
Performance in these different types of institutions is quantified by an 
array of composite indicators available from various sources. The most widely 
used, however, include indicators from the International Country Risk Group 
(ICRG), the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Index, the Heritage Foundations’ Index of 
Economic Freedom, the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the Word 
(EFW) index, the Freedom House’s Freedom of Press and Freedom in the 
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World, the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
and the Polity IV’s index of institutional democracy/autocracy.  
Table 5.2, adapted from Kunčič (2014: 143), classifies various 
institutional composite indicators into legal, economic, and political institutions. 
The table shows that that time and country coverage vary widely across 
different sources, with the largest coverage provided by the WGI. 
Table 5.2: Institutional indicators by category 
Institutional 
group 


















Index of economic 















Economic Freedom of the 
World Index (EFWI): 
judicial independence 
Fraser Institute 157 1970 
EFWI: impartial courts    






Law and order ICRG   
Religion in politics ICRG   




















Freedom in the World: 








Polity IV 167 1800 
Voice and accountability WGI >200 1996 
Democratic accountability ICRG 140 1984 
Corruption ICRG   
Bureaucratic quality ICRG   
Internal conflict ICRG   
Military in politics ICRG   







































Regulatory quality WGI >200 1996 





EFWI: freedom to own 
foreign currency bank 
accounts 
Fraser Institute 157 1970 
EFWI: regulations of 
credit, labor, and business: 
credit market regulations 
Fraser Institute   
EFWI: regulation of 
credit, labor, and business: 
labor market regulations 
Fraser Institute   
EFWI: regulations of 
credit, labor, and business: 
business regulations 




Fraser Institute   
EFWI: capital controls  Fraser Institute   
 Doing Business Index World Bank 185 2003 
Source: as noted in table; and adapted from Kunčič (2014: 143)  
While indicators listed in Table 5.2 are generally used as institutional 
proxies in the empirical literature, their adoption often lacks rigorous discussion 
about what they actually capture and how they were developed (Luiz, 2009). 
Further, one needs to be cautious that each of the institutional dimensions (i.e., 
enforcement of property rights, rule of law, civil liberty, control of corruption, 
or accountability) has a potentially different mechanism through which it may 




 The current study uses data from the World Bank’s WGI as they cover 
a larger set of countries and years than the other data bases listed in Table 5.2. 
Moreover, the analysis focuses on the Regulatory Quality indicator, which 
captures perceptions of the ability of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. The Regulatory Quality indicator is an index based on a 
combination of factors, including: (1) regulations and administrative 
requirements for starting, operating, and closing a business; (2) investment 
licensing requirements; (3) the extent to which the government supports 
uncompetitive industries through subsidies; (5) the complexity and efficiency 
of the tax system; (6) labor market policies; (7) prevalence of trade barriers; (8) 
strength of the banking system and legal regulations in the banking sector; and 
(9) the existence of a policy, legal, and institutional framework that supports 
the rural or agricultural sector.  
 Furthermore, the Regulatory Quality indicator is based on data coming 
from various sources, including the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments (CPIA), the Afrobarometer, the African 
Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, the Asian 
Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, the Business 
Enterprise Environment Survey, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the 
Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads, the Transparency International 
Global Corruption Barometer Survey, the Heritage Foundation Index of 
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Economic Freedom, the Political Risk Services International Country Risk 
Guide, the (IFAD) Rural Sector Performance Assessments, among others.2   
 Overall, the preference for Regulatory Quality as the institutional 
measure was motivated by the idea that the regulations and practices captured 
by this indicator may have a strong influence not only on FDI, but also may 
exert an impact on other economic and social indicators. Further, and perhaps 
more importantly, Regulatory Quality reflects more about the overall 
institutional quality than what matters only to private sector development. For 
example, a country with a sound Regulatory Quality is also likely to have a 
more effective and less corrupt government.  
 This can be illustrated by the strong correlation between the 
Regulatory Quality scores and some selected institutional indicators (see Table 
5.3). Regulatory Quality has a 0.8 correlation with Corruption Perceptions 
Index, a 0.9 correlation with Governance Effectiveness, a 0.81 correlation with 
the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, and a 0.88 correlation with The 
Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom. Such high correlations give added 
confidence in using the RQ variable. Nevertheless, robustness checks will be 
conducted using some of the other institutional variables.  
 
                                            
2 Readers interested in learning how this indicator is constructed, in particular which 




Table 5.3: Correlations between RQ and some selected institutional indicators, 
1996-2015 
Indicator Correlation Number of 
Obs. 
RQ 1 1134 
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI) 0.80 550 
Control of Corruption (WGI) 1 1134 
Governance Effectiveness (WGI) 0.90 917 
Economic Freedom Summary Index (Fraser 
Institute) 
0.81 615 
Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation) 0.88 977 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the full sample of 54 SSA and nine SEA 
countries. 
 Data for RQ are available since 1996 for all the countries included in 
the current analysis. The RQ has scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with scores 
close to -2.5 representing poor quality, and scores close to +2.5 representing 
good quality. The RQ scores are also available on a different scale—percentile 
rank—indicating the country’s rank among all countries covered by the 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank 
(Kaufman et al. 2010). Both scales well capture a country’s Regulatory Quality: 
the correlation between the two scales for the list of countries included in the 
current analysis is approximately 0.98. Such high correlation gives somewhat 
confidence in using either of these two measures. Nevertheless, the second 
measure with scores ranging from 0 to 100 appears to be more suitable for the 
current analysis. This choice is dictated by the high correlation between this 






Table 5.4: Correlation between RQ (-2.5 to +2.5), RQ (0 to 100) and the three 
dependent variables of interest 
 Log of GDP 
per capita 
FDI inflows in 
current USD 
(billion) 
Log of infant 
mortality rate 
RQ (-2.5 to +2.5) 0.51 0.26 -0.56 
RQ (0 to 100) 0.52 0.29 -0.60 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
  
5.2.3. Measuring socioeconomic performance 
 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the difference between countries 
with good economic performance and countries with poor economic 
performance can be summarized by saying that the former have at some point 
of their history experienced extended periods of rapid economic growth, but the 
latter have not experienced sustained growth or have experienced economic 
decline (Abel and Bernanke, 1991). Economic performance thus can be referred 
to as the achievement or not of economic progress over a certain period of time. 
More broadly, however, economic performance can be assessed in terms of 
socio-economic welfare, that is whether a country has experienced decreased 
unemployment, increased levels of savings, decreased levels of poverty or 
inequality, increased investment levels, improvement in measures of human 
development—e.g. literacy rates or infant mortality rate—and so forth.  
As noted earlier, GDP per capita growth has constituted a major and 
popular measure of economic performance in the empirical literature on the 
resource curse (see, for example, Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Lederman and 
Maloney, 2007; Collier, 2007; Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2011).  
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This thesis takes a different approach to decide on the appropriate 
economic performance measure. First, assuming that GDP growth is the ideal 
measure of economic performance, the 15 best performing countries of both 
SSA and SEA are compared on a set of socio-economic indicators including 
real GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, and FDI inflows in US$. Second, it 
is assumed that the best performing countries have to perform above average 
by SSA or SEA regional standards. With that in mind, one can make the 
following observations from Table 5.5: 
First, nine of the top 15 growth performers are resource-abundant 
countries. This suggests that abundance in natural resources may not be 
detrimental to economic success. Second, in terms of performance in income 
per capita over the period 2000-2015, only two countries (Equatorial Guinea 
and Mauritius) perform above regional average. One country (Nigeria) has 
income per capita around SSA average.  
In terms of infant mortality rate, most countries have performed poorly 
(infant mortality rate above regional averages), suggesting that having achieved 
high levels of economic growth over the sixteen-year period (2000-2015) has 
not necessarily brought improvement in health conditions of people living in 
these countries. Only six countries (Ethiopia, Vietnam, Rwanda, Eritrea, Sudan, 
and Mauritius) have performed well (mortality rates of below regional average).  
Finally, seven countries (Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Vietnam, 
Rwanda, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan, and Indonesia) have attracted inflows 
of FDI above regional averages.  
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Equatorial Guinea* 9.31 + + + 
Myanmar* 9.71 - + - 
Ethiopia 6.09 - - + 
Cambodia 6.04 - + - 
Lao 5.56 - + - 
Vietnam* 5.21 - - + 
Rwanda 4.83 - - - 
Nigeria* 4.76 ~ + + 
Chad* 4.60 - + - 
Mozambique* 4.43 - + + 
Eritrea 4.42 - - - 
Sudan* 4.16 - - + 
Angola* 4.01 - + - 
Indonesia* 3.92 - + + 
Mauritius 3.89 + - - 
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2000-2015 averages and data from the World 
Bank’s WDI and UNCTAD 
Notes: (*) Resource-abundant countries; (+) above regional average; (-) below 
regional average; (~) around regional average. 
 
This comparison, in spite of being unsophisticated, suggests that one 
needs to be cautious to limit an analysis of economic performance to GDP 
growth. The effects of natural resources on economic performance can be 
highly mixed depending on how economic performance is conceptualized. This 
thesis considers three aspects of performance, namely economic growth, FDI, 
and infant mortality. A similar approach is adopted by Alexeev and Conrad 
(2011) who examine the impact of natural resources on a set of socio-economic 
and institutional variables including economic growth (growth of GDP per 
capita), institutional quality (rule of law, control of corruption, and voice and 
accountability), investment in human and physical capita, life expectancy, and 
infant mortality rate.  
 
 １００ 
First, per capita GDP growth is a well-accepted economic 
performance indicator in the governance or the resource curse literature 
(Acemoglu et al. 2014; Arezki and van der Ploeg 2011; Lederman and Maloney 
2007; Rodrik et al 2004).  
Second, a country can grow rapidly without making significant 
improvement in terms of social welfare (Stigitz et al 2009). For instance, in a 
country like Equatorial Guinea the main indicators of human development such 
as child mortality, primary school enrollment, and fertility rates have not 
improved in spite of the sustained growth of per capita income over two decades 
(Daniele 2011: 566). Hence, it is useful to also examine the impact of natural 
resources and institutional quality on a broad indicator of social indicator such 
as infant mortality rate. 
 Finally, the ability for a country to attract large inflows of FDI can be 
regarded as an indicator of economic performance. FDI can create and maintain 
productive growth, bring together know-how and technology diffusion, 
employment generation, and expansion of access to infrastructure and social 
services in host economies (Borensztein et al, 1998; Lim, 2001). FDI can thus 
be thought of as a proxy for employment, technology diffusion, access to 
infrastructure, and so forth.3  
                                            
3 Perhaps this argument is more relevant for SEA than for SSA. It has been argued that 
FDI has played a leading role for major changes in economic structure of most SEA 
countries (Thomsen 1999). Foreign firms have fueled export-led growth and 
contributed to changes in economic structures of countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, 
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5.3. Empirical Methodology 
 
 As noted in the preceding chapters, over the last two decades and a 
half on average SEA experienced better economic and social outcomes 
compared to SSA. However, disaggregation to individual countries reveals a 
wide diversity within the two regions. In both SSA and SEA, countries that 
have good institutions (i.e., higher RQ score) tend to have higher per capita 
GDP, greater FDI inflows, and lower infant mortality. Furthermore, resource-
abundant countries within SSA tend to outperform their resource-scarce 
counterparts. These patterns further raise questions on the actual role of 
institutional quality and natural resources in explaining performance in SSA 
relative to SEA.   
 This section presents the empirical methodology for analyzing the 
effects of natural resources and institutional quality on socioeconomic 
performance in SSA and SEA. In order to allow for a clear presentation, the 
analysis is divided into two parts. The first part is based on the following 
research questions: (1) how SSA performed compared with SEA in the post-
1990 period, and how natural resources and institutions influence patterns of 
performance across the two regions. The second part then is based on the 
                                            
Thailand, and the Philippines. In most of SSA countries, however, FDI is mostly 
directed to extractive industries. Whether FDI in extractive industries generates 
employment, or promotes technology diffusion in SSA is beyond the scope of the 




following questions: (2) whether resource-abundant countries performed better 
compared with their resource-scarce counterparts, and whether and how the 
impact on performance of being resource-abundant is conditioned by 
institutional quality.  
Part 1: How SSA performed compared with SEA in the post-1990 period; and 
how natural resources and institutions influence patterns of performance 
across the two regions.   
In order to address these questions, the analysis makes the following 
assumptions: SSA performs poorly relative to SEA; natural resources and 
institutional quality promote or hinder good economic performance in SSA 
relative to SEA.  
 These assumptions imply that for a country located in SSA 
socioeconomic performance is inferior relative to a country located in SEA. 
Further, the impact on performance of SSA location is conditional upon 
institutional quality or abundance in natural resources.  
 Multiplicative interaction models can thus be employed to reflect 
these propositions. Specifically, one simple way to reflect it into a regression 
model is to start with a standard linear-additive model that would take the 
following form: 





Where 𝑌 is a performance measure (per capita GDP growth, FDI, or infant 
mortality); SSA is a time-invariant variable which equals unity if the country is 
located in SSA, and takes the value 0 if the country is located in SEA; 𝑅𝑄 is 
an institutional quality measure; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is a resource abundance measure; and 
𝜀 is the error term.  
 Equation (5.1) is thus a standard linear-additive model that expresses 
the relationship between performance (Y) and each of the three independent 
variables, namely SSA location, institutional quality, and abundance in natural 
resources. Specifically, ∝  is the intercept and represents the effect on 
performance of being located in SEA, that is, when SSA=0, and holding 
constant institutional quality and abundance in natural resources. 𝛽1 is the 
effect on performance of being located in SSA, that is, when SSA=1, and 
holding constant institutional quality and abundance in natural resources. 𝛽2 
is the effect of institutional quality on performance for both SEA and SSA, 
when abundance in natural resource is held constant. Finally, 𝛽3 is the effect 
of natural resource abundance on performance for both SEA and SSA, when 
institutional quality is held constant.  
 As noted, equation (5.1) is a standard linear-additive model that only 
reflects the effect on Y of each of the independent variables. However, equation 
(3.1) does not explicitly capture the extent to which performance in SSA or SEA 
is conditional upon institutional quality or abundance in natural resources.  
 Two approaches can be utilize for estimating the extent to which 
institutional quality or abundance in natural resources influence the impact of 
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regional location on economic performance. The first approach is to 
dichotomize the sample on the regional location (SSA versus SEA), and then 
estimate separate linear regressions such as (5.2) for each sample.  
𝑌 =∝ +𝛽1𝑅𝑄 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝜀                            (5.2) 
Hence, equation (5.2) would be estimated for the SSA-only sample, on the one 
hand, and for the SEA-only sample, on the other. The point estimates of the two 
regressions would then be compared to see whether the effect of each of the 
explanatory variables differ across the two samples.  
The second approach, which is preferred for the current study, involves creating 
a multiplicative (or interaction) term between the regional location variable and 
each of the explanatory variables of interest (i.e. RQ and EXP), and then 
estimate a single regression. In consequence, equation (5.2) can be modified to 
reflect the conditional proposition that performance in SSA (or SEA) is 
influenced by institutional quality and abundance in natural resources. 
Specifically, equation (5.2) is modified by adding a SSA dummy and two 
multiplicative terms. The first term interacts the SSA duumy with institutional 
quality, while the second term interacts the SSA dummy with abundance in 
natural resources. This gives the following multiplicative equation4: 
𝑌 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑄 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑄) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃) + 𝜀   (5.3) 
                                            
4 One could instead interact institutional quality and abundance in natural resources 
with the SEA location. However, since the main focus in the current analysis is on SSA, 
the SSA dummy is the preferred moderating term.  
 
 １０５ 
Expression (5.3) differ from (5.2) in several ways. First, the intercept (∝) 
reflects the effect of being located in SEA (SSA = 0) on performance, holding 
institutional quality and abundance in natural resources at zero. Second, 𝛽1 
reflects the effect on performance of being located in SSA, holding institutional 
quality and abundance in natural resources at zero. Third, 𝛽2 is now the effect 
of institutional quality on performance for a SEA country relative to a SSA 
country, holding abundance in natural resources at zero. Forth, 𝛽3 is the effect 
of natural resource abundance on performance for a SEA country relative to a 
SSA country, holding institutional quality at zero. Fifth, 𝛽4 is the effect on 
performance of being located in SSA relative to being located in SEA 
conditional upon institutional quality. Sixth, 𝛽5 is the effect on performance 
of being located in SSA relative to being located in SEA conditional upon 
abundance in natural resources. 𝛽4 can also be interpreted as the effects on 
performance of institutional quality for a SSA country. 𝛽5, on the other hand, 
reflects the effect of natural resources on performance for a SSA country. These 
interpretations suggest that both being located in SSA (SSA) and institutional 
quality (RQ) intervene in each other’s relations to performance.     
 To put it more simply, equation (5.1) estimates the effect of SSA on Y, 
controlling for institutional quality and natural resources. Equation (5.2), by 
contrast, estimates the effect of institutional quality and abundance in natural 
resources on performance for both SSA and SEA. Finally, equation (5.3) 
estimates the effects of institutional quality and abundance in natural resources 
on performance, conditional upon regional location. Equation (5.3) can also be 
interpreted as the effects of regional location on performance, conditional upon 
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institutional quality and abundance in natural resources.5  
 With that in mind, the preferred model for examining the extent to 
which institutions (RQ) and natural resources (EXP) influence the differential 
performance (Y) between SSA and SEA will take the form of equation (5.3). 
Recall that since equation (5.3) implies that the effects of RQ and EXP on Y 
depend on regional location (SSA), caution is needed with regard to the 
interpretation of the marginal effects. As the above discussion should have 
made clear, the coefficients on RQ and EXP capture respectively the effects of 
RQ and EXP on Y when SSA=0, that is, for a SEA country. By contrast, the 
coefficients on the two interaction terms capture the effects of RQ and EXP on 
Y when SSA=1, that is, for a SSA country. These can be further illustrated as 
follows. 
Taking derivatives from equation (5.3), the marginal effect of institutional 
quality (RQ) is given by the expression:   
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑅𝑄
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝐴                 (5.4) 
 
Because SSA is dichotomous, and equals either 0 or 1, the marginal effect of 




= β2                          (5.5). 
 
                                            
5 This is because both interpretations are symmetric in the context of a multiplicative 
interaction model (Kam and Franzese 2003).  
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This is because 𝛽2[= 𝛽2 + (𝛽4 ∗ 0)]. Similarly, the marginal effect of RQ for 
a SSA country, that is, when SSA equals unity is given by: 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑅𝑄
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽4                     (5.6) 
This is because 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 [= 𝛽2 + (𝛽4 ∗ 1)].  
  So, it can be said that for a SEA country, an increase of 1 unit of RQ 
will lead to a 𝛽2 change in Y, holding constant other variables. Similarly, for a 
SSA country, a 1 unit increase in RQ will change Y  by 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 , holding 
constant other variables.  
 The same logic applies for computing the marginal effect of natural 
resources on Y for SSA and SEA countries. Again, taking derivatives from 
equation (3.3) will give the following expression:  
∂Y
∂EXP
= β3 + β5SSA         (5.7) 
 
Hence, the marginal effect of EXP on Y for a SEA country, (SSA = 0) is simply 
𝛽3. This is because 𝛽3 [= 𝛽3 + (𝛽5 ∗ 0)]. Similarly, the marginal effect of 
EXP on Y for a SSA (SSA = 1) is 𝛽3 +  𝛽5, because  𝛽3 + 𝛽5 [= 𝛽3 +
(𝛽5 ∗ 1)]. 
 
 In consequence, a 1 unit increase in natural resource abundance in a 
SEA country will lead to a 𝛽3 change in Y. In a SSA country, by contrast, a 1 




Part 2: Do resource-abundant countries in SSA perform better compared with 
their resource-scarce counterparts; and is performance in resource-abundant 
countries conditioned by institutional quality? 
The second part of the analysis makes the assumption that in SSA economic 
performance is superior in resource-abundant countries than in resource-scarce 
countries. Further, it theorizes that the effect on performance of being resource-
abundant is moderated by the quality of institutions. 
The analysis employs a similar logic as developed in the preceding discussion. 
Specifically, it estimates an equation that takes the following form: 
 
𝑌 =∝ +𝛽1𝑅𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑄 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑄) + 𝜀   (5.8) 
Where 𝑌 is an indicator of economic performance; RA is a time-invariant 
variable which equals unity if the country is resource-abundant, and takes the 
value of 0 if the country is resource-poor; 𝑅𝑄  is an institutional quality 
measure; and (RA * RQ) interacts the resource-abundant dummy with the 
continuous institutional measure.  
 Again, drawing from the logic in the preceding discussion, 𝛽1 is the 
effect of being resource-abundant on Y relative to being resource-poor, holding 
constant institutional quality. 𝛽2 is the effect of RQ on Y for a resource-poor 
country (RA = 0), because β2 =  β2 + (β3*0) . For resource-abundant 
country, by contrast, the effect of RQ on Y  is 𝛽1 + 𝛽3, because β2 + β3 =




VI. Empirical Analysis and Findings 
 
 
6.1. Background and Structure of the Chapter 
 Drawing on the empirical methodology discussed in the preceding 
chapter, this chapter attempts to empirically address the main research 
questions of this study. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is 
based on the full list of forty-five SSA and nine SEA countries introduced in 
the previous chapters, and for the period from 1995 to 2015. It empirically 
examines (1) how SSA performed compared with SEA in the post-1990 period; 
and (2) how natural resources and institutions influence patterns of performance 
across the two regions. For this purpose, it estimates pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) models that include a dummy variable for SSA and interaction 
terms between the SSA dummy and continuous measures of institutional quality 
and resource abundance, respectively. This approach is borrowed and modified 
from Collier and O’Connell (2008) who studied the differential growth 
performance between four groups of countries: resource-abundant, landlocked; 
resource-scarce, landlocked; resource-abundant, coastal; and resource-scarce, 
coastal.  
The second part in turn focuses on performance within SSA. The goal 
here is to empirically examine the impact of resource abundance and 
institutional quality on performance; and whether and how the impact on 
performance of natural resources is conditioned by institutional quality. 
Furthermore, it differentiates between two groups of countries—resource-
abundant and resource-poor. It estimates a panel of forty-five SSA countries for 
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the period from 1995 to 2015, using pooled OLS models with robust standard 
errors that account for cross-sectional dependence.  
 As already noted, the current analysis applies three sorts of 
performance measures, including GDP per capita growth, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and one aspect of social welfare, namely infant mortality 
rates. As such, the analysis controls for a range of variables that can potentially 
influence these three performance measures, including inflation rates, official 
development assistance inflows (ODA), government expenditure, urban 
population size, population growth, and dependency ratio. Aside from being 
often included in the empirical growth, governance, or resource curse literature, 
these variables are considered in the current analysis for their policy relevance, 
as will be discussed later. Furthermore, both the OLS and fixed effects 
estimations applied in this chapter use the heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and modified by 
Hoechle (2007), which account for spatial and temporal dependence in 
unbalanced panel data. This approach is also appropriate if the panel’s time 
dimension (T) is smaller than its cross-sectional dimension (N), as is the case 
in the current analysis. Regression results suggest a number of noticeable 
patterns with regard to the role of natural resources and institutions in SSA and 
SEA.   
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section two 
presents the hypotheses and empirical models. Section three reports empirical 




6.2. Regression specifications and data 
  As already noted, the analysis in this chapter is divided into two parts. 
The first part is based on the full sample of 54 SSA and SEA countries, and 
addresses the following questions: (1) how SSA performed compared with 
SEA in the post-1990 period; and (2) how natural resources and institutions 
influence patterns of performance across the two regions. The second part, on 
the other hand, focuses on the SSA sample and addresses two questions: (1) 
whether resource-abundant countries performed better compared with their 
resource-scarce counterparts; and (2) whether and how the impact on 
performance of being resource-abundant is conditioned by institutional quality. 
(1) How SSA performed compared with SEA in the post-1990 period; and (2) 
how natural resources and institutions influence patterns of performance 
across the two regions. 
In order to test the propositions formulated in the current study, regression (6.1) 
is first introduced: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6.1) 
Where i = 1, …, 54 denotes the countries and t = 1995, 1996, 1997, …, 2015 
is the year extending from 1995 to 2015. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of economic 
performance in country i and year t; SSA is a time-invariant variable which 
equals unity if the country is located in SSA, and takes the value 0 if located in 
SEA; 𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the Regulatory Quality Score in country i in year t; 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the 
share of natural resource exports in percentage of total merchandise exports in 
country i in year t. Note that for the purpose of the current analysis, RQ and 
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institutional quality, as well as EXP and abundance in natural resources will be 
used interchangeably. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
In regression (6.1), ∝ (the intercept) is the expected effects of being located in 
SEA, holding constant institutional quality and abundance in natural resources. 
𝛽1 captures the effects of being located in SSA relative to being located in SEA, 
holding constant institutional quality and abundance in natural resources. 𝛽2 
captures the effects of institutional quality, while 𝛽3 captures the effects of 
abundance in natural resources in both SSA and SEA.  
Regression (6.1), however, does not explicitly capture the effects of 
institutional quality or abundance in natural resources for a SSA country 
relative to a SEA country. Hence, regression (6.2) modifies regression (6.1) by 
introducing two interactions terms: one that interacts the SSA dummy with the 
continuous institutional quality variable (RQ), and another that captures 
interactions between the SSA dummy and the continuous resource abundance 
variable (EXP). Overall, this gives a model that can be expressed as follows:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗
𝐸𝑋𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                        
(6.2) 
 
Regression (6.2) has the same structure as regression (6.1), but includes two 
multiplicative variables. Specifically, 𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑄  is an interactions term 
between the SSA binary variable and the continuous measure of institutional 
quality (Regulatory Quality); similarly, 𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃 interacts the SSA dummy 
with the continuous resource abundance measure (EXP). Regression (6.2) thus 
allows seeing the strength of institutional quality, abundance in natural 
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resources, and their interactions in explaining performance across SSA and 
SEA. It shows if the regional effect on economic performance can be changed 
by the quality of institutions and abundance in natural resources. More 
specifically, ∝ (the intercept) captures the expected value of 𝑌𝑖𝑡 for a SEA 
country when other variables equal zero. 𝛽1  captures the effect of being 
located in SSA relative to being located in SEA when the quality of institutions 
and abundance in natural resources equal zero. 𝛽2  and 𝛽3  respectively 
capture the effects of changes in institutional quality and abundance in natural 
resources if the country is located in SEA. By contrast, 𝛽4 captures the effect 
of changes in institutional quality for a country located in SSA relative to SEA 
country. Finally, 𝛽4 captures the effect of changes in resource abundance for a 
country located in SSA relative to SEA country. 
 Moreover, in order to allow for meaningful interpretation of the results, 
values of Regulatory Quality scores (RQ) as well as the share of natural 
resource exports in total merchandise exports (EXP) are centered to their 
respective means. Such transformation allows evaluating the impact of being 
located in SSA and SEA on Y at the mean of RQ and EXP. The benefit with 
centering is that values of zero on RQ or EXP would correspond to the mean, 
whereas without centering, this would not be the case (Jaccard et al 1990). More 
specifically, without centering, values of zero would correspond to zero natural 
resource exports and zero institutional quality. Since in real world every SSA 
or SEA at least exports some amount of natural resources and experiences some 
level of institutional quality, it is thus entirely appropriate using centered values.    
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 Regression (6.1) and regression (6.2) are then estimated for the three 
dependent variables: (i) lnGDP, defined as the log of GDP per capita in 2005 
constant prices; (ii) FDI, defined as the net inflows of foreign direct investment 
in billion US$; and (iii) lnIMRT, defined as the log of infant mortality rate 
(deaths per 1,000 live births).  
 Table 6.1 shows simple correlations between each of the three 
performance measures and the explanatory variables used in regression (6.1) 
and regression (6.2). Column (1) shows a negative and significant association 
between the SSA dummy and per capita GDP growth. Note also the relatively 
high and positive correlation between lnGDP and RQ. This is suggestive that 
institutional quality has a positive impact on per capita GDP growth. There is 
also a positive and significant association between natural resources and per 
capita GDP growth. The two product terms are also significantly and positively 
associated with per capita GDP growth. These suggest both institutional quality 
and abundance in natural resources augment per capita GDP growth in SSA. 
Column (2) shows correlations between FDI and other variables used in 
regression (6.1) and (6.2). Again, note the negative correlation between the SSA 
dummy and FDI, indicating the negative effect of being located in SSA on the 
flow of inward FDI. Also, RQ is significant and significantly associated with 
FDI. By contrast, the association between natural resources and FDI is not 
statistically significant for full sample. However, product term between the SSA 
dummy and natural resources seems to indicate that the association between 
natural resources and FDI is positive and significant for SSA. Finally, column 
(3) confirms the adverse impact on performance of being located in SSA. This 
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is indicated by positive and significant association between the SSA dummy 
and infant mortality rate. Note also the negative and significant association 
between RQ, the product term (SSA times RQ), and Infant mortality rate. This 
is suggestive that institutional quality significantly reduces infant mortality in 
both SSA and SEA. By contrast, the association between natural resources and 
infant mortality is positive.  
 







SSA -0.178*** -0.299*** 0.537*** 
RQ 0.523*** 0.270*** -0.603*** 
EXP 0.203*** 0.039 0.233*** 
SSA*RQ 0.332*** 0.176*** -0.351*** 
SSA*EXP 0.200*** 0.122*** 0.155*** 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 Overall, these preliminary findings seem to suggest that: first, being 
located in SSA reduces per capita GDP growth and FDI inflows, and augments 
infant mortality; second, institutional quality augments per capita GDP growth 
and FDI, and reduces infant mortality; finally, natural resources augment per 
capita GDP growth, but have no appreciable effects on FDI and infant mortality. 
Correlation does not imply causation. However, consistent with the discussion 






GDP per capita growth (log of GDP per capita) as the dependent variable: 
In regression (6.1), 𝛽1  is negative (being in SSA reduces per capita GDP 
growth relative to being in SEA when the quality of institutions and abundance 
in natural resources are not accounted for); 𝛽2 is positive (improvement in 
institutional quality increases GDP per capita for a SSA and SEA country); and 
𝛽3 is positive (increase in resource abundance increases GDP per capita for a 
SSA and SEA country). 
In regression (6.2), 𝛽1  is negative (being in SSA reduces per capita GDP 
growth relative to being in SEA when the quality of institutions and abundance 
in natural resources are not accounted for); 𝛽2 is positive (improvement in 
institutional quality in a SEA country increases GDP per capita relative to a 
SSA country); and 𝛽3 is positive (increasing institutional quality in a SEA 
country increases GDP per capita relative to a SSA country). 𝛽4 is positive 
(increasing institutional quality in a SSA country increases GDP per capita 
relative to a SEA country); and 𝛽5 is positive (abundance in natural resources 
increases GDP per capita for a SSA country relative to a SEA country). 
 
Foreign direct investment (log of FDI inflows in billion US$) as the 
dependent variable: 
In regression (6.1), 𝛽1 is negative (being in SSA reduces FDI inflows relative 
to being in SEA when institutional quality and abundance in natural resources 
are not accounted for); 𝛽2 is positive (improvement in institutional quality 
increases FDI inflows for a SSA and SEA country); and 𝛽3  is positive 




In regression (6.2), 𝛽1 is negative (being in SSA reduces FDI inflows relative 
to being in SEA when the quality of institutions and abundance in natural 
resources are not accounted for); 𝛽2  is positive (improving institutional 
quality in a SEA country increases FDI inflows relative to a SSA country); and 
𝛽3 is positive (increasing institutional quality in a SEA country increases FDI 
inflows relative to a SSA country). 𝛽4  is positive (increasing institutional 
quality in a SSA country increases relative to a SEA country); and 𝛽5  is 
positive (abundance in natural resources increases FDI inflows for a SSA 
country relative to a SEA country). 
Infant mortality rate (log of infant mortality per 1,000 live births): 
In regression (6.1), 𝛽1  is positive (being in SSA augments infant mortality 
relative to being in SEA when the quality of institutions and abundance in 
natural resources are not accounted for); 𝛽2  is negative (improving 
institutional quality reduces infant mortality for a SSA and SEA country); and 
𝛽3 is negative (increase in resource abundance reduces infant mortality for a 
SSA and SEA country). 
In regression (6.2), 𝛽1  is positive (being in SSA augments infant mortality 
relative to being in SEA when the quality of institutions and abundance in 
natural resources are not accounted for); 𝛽2  is negative (improvement in 
institutional quality in a SEA country reduces infant mortality relative to a SSA 
country); and 𝛽3 is positive (increasing institutional quality in a SEA country 
reduces infant mortality relative to a SSA country). 𝛽4 is negative (increasing 
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institutional quality in a SSA country reduces infant mortality relative to a SEA 
country); and 𝛽5 is negative (abundance in natural resources decreases infant 
mortality for a SSA country relative to a SEA country). 
 Having specified regression (1) and (2), it is also instructive to 
examine whether the effects of institutions and resource abundance on 
performance are different when other variables are controlled for. These 
variables include inflation rates, government expenditure, official development 
aid (ODA), population growth, and the share of urban population in percentage 
of total population. These variables are selected for their potential effects on 
per capita GDP growth, FDI, and infant mortality, and also for their policy 
relevance. 
 First, inflation can be regarded as an indicator of the overall ability of 
the government to manage the economy (Fischer 1991). An economy with 
higher rates of inflation is unlikely to experience higher economic growth. 
There is empirical evidence that inflation rates exceeding 17 percent have more 
distortional effects on economic performance, in particular in non-
industrialized countries (Kremer et al 2013). Following this argument, a 
variable capturing the threshold of 17 percent will be introduced in the models. 
The variable is dichotomous and equals unity if inflation in period t in country 
i exceeds 17 percent, and equals 0 if it is less than 17 percent. This variable is 
introduced to capture the effect of higher inflation rate on economic growth as 
well as on FDI and infant mortality. In fact, high inflation rates are also 
suggested to discourage the flow of FDI: countries with high and uncertain 
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inflation (unstable macroeconomic conditions) are likely to receive less FDI 
inflows (Asiedu 2006). Finally, inflation may affect social progress, in 
particular through its impact on income. By depressing income (real wage), 
inflation may have more detrimental effects for the poor (Easterly and Fischer 
2001), and thus may deteriorate measures of social progress such as infant 
mortality.   
 Second, increases in government expenditure have been suggested to 
have positive and statistically significant growth effects (Wu et al 2010). These 
positive effects depend, however, on the composition of public expenditure 
(Devarajan et al 1996) or the quality of institutions (Cooray 2009). With regard 
to the relationship between government expenditure and FDI, one needs to 
consider two lines of arguments. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence 
to the idea that increases in government spending result in the crowding of 
private investment (Bairam 1993). This is because increased public spending 
requires more government borrowing in the domestic market, which in turn 
reduces the capital available for the private sector. On the other hand, increased 
public investment in areas such as physical infrastructure and education reduces 
the cost of private capital, which in turn increases the level of private 
investment (Collier et al. 2010). Therefore, following the second line of 
argument one can argue that increases in government spending result in larger 
inflows of FDI. Finally, building on the preceding argument, increased 
government spending may lead to more investment in health care, water supply, 
and sanitation. Improvement in health, water supply, and sanitation may in turn 
result in reduced infant mortality (Gupta et al 2002). 
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 Third, population growth has been suggested to be positively and 
significantly associated with economic growth in developing countries 
(Yanikkaya 2010). Other studies have suggested that a large growth in 
population can depress growth and prevent development (van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke, 2008). In the case of SSA for instance, rapid population growth 
since the early 1970s has been argued to have depressed individual African 
incomes in comparison with those of citizens of other regions such as SEA or 
Latin America (Ndulu et al. (2007). Empirical literature on FDI, on the other 
hand, has often included population size as a proxy for the market size under 
the hypothesis that a larger domestic market is likely to attract greater FDI 
inflows (see, for example, Mottaleb and Kalirajan 2010). 
  Forth, Official Development Aid (ODA) is suggested to positively 
affect performance. A developing country that receives a large inflow of foreign 
aid is likely to experience positive economic and social outcomes, including 
higher growth, reduced poverty and lower infant mortality (Arndt et al 2015). 
This is because aid increases investment in physical and human capital 
(Clemens et al. 2012). Hence, by raising the marginal productivity of capital, 
ODA may have a catalyzing effect on FDI (Selaya and Sunesen 2012). In 
consequence, this analysis expects that ODA is positively associated with 
economic growth and FDI, and negatively associated with infant mortality.  
 Fifth, the size of the urban population also can potentially influence 
performance. Some studies have suggested that it positively affects growth, as 
populations living in cities might be more productive compared to those living 
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in rural areas (e.g., Bertinelli and Black, 2004). Also, a larger urban population 
offers some potential economic gains in terms of access to a larger pool of 
workers, localized knowledge spillovers, and economies of scale related to 
infrastructure and other public services, which in turn can influence the net 
inflows of FDI (Guimarae et al 2000). Finally, urbanization is suggested to have 
positive implications for national development (Njoh 2003). 
 Hence, in the following specification the five variables introduced 
above are added to regression (6.2): 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑆𝑆𝐴 ∗
𝐸𝑋𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑍)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                 
(6.3) 
Regression (6.3) modifies regression (6.2) by adding 𝑍𝑖𝑡, which is a vector of 
control variables. 𝑍𝑖𝑡  includes 𝐼𝑛𝑓17𝑖𝑡  , which is a dummy variable 
capturing rates of inflation exceeding 17 percent. It takes the value of 1 if 
inflation rates in country i and year t exceeds 17 percent, and equals 0 if it is 
less than 17 percent; 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the net official development assistance and 
official aid received in current US$ per capita in country i and year t; 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 
is the government expenditure in percentage of GDP in country i and year t; 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 is introduced to capture population growth. It denotes the logarithm 
of total population in country i and year t; 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 denotes the size of the 
urban population in percentage of the total population in country i and year t; 
Finally, HIC is dummy variable that equals unity if the country has a per capita 
income exceeding 12.476 US$ (High-income) according to the World Bank 




Before estimating regressions (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3), it is worth noting 
the following points. First, the panel at hand is unbalanced. As shown in Table 
6.2, observations for some continuous variables are missing. Second, the 
number of countries (cross-sections) is larger than the number of years (time 
series), that is N > T. Third, countries within and across both SSA and SEA may 
potentially exhibit cross-sectional dependence, perhaps due to some 
unobservable common factors, including location, distance, or common 
economic or institutional factors across or within the two regions. It has been 
stated that many countries in both SSA and SEA have similar social structure 
and history, ethnic and religious diversity, and institutional landscape 
dominated by authoritarian regimes, corruption, patronage, and elite rent-
seeking (Lewis 2013: 52). Also, changes in commodity prices are likely to 
affect economies in both regions. Overall, the presence of a cross-sectional 
dependence in the dataset is confirmed after conducting a Pesaran’s test of cross 
sectional dependence. The null hypothesis of no contemporaneous correlation 
is rejected for all regressions (p value of Perasan’s test equals 0.000 using each 
of the three dependent variables). This in turn suggests that estimating 
regression (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3) without accounting for such disturbances 
would lead to biased statistical inference (Hsiao 2014: 327). Finally, including 
fixed effects in regression (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3) would remove one of the main 




Straightforward alternatives for estimating regression (6.1), (6.2), and 
(6.3) are pooled OLS and random effects. The former constitutes the preferred 
estimation strategy given the interest in examining the overall impact of 
institutions and abundance in natural resources on performance for all 
individual countries included in the sample. Following Baltagi’s (1995: 47) 
words, the interest here is in testing whether the behavioral relationship 
predicting performance from one year to the other over the twenty-one-year 
period is the same across SSA and SEA countries.  
The aforementioned concerns, including the unbalanced nature of the 
panel at hand, cross-sectional dependence, time-invariant independent 
variables, alongside the purpose of the current analysis, justify use of pooled 
OLS with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. In effect, the estimators proposed by 
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) and adjusted by Hoechle (2007) produce 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors that are robust to temporal and 
spatial dependence in unbalanced panel data with N > T. In addition, it is worth 
noting that in regression (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3) residuals are constrained to be 
autocorrelated up to 2 lags. The choice for the 2 year lags follows procedures 
proposed by Newey and West (1994) for automatically selecting the optimum 
number of lags according to an asymptotic mean squared error criterion. 6  
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics of all continuous variables.  
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
Urban 1,130 37.07 15.74 7.211 87.16 
SSA 1,134 0.833 0.373 0 1 
lnGDP 1,134 6.788 1.228 4.028 10.32 
lnIMR 1,134 4.012 0.663 1.792 5.064 
lnFDI 1,134 4.841 2.824 -8.871 9.993 
INFL17 1,134 0.116 0.320 0 1 
lnPOP 1,134 2.138 1.639 -2.586 5.551 
HIC 1,134 0.0370 0.189 0 1 
EXP 1,134 0 30.40 -34.80 64.61 
SSA*EXP 1,134 3.224 28.49 -34.80 64.61 
RQ 1,134 0 20.50 -31.67 63.33 
SSA*RQ 1,134 -1.925 17.02 -31.20 51.98 
ODA 1,070 598.6 819.1 -943.2 11,428 
GEXP 1,102 24.18 10.74 2.147 128.3 
SSA*INFL17 1,134 0.0996 0.300 0 1 
SSA*GEX 1,102 20.49 13.66 0 128.3 
SSA*ODA 1,070 497.9 770.9 -14.13 11,428 
SSA*lnPOP 1,134 1.603 1.555 -2.586 5.205 
SSA*Urban 1,130 30.13 19.30 0 87.16 
Number of groups 54 54 54 54 54 
 
 
(2) Do resource-abundant countries performed better compared with their 
resource-scarce counterparts? Is the impact on performance of being 
resource-abundant conditioned by institutional quality? 
In order to address these questions, the following regression is estimated:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑅𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐻𝐼𝐶 +  ∑ [
𝑛
𝑘=5 𝛽𝑘(𝑍)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝐴 ∗
𝛽𝑘(𝑍)𝑖𝑡] +    𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (6.4)  
Where i = 1, …, 45 denotes the countries and t = 1995, 1996, 1997, …, 2015 
is the year extending from 1995 to 2015. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a performance measure in 
country i and year t; 𝑅𝐴  is a time-invariant variable capturing whether a 
country is resource-abundant or not. It equals unity if the country’s average of 
total natural resource exports represents at least 25 percent of total merchandise 
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exports for the period 1995-2015. RA equals 0 otherwise. 𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡  is the 
Regulatory Quality Score in country i in year t; (𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑄)𝑖𝑡 is the interaction 
term between RA and RQ. 𝑍  is a vector of control variables, including 
𝐼𝑛𝑓17𝑖𝑡 (a dummy variable which equals unity if annual rates of inflation 
exceeds 17 percent); 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 (net official development assistance and official 
aid received in current US$ per capita in country i and year t); 𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 (the 
government expenditure in percentage of GDP in country i and year t); 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 (population growth); 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 (the urban population in percentage of 
the total population in country i and year t); Finally, UMHIC is dummy variable 
that equals unity if the country has a per capita income exceeding 4.036 
US$ (Upper-middle-income and High-income countries). Each of the controls 
included in vector Z is interacted with the resource-abundant (RA) dummy in 
order to allow for different effect between resource-abundant and resource-poor 
countries.  
Again regression (6.4) is estimated using pooled OLS with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors. Further, the Newey and West's (1994) procedure 
constrain the residuals to be autocorrelated up to 2 lags. Table 6.3 presents 
descriptive statistics of all continuous variables.  
 Table 6.3 provides a more detailed description as well as sources of 





Table 6.3: Variables and sources 
Variable Description Source 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Logarithm of per capita GDP in 







Share of natural resource exports in 
total merchandise exports (%). It is 
obtained using the following formula: 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡
= 100 ∗
 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡 +   𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
Where Total Exports is the total 
merchandise exports in current US$; 
OIL is the oil (mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials) exports in current 
US$ and MIN is the minerals (ores, 
metals, precious stones and non-






Regulatory Quality Regulatory Quality percentile rank 
scores, centered to the mean 
Kaufman et al. 
(2008, 2011) and 
available online 














Logarithm of foreign direct investment 
inflows in current US$. Since data on 
FDI inflows includes both positive and 
negative values, the log of FDI has 
been computed as follows using Stata: -
ln(-FDI + 1) if FDI <=0; and ln(FDI + 
1) if FDI > 0  
UNCTAD 




Urban population  Urban population, % of total population UNCTAD 
ODA The net official development assistance 
and official aid received in current 
US$ per capita  
WDI 
Infant mortality rate Logarithm of the number of children 
dying before the age of 5 per 1,000 
births 
WDI 
Inflation A dummy  variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the annual % change in 




takes the value of 0 otherwise 
HIC A dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the country is classified as High-
income economy in the World Bank’s 
classification, and has a value of 0 
otherwise. HIC includes the following 
countries: Brunei and Seychelles 
World Bank 
UMHIC Is a variable created using SSA 
countries classified as Upper-middle-
income or High-income countries in the 
World Bank’s classification 
World Bank 
RA Is a variable created to classify SSA 
countries into two groups, namely 
resource-abundant and resource-poor. It 
equals unity if the country’s average 
share of natural resource exports 
exceeds 5 percent of total merchandise 
exports in the period 1995-2015. It takes 
the value of 0 if the country’s average 
natural resource exports represent less 
than 25 percent of total merchandise 





6.3. Empirical Findings 
 Consistent with the preceding section, results are divided into two 
parts. The first part is based on the full sample of 54 SSA and SEA countries, 
while the second part focuses on the SSA sub-sample. Note also that several 
regressions are run to test the robustness of the main results, namely the effects 
of natural resources and institutional quality on measures of socioeconomic 
performance. These regressions employ different institutional and 
socioeconomic performance measures. However, in order to keep the 
discussion in the current chapter focused, results of these alternative regressions 





6.3.1. Estimation of the full sample (SSA versus SEA) 
Recall that when interaction terms are included, as in regression (6.2) and 
regression (6.3), it is useful to go beyond the results table and compute the 
marginal effects of the variables of interest on Y (Brambor et al. 2005). For this 
purpose, the analysis relies upon the differentiation method to compute and 
interpret substantively meaningful marginal effects. With respect to regression 
(6.2) and regression (6.3), the effects of RQ on Y (performance measure) for a 
SEA country (i.e., SSA = 0), is simply: 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑅𝑄
= 𝛽2           (6.5) 
In expression (6.6), the coefficient 𝛽2 indicates by how much Y changes with 
a percentile increase in RQ score when SSA equals 0, that is, for a SEA country.  
Similarly, expression (6.6) below indicates the amount by which a percent 
increase in EXP increases Y for a SEA country:  
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐸𝑋𝑃
= 𝛽3           (6.6) 
For a SSA country, that is, when SSA equals unity, the effects of RQ on Y can 
be expressed as follows: 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑅𝑄
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽4          (6.7) 
Finally, the effect of EXP on Y for a SSA country can be expressed as follows: 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐸𝑋𝑃
= 𝛽3 + 𝛽5        (6.8) 
Expressions (6.5) through (6.8) can thus be applied to compute and interpret 
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the interactive effects from regression (6.2) and (6.3). Because regression (6.3) 
includes all the explanatory variables considered in the current analysis, it is 
the preferred model to compute the interactive effects for relevant values of RQ 
and EXP. Tables 6.4, 6.6, and 6.8 show the estimation results when the 
dependent variable is lnGDP (per capita GDP growth), lnFDI (growth rate of 
FDI inflows), and lnIMR (infant mortality rate), respectively. In each of these 
tables, Column (1) shows the regression (6.1), that is, where the SSA dummy, 
RQ, and EXP are the only explanatory variables; column (2) reports results 
from regression (6.2), where the interaction terms are included; and column (3) 
shows results from regression (6.3). Overall, in spite of the small magnitude of 
the coefficients, the regression results show a number of noticeable points. 
Per capita GDP growth as the dependent variable: 
Results reported in Table 6.4 somewhat fully confirm the hypotheses about the 
signs of the coefficient estimates. First, the coefficient on SSA is negative and 
statistically significant in all the regressions. 
 In regression (6.1), it suggests that all else held constant, being located 
in SSA reduces per capita GDP growth relative to a being located in SEA by -
0.450 percentage points, at the 1 percent significance level. Second, the 
coefficients on RQ and EXP are both positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level. Specifically, the coefficient on RQ suggests that a one percentile increase 
in Regulatory Quality score increases per capita GDP growth by 0.03 
percentage points in a SSA or SEA country. The coefficient on EXP, on the 
other hand, indicates that a one percent increase in the share of natural resource 
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exports in percentage of total merchandise exports augments per capita GDP 
growth by 0.01 percentage points in a SSA or a SEA country.  
 Overall, regression (6.1) confirms the negative effect of being located 
in SSA on per capita GDP relative to being located in SEA. It further shows 
that institutional quality and abundance in natural resources in all SSA and SEA 
countries have positive effects on per capita GDP growth, somewhat against the 
resource curse thesis. Regression (1), however, does not include the interaction 
terms.  
 With respect to regression (6.2), inclusion of interactions terms also 
shows some interesting patterns. First, the coefficient on the intercept suggests 
that all else remaining constant, per capita GDP growth in a SEA country 
increases relative to a SSA country by 7.38 percentage points. Second, the 
coefficient on SSA is negative. It suggests that when institutional quality and 
abundance in natural resources are at their means, GDP per capita growth 
decreases for a SSA country relative to a SEA country by 0.67 percentage points. 
Third, the coefficient on RQ is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. It 
suggests that a one percentile increase in the Regulatory Quality score increases 
per capita GDP growth for a SEA country relative to a SSA country by 0.04 
percentage points. Fourth, the coefficient on EXP is positive and significant, 
indicating that a one percent increase in the share of natural resource exports in 
total merchandise exports augments per capita GDP growth in a SEA country 
relative to a SSA country by 0.03 percentage points. Fifth, coefficients on the 
two interaction terms are both significant at the 1 percent level. 
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 Regression (6.3) examines how location, natural resources and 
institutions affect per capita GDP growth when other explanatory variables are 
accounted for. First, it shows that being located in SSA reduces per capita GDP 
growth relative to being located in SEA by 0.24 percentage points. Now, 
expression (6.5) and expression (6.7) can be applied to obtain the marginal 
effect of RQ on per capita GDP for a SEA and a SSA country, respectively. For 
a SEA country, a percentile increase in RQ score will increase per capita GDP 
growth by 0.02 percentage points. In a SSA country, by contrast, a 1 percentile 
increase in RQ score will augment per capita GDP growth by 0.017 percentage 
points [0.023+(-0.006) = 0.017]. On the other hand, the effect of a 1 percent 
increase in the share of natural resource exports in percentage of total 
merchandise exports is as follows: in a SEA country, it will reduce per capita 
GDP growth by 0.004 percentage points; and in a SSA country, it will augment 










Table 6.4: Pooled OLS with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. 
Dependent variable = lnGDP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 
SSA -0.450*** -0.672*** -0.242** 
 (0.088) (0.066) (0.087) 
RQ 0.033*** 0.0446*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
EXP 0.014*** 0.032*** -0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
SSA*RQ  -0.018*** -0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) 
SSA*EXP  -0.0199*** 0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
INFL17   -0.084 
   (0.090) 
GEX   0.012*** 
   (0.002) 
ODA   0.00001 
   (0.00003) 
lnPOP   -0.154*** 
   (0.030) 
Urban   0.027*** 
   (0.003) 
HIC   1.125*** 
   (0.101) 
Constant 7.163*** 7.378*** 5.959*** 
 (0.098) (0.056) (0.207) 
    
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,035 
R-squared 0.381 0.412 0.624 
Number of groups 54 54 54 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 In addition, coefficients on control variables are also of interest: first, 
as one could expect, inflation rates exceeding 17 percent per annum is 
negatively associated with per capita GDP growth, although the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant; second, the coefficient on ODA is insignificant. This 
gives no indication that SSA and SEA countries that receive larger flows of net 
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official development assistance and official aid per capita significantly 
experience increase in per capita GDP. Third, government expenditure 
significantly increases per capita GDP growth by 0.012 percentage points at the 
1 percent level in both SSA and SEA. Finally, consistent with the theory, 
population growth significantly reduces per capita GDP growth by 0.154 
percentage points, whereas larger urban population size in percentage of the 
total population significantly increases per capita GDP growth by 0.027 
percentage points.   
 Overall, regression (6.3) suggests that the magnitude of the effects of 
institutions and natural resources differ between SSA and SEA. Specifically, 
higher levels of institutional quality augment per capita GDP in both SSA and 
SEA, but the magnitude of the effect is somewhat larger in SEA than in SSA. 
With regard to abundance in natural resources, on the other hand, the effect is 
positive in SSA, but negative in SEA. 
 In order to get a better sense of these effects, marginal effects of RQ 
and EXP on Y (per capita GDP) are calculated for relevant values of RQ and 
EXP. Specifically, marginal effects are calculated at 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th 
percentile of RQ and EXP for the year 20157. Hence, for the year 2015, the 10th, 
25th, 75th, and 90th percentile of RQ correspond to the value of RQ for Sudan, 
Central African Republic, Botswana, and Malaysia, respectively. Conversely, 
the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile of EXP correspond to the value of EXP 
                                            
7 2015 is chosen for purely illustrative purpose. One could randomly pick a year in the 
period extending from 1995 to 2015. 
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for Swaziland, Comoros, Chad, and DR Congo, respectively. Results are 
reported in Table 6.5, and show some notable points. First, in both SSA and 
SEA per capita GDP growth augments as RQ increases. In either SSA or SEA, 
a country whose RQ in 2015 equals that of Sudan would experience lower per 
capita GDP growth compared to a country with a RQ as higher as that of 
Malaysia.   
 The second notable point is that per capita GDP growth in SEA is 
higher relative to SSA at lower levels of EXP. In SSA, by contrast, per capita 
GDP growth increases as EXP increases. For instance, at a EXP level similar to 
Swaziland (2.63 percent) SEA countries would experience higher per capita 
GDP growth relative to their SSA counterparts. By contrast, at a EXP level 
similar to the DR Congo (91 percent) SEA countries would experience lower 
per capita GDP growth relative to their SSA counterparts.  
Table 6.5: Marginal effects of RQ and EXP on per capita GDP growth, at the 
10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles 




RQ 10 -26.864 -0.472 -0.627 
25 -26.383 -0.463 -0.616 
75 36.597 0.643 0.854 
90 42.848 0.753 0.999 
EXP 10 -32.200 -0.267 0.116 
25 -31.479 -0.262 0.114 
75 56.093 0.4667 -0.203 
90 56.656 0.471 -0.205 






Foreign direct investment as the dependent variable: 
 Table 6.6 reports the estimating results when foreign direct investment 
(lnFDI) is used as the dependent variable. Here, the negative and significant 
coefficient on SSA in regression (6.1) indicates that being located in SSA 
reduces FDI inflows relative to being located in SEA by 2.189 percentage 
points, holding constant other factors. Also interestingly, the coefficients on RQ 
and EXP are both positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient 
on RQ indicates that a 1 percentile increase in Regulatory Quality score leads 
to an increase of FDI inflows by 0.031 percentage points, irrespective of 
regional location.  
 Conversely, a one percent increase in the share of natural resource 
exports in total merchandise exports in a SSA or SEA country augments FDI 
inflows by 0.02 percentage points. Regression (6.1) in Table 6.6 thus confirms 
the hypothesis on the negative effect on FDI inflows of being located in SSA 
relative to being located in SEA. It further confirms the positive effects of better 
institutional quality and abundance in natural resources on FDI inflows in the 
overall sample.  
 Regression (6.2) shows the following patterns: first, being located in 
SSA reduces FDI inflows by 1.235 percentage points. Second, the coefficient 
on RQ is positively and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
indicates a positive effect of RQ on FDI inflows for a SEA country. By contrast, 
the coefficient on EXP, although statistically significant, has a negative sign. 
This implies that resource-abundance reduces FDI inflows for a SEA country. 
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Third, the coefficient on the first interaction term is negative and statistically 
insignificant. The negative sign implies that RQ is negatively associated with 
FDI inflows for a SSA country. Finally, the positive and significant coefficient 
on the second interaction term implies that abundance in natural resources 
increases FDI inflows for a SSA country. These effects are further analyzed by 
computing the marginal effects for substantial values of RQ and EXP, and using 
results from regression (6.3).  
Table 6.6: Pooled OLS with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Dependent 
variable = lnFDI 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 
SSA -2.189*** -1.235*** -0.375 
 (0.252) (0.326) (0.664) 
RQ 0.0312*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) 
EXP 0.015*** -0.029*** -0.0272** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) 
SSA*RQ  -0.008 -0.011 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
SSA*EXP  0.047*** 0.031** 
  (0.006) (0.014) 
INFL17   -0.351 
   (0.335) 
GEX   0.025* 
   (0.013) 
ODA   0.001*** 
   (0.0001) 
lnPOP   0.521*** 
   (0.098) 
Urban   0.034*** 
   (0.009) 
HIC   1.348*** 
   (0.294) 
Constant 6.665*** 5.704*** 1.590 
 (0.393) (0.467) (1.001) 
    
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,035 
R-squared 0.154 0.164 0.285 
Number of groups 54 54 54 
Standard errors in parentheses 




 Regression (6.3) confirms results of regression (6.2) after controlling 
for other variables. First, being located in SSA reduces FDI inflows by 0.375 
percentage points. Second, for a SEA country a percentile increase in RQ score 
will augment the flow of inward FDI by 0.032 percentile points [0.032 + (-
0.027)]. For a SSA country, a 1 percent increase in RQ score will augment the 
flow of inward FDI by 0.021 percentage points. Third, increasing EXP by 1 
percent reduce the flow of inward FDI in a SEA country by 0.027 percentage 
points. For a SSA country, by contrast, increasing EXP by 1 percent will 
increase the flow of inward FDI by 0.004 percentage points [-0.027 + 0.031 = 
0.027]. These effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 With FDI as the dependent variable, regress (6.3) suggests that natural 
resources have more appreciable effects for a SSA country compared with a 
SEA country. On the other hand, institutional quality augments the flow of 
inward FDI in both SSA and SEA. Again, in order to get a better sense of these 
findings it is instructive to compute the effects of RQ and EXP at reasonable 
values of RQ and EXP. Accordingly, marginal effects of RQ and EXP on FDI 
are calculated at 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile of RQ and EXP for the year 
2015. Results are reported in Table 6.7. It can be observed that FDI inflows 
augment both in SSA and SEA as RQ increases. By contrast, as the value of 
EXP augments, FDI inflows augment in SSA but decrease in SEA.  
 Specifically, at higher levels of EXP such as that of the DR Congo in 
2015 (91 percent), a SEA country would receive less FDI inflows relative to a 
SSA country. By contrast, at lower levels of EXP such as in Swaziland, SEA 
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countries would receive more FDI inflows than their SSA counterparts.  
 The picture is different for the effects of RQ. In either SSA or SEA a 
country with a RQ score as high as in Malaysia would receive more FDI inflows 
compared to a country with a RQ score as low as Sudan.  
Table 6.7: Marginal effects of RQ and EXP on FDI inflows, at the 10th, 
25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles 




RQ 10 -26.864 -0.547 -0.848 
25 -26.383 --0.538 -0.833 
75 36.597 0.746 1.156 
90 42.848 0.873 1.352 
EXP 10 -32.200 -0.115 0.876 
25 -31.479 -0.113 0.856 
75 56.093 0.201 -1.525 
90 56.656 0.203 -1.541 
Note: RQ and EXP at 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile are computed for the year 
2015 
 
 In addition, regression (6.3) reveals interesting associations between 
FDI inflows and the control variables. First, although not statistically 
significant, annual rates of inflation exceeding 17 percent reduce FDI inflows. 
Second, the coefficient on the net official development assistance and official 
aid is significant and positively associated with FDI inflows at the 1 percent 
level. Third, government expenditure in percentage of GDP significantly 
increases FDI inflows by 0.025 percentage points at the 10 percent level. Also, 
as the theory on the determinants of FDI predict, larger market size in terms of 
population growth and urban population size positively affect FDI inflows: a 
one percentage point rise in population growth augments FDI inflows by 0.521 
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percentage points; and a one percent increase in urban population in percentage 
of total population leads to an increase of FDI inflows by 0.03 percentage points 
in SSA and SEA. Finally, being a high-income country augments FDI inflows 
relative to being in other income groups by 1.348 percentage points. Again, 
regression (6.3) seems to indicate that for a SEA country, institutions have 
primacy over natural resources in explaining FDI inflows in SEA, whereas for 
SSA, both institutions and natural resources matter for FDI.  
Infant mortality rate as the dependent variable: 
Table 6.8 presents results when infant mortality rate is used as the dependent 
variable. In all of the three regressions, the coefficient on SSA is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent significance level. It indicates that being located in 
SSA augments infant mortality relative to being located in SEA. In regression 
(6.1), Regulatory Quality significantly reduces infant mortality, whereas 
abundance in natural resources has no appreciable effect on infant mortality in 
both SSA and SEA.  
Regression (6.2) also shows some interesting patterns: first, the negative and 
significant coefficient on RQ suggests that RQ decreases infant mortality for a 
SEA country. Second, the positive coefficient on EXP indicates that EXP has 
no appreciable effect on infant mortality for a SEA country. For a SSA country, 
on the other hand, abundance in natural resources lowers infant mortality, 




 Regression (6.3) confirms that being located in SSA augments infant 
mortality relative to being located in SEA by 0.458 percentile points. Increasing 
institutional quality reduces infant mortality in SEA and SSA by 0.015 and 
0.008 [0.008 = -0.015 + 0.006] percentage points, respectively. Abundance in 
natural resources augments infant mortality in SEA and SEA by 0.012 and 
0.004 [0.004 = 0.012 + (-0.008) percentage points, respectively. Regression (6.3) 
thus suggests that in both SSA and SEA, institutional quality reduces infant 
mortality, whereas abundance in natural resources augments it.  
Table 6.8: Pooled OLS with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. 
Dependent variable = lnIMR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 
SSA 0.717*** 0.787*** 0.458*** 
 (0.026) (0.099) (0.054) 
RQ -0.0161*** -0.024*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
EXP 0.001 -0.008* 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
SSA*RQ  0.012*** 0.006** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
SSA*EXP  0.009** -0.008*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) 
INFL17   0.032 
   (0.065) 
GEX   -0.008*** 
   (0.001) 
ODA   -0.0001*** 
   (0.000) 
lnPOP   0.0238** 
   (0.010) 
Urban   -0.012*** 
   (0.001) 
HIC   -0.948*** 
   (0.037) 
Constant 3.415*** 3.350*** 4.330*** 
 (0.068) (0.035) (0.142) 
    
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,035 
R-squared 0.523 0.562 0.706 
Number of groups 54 54 54 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 It is also instructive to calculate the marginal effects for relevant 
values of RQ and EXP. Consistent with Table 6.5 and Table 6.7, Table 6.9 
reports the marginal effects at 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile of RQ and EXP. 
It shows that infant mortality decreases in both SSA and SEA as institutional 
quality (RQ) increases. Note, however, that the effect is superior for SEA. On 
the other hand, as resource abundance increases infant mortality also augments 
in both regions. 
 Put differently, having a RQ score similar to Malaysia in 2015 would 
decrease infant mortality by 0.355 and 0.621 percentage points in a country 
located in SSA and SEA, respectively. Similarly, a lower level of RQ similar to 
Sudan in 2015 would imply a higher infant mortality.  
 With regard to natural resources, results reported in Table 6.9 indicate 
that having high levels of EXP like the DR Congo in 2015 (91 percent) would 
have a detrimental effect on social progress (i.e. infant mortality), irrespective 
of whether the country is located in SSA or SEA. 
Table 6.9: Marginal effects of RQ and EXP on infant mortality rate, at 
the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles 




RQ 10 -26.864 0.223 0.389 
25 -26.383 0.219 0.382 
75 36.597 -0.303 -0.530 
90 42.848 -0.355 -0.621 
EXP 10 -32.200 -0.118 -0.375 
25 -31.479 -0.115 -0.367 
75 56.093 0.205 0.654 
90 56.656 0.207 0.660 




 It is also instructive to see the relationship between infant mortality 
and the control variables, despite the small coefficients. First, annual rates of 
inflation exceeding 17 percent (INFL17) are positively correlated with infant 
mortality. Second, with negative and significant coefficient at the 1 percent 
lever, net official development assistance and official aid (ODA) reduces infant 
mortality. Larger government expenditure is significant and negatively 
correlated with infant mortality. Population growth is also significant and 
negatively associated with infant mortality. This correlation may, however, 
appear counter-intuitive. A recent study shows that reduced mortality leads to 
population growth (Shelton 2014). Against the so-called ‘child survival 
hypothesis’, the study shows that substantial declines in infant mortality in a 
number of SSA countries have not been followed by declines in 
fertility.
8
Furthermore, the study argues that reduced child mortality contributes 
to rapid population growth in particular in pre-transition societies such as in 
SSA. It seems thus possible that population growth at some time lag be 




                                            
8 According to this hypothesis, when children survive in greater numbers, parents 




 Finally, a 1 percent increase in urban population in percentage of total 
population reduces infant mortality by 0.01 percentage points. As noted in the 
preceding section, urban population is likely to have access to better health 
infrastructure and facilities which in turn can contribute to decreasing infant 
mortality. Conversely, being high-income reduces infant mortality by 0.93 
percentage points.   
6.3.2. Estimation of the SSA sub-sample (resource-abundant versus 
resource-scarce) 
 As previously noted, the second part of the analysis focuses on the 
SSA sample. It examines whether performance is superior for resource-
abundant countries compared with resource-poor countries. Further, it 
examines whether and how institutional quality promotes or hinder 
performance in a resource-abundant country relative to a resource-poor country. 
For this purpose, the model employed to address these questions allows for the 
effects of all explanatory variables (except UMHIC) to vary between resource-
abundant and resource-scarce countries. Table 6.10 shows the estimation 
results, indicating a number of noticeable points. 
 First, being resource-abundant has no significant effect on per capita 
GDP growth relative to being resource-poor. Second, being resource-abundant 
augments the flow of inward FDI relative to being resource-poor by 2.858 
percentage points. This is consistent with some existing empirical studies on 
the determinants of FDI in SSA suggesting a positive and significant 
association between FDI inflows and abundance in natural resources (i.e., 
Anyanwu 2011). Third, being resource-abundant augments infant mortality 
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relative to being resource-poor by 0.228 percentage points. Fourth, a 1 
percentile increase in RQ score will augment per capita GDP growth in a 
resource-poor country by 0.012 percentage points, but will reduce per capita 
GDP growth in a resource-abundant country by 0.003 percentage points [-0.003 
= 0.012 + (-0.014)]. Fifth, a 1 percentile increase in RQ score will augment the 
flow of inward FDI in both resource-abundant and resource-scarce countries by 
0.027 and 0.014 [= 0.027 + (-0.014)] percentage points, respectively. This is 
consistent with the results from regression (6.3) (see Table 6.7) suggesting that 
improvement in institutional quality augments the flow of inward FDI in both 
SSA and SEA. Sixth, increasing RQ score by 1 percentile will reduce infant 
mortality by 0.01 percentage points in a resource-poor country. Similarly, a 1 
percentile increase in RQ score will reduce infant mortality in a resource-
abundant country by 0.005 percentage points [-0.005 = -0.009 + 0.004]. This is 
suggestive that improvement in institutional quality has appreciable effect on 














Table 6.10: Estimation results from regression (6.4) 
 (1) (2) (3) 






RA -0.262 2.858*** 0.228 
 (0.156) (0.937) (0.178) 
RQ 0.012*** 0.027*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
RA*RQ -0.0141*** -0.014 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
INFL17 -0.239*** -0.166 -0.074 
 (0.032) (0.238) (0.112) 
RA*INFL1 -0.171 -0.0205 0.175* 
 (0.150) (0.584) (0.096) 
GEX 0.006*** 0.039*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) 
RA*GEX -0.006 -0.008 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.004) 
ODA 0.0002*** 0.0009*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.000) 
RA*ODA -0.0002** -0.0002 0.0003*** 
 (0.00005) (0.0004) (0.003) 
lnPOP -0.252*** 0.566*** 0.153*** 
 (0.020) (0.122) (0.022) 
RA*lnPOP 0.290*** -0.187 -0.187*** 
 (0.027) (0.201) (0.014) 
Urban 0.015*** 0.061*** -0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
RA*Urban 0.003 -0.050* 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.027) (0.003) 
UMHIC 1.758*** 0.093 -0.390*** 
 (0.067) (0.522) (0.053) 
Constant 5.982*** -0.346 4.567*** 
 (0.069) (0.808) (0.189) 
Observations 876 876 876 
R-squared 0.743 0.270 0.627 
Number of groups 45 45 45 
Standard errors in parentheses 









The aim in this chapter was two-fold. First, empirically examine the 
extent to which institutions and natural resources influence patterns of 
performance across SSA and SEA. Second, empirically examine whether 
resource-abundant countries in SSA experience better performance in economic 
and social indicators, and whether institutional quality influence these effects. 
Overall, the findings can be summarized as follows: 
1. All else held constant, being located in SSA is significantly associated 
with lower per capita GDP growth, lower flow of inward FDI, and 
higher infant mortality rates relative to being located in SEA. These 
results thus corroborate the prevailing argument of SSA’s under-
performance compared to other developing regions. 
2. Institutional quality is an important determinant of the three 
performance indicators in both SSA and SEA. Specifically, improving 
institutional quality increases per capita GDP growth and the flow of 
inward FDI, and reduces infant mortality, irrespective of regional 
location (SSA or SEA). The magnitude of the impact of institutional 
quality, however, is larger for SEA compared with SSA. 
3. Abundance in natural resources augments infant mortality in both SSA 
and SEA. However, the effects of abundance in natural resources on 
the two other performance measures (per capita GDP growth and FDI) 
are different between SSA and SEA: on the one hand, increasing 
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resource-abundance augments per capita GDP growth and the flow of 
inward FDI in SSA, and on the other, it reduces per capita GDP growth 
and the flow of inward FDI in SEA.  
4. Comparing performance across resource-abundant and resource-poor 
countries in SSA reveals that institutional quality matters for both 
groups. Specifically, increasing the RQ score increases per capita GDP 
growth and the flow of inward FDI, and reduces infant mortality in 














7. Implications and Conclusion 
7.1. Summary of principle findings 
 The main purpose of this study was to examine performance in 
economic and social indicators in SSA countries relative to their SEA 
counterparts over the period from 1990 to 2015. The interest in such analysis 
originated in the observation that poor institutional quality or governance and 
abundance in natural resources, often argued to explain SSA’s development 
problems, are in fact also present in a large part of SEA. For instance, many 
countries in both regions are among the world’s most corrupt according to the 
Transparency International’s CPI and are similarly richly endowed in natural 
resources such as oil and gas. The aim thus was to explain causalities between 
abundance in natural resources, institutional quality, and their interactions, and 
socioeconomic outcomes in the two regions.   
 Specifically, the study attempted to address the following questions: 
(1) how SSA performed relative to SEA in the period between 1990 and 2015; 
(2) whether and how abundance in natural resources and institutional quality 
influence patterns of socioeconomic performance across and within the two 
regions; and (3) whether and how the impact on socioeconomic performance of 
natural resources is conditioned by institutional quality.  
 In order to address these questions, the study drew upon two analytical 
perspectives: (1) the institutional perspective (institutions as the fundamental 
cause of good economic performance); and (2) the resource curse perspective 
(abundance in or dependence on natural resources, especially minerals and oil, 
 
 １４９ 
adversely affects economic performance). In addition, the study accounted for 
the explanation according to which socioeconomic performance, especially in 
SSA, may be linked to physical or geographic factors.  
 The analysis was divided into two parts. The first part, which 
comprised chapters 4 and 5, proposed a descriptive analysis on whether and 
how natural resources and institutional quality influence performance in 
economic and social indicators in SSA and SEA. Specifically, chapter 3 
focused on a comparison of socioeconomic performance across two groups of 
SSA countries, namely resource-abundant and resource-scarce. Chapter 4, by 
contrast, proposed a comparison of the SSA and SEA data on a range of 
indicators, including institutional quality (i.e., Corruption Perception Index, 
Regulatory Quality, and Voice and Accountability), economic performance 
(i.e., per capita GDP growth, FDI, inflation rates, natural resource exports, 
economic diversification), and social welfare (i.e. infant mortality rate, 
dependency ratio). The aim here was to describe whether and how natural 
resources and institutional quality influence patterns of economic and social 
outcomes between and within the two regions.  
The second part of the analysis (chapter 6), empirically examined the 
link between natural resources, institutional quality and socioeconomic 
performance in SSA and SEA. The analysis used the Regulatory Quality 
indicator of the World Bank’s WGI and the share of natural resource exports in 
percentage of total merchandise exports as the institutional quality and natural 
resource abundance measures, respectively. Further, socioeconomic 
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performance was measured in terms of three variables: per capita GDP growth, 
the flow of inward FDI, and a measure of social progress, namely infant 
mortality rate.  
The choice for these three variables was motivated by the fact that per 
capita GDP growth is a well-accepted economic performance indicator in the 
governance or the resource curse literature. On the other hand, the ability for a 
country to attract large flows of FDI can be suggestive of improvement in other 
economic and social indicators such as know-how and technology diffusion, 
employment generation, and expansion of access to infrastructure and social 
services. Finally, infant mortality rate can be indicative of a country’s social 
welfare conditions. 
The empirical analysis was based on an estimation of pooled ordinary 
least squares (POLS) models that accounted for the interactions between 
regional location and institutional quality as well as abundance in natural 
resources. On the other hand, the analysis of socioeconomic performance 
within SSA considered interactions between institutional quality and natural 
resource abundance, and was also based upon an estimation of POLS models. 
In addition, the estimated models controlled for a range of variables that can 
potentially influence per capita GDP growth, FDI inflows, and infant mortality 
rates. Such variables included inflation rates, official development assistance 
inflows (ODA), government expenditure, urban population size, population 




 Overall, the main findings can be summarized as follows:  
1. Performance in institutional indicators such as the CPI and the WGI is 
poor in both SSA and SEA compared to more advanced economies 
(e.g. Japan, Korea, and other OECD countries);  
2. Despite similarities in terms of institutional performance in SSA and 
SEA, a country that is located in the former is likely to experience 
lower per capita GDP growth, lower FDI inflows, and higher infant 
mortality relative to a country located in SEA. Further, SEA on 
average experiences better economic and social outcomes compared to 
SSA. 
3. At the same time, regardless of the regional location (SSA or SEA), a 
country that improves its Regulatory Quality is likely to experience an 
increase in per capita GDP growth and FDI inflows, and decrease in 
infant mortality. It has been shown that better-performing-countries in 
both SSA and SEA tend to have higher Regulatory Quality scores 
compared to the poor-performing-countries. Among the countries with 
better Regulatory Quality, however, those located in SEA perform 
somewhat better than their counterparts located in SSA. 
4. The effects of natural resource abundance are particularly noticeable 
for SSA as it contributes to augmenting per capita GDP and the flow 
of inward FDI. In SEA, by contrast, what seems to matter for per capita 
GDP growth, FDI inflows, and infant mortality, is the improvement in 
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Regulatory Quality. In effect, unlike for the Regulatory Quality 
measure, there is no significant association between the natural 
resource measure and the three performance measures (per capita GDP 
growth, FDI, and infant mortality rate).  
5. Within SSA, a sound Regulatory Quality positively influences 
socioeconomic performance, regardless of whether a country is 
resource-abundant or resource-scarce. Keeping Regulatory Quality 
and other factors constant, however, socioeconomic performance 
differs between resource-abundant and resource-scarce countries: 
resource-abundant countries experience higher per capita GDP growth, 
and tend to attract larger FDI inflows compared to their resource-
scarce counterparts. By contrast, resource-scarce countries tend to 
have lower infant mortality (under-five deaths per 1,000 live births) 
compared to their resource-abundant counterparts. 
6. Finally, resource-abundant countries with a good Regulatory Quality 
have higher economic growth and receive more FDI than either 
countries with abundant natural resources and poor Regulatory Quality, 
or no resources with good Regulatory Quality, or non-resources with 
poor Regulatory Quality.  
What are the implications of these findings? It is argued in this chapter 
that institutional enhancement—a better Regulatory Quality—can be regarded 
as a precondition for achieving better economic and social outcomes. Further, 
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the benefits from having good institutions could be particularly greater for 
countries richly endowed with natural resources, especially in SSA.  
The next section elaborates these claims about the implications of the 
findings by explaining (1) the relative backwardness of SSA compared to SEA; 
(2) how SSA and SEA, with similar measured level of institutional quality, 
experience different economic and social outcomes; and (3) what can explain 
the effects of natural resources, especially on social outcomes. The last section 
then concludes with some final remarks and suggestions for future research.  
7.2. Discussion of principle findings and implications 
 In order to be more sharply focused, this section puts an emphasis on 
issues that may require further research to be addressed. The first issue concerns 
the relative backwardness of SSA compared to SEA. Throughout this study it 
has been shown that a country located in SSA is more likely to experience lower 
per capita GDP growth, smaller flow of inward FDI, and greater infant mortality 
relative to a country located in SEA. The aim in this section thus is to discuss 
what factor(s) explain(s) such poor performance and what can be done about it 
(them).  
 The second issue concerns the role of institutions in explaining the 
observed variation in economic and social outcomes between SSA and SEA. 
The aim here is to discuss how socioeconomic performance differs between the 
two regions in spite of having similar measured levels of institutional quality.  
 The final issue relates to the actual impact of natural resources on 
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economic and social outcomes, especially in SSA. It has been shown that 
abundance in natural resources does not necessarily impede economic growth 
or the attractiveness to FDI. Infant mortality, by contrast, seems to be less 
affected the abundance in natural resources. The analysis has shown that 
resource-abundant countries, especially in SSA, tend to have a higher infant 
mortality. Put differently, abundance in natural resources is likely to be 
detrimental to measures of social progress. The aim here thus is to elaborate the 
reasons that may explain the adverse effects of natural resources on measures 
of social progress.   
7.2.1. Explaining SSA backwardness relative to SEA 
 Earlier, Baro (1991) attributed part of the observed difference in 
economic performance between SSA and other regions to the fact of “being in 
Africa” (p. 419). As he put it, “Even if you provide the same level and quality 
of physical and human capital and technology to an average African economy 
and to an average economy outside Africa, the growth rates of the two would 
ultimately differ…” It would be, however, too simplistic to attributing a SSA 
country’s development problems to the simple fact of ‘being in SSA’. Other 
variables such as policy choices may be worth accounting for in the observed 
economic and social outcomes in SSA (see, e.g., Ndulu et al 2008).  
 In the understanding of SSA underperformance relative to SEA, there 
is a number of case-study evidence that strongly suggests that the differences 
in development outcomes between the two regions may be explained by 
differences in the adoption of three policy features: economic freedom for 
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peasants and small entrepreneurs; rural sector development (i.e., pro-poor, pro-
rural spending), and macroeconomic stability (i.e., low inflation) (see, e.g., 
Berendsen et al. 2013; van Donge et al 2012; Henley 2012). While such policies 
were adopted in most of the SEA countries, they have been neglected in SSA. 
One should note, however, that such findings are based on the period extending 
from 1960 to the early 2000s.  
 With regard to macroeconomic stabilization, based on data for the 
period 1990-2015, the current study has shown that SEA on average 
consistently enjoyed lower inflation rates relative to SSA. On the other hand, 
SSA has been able to achieve dramatic improvements in macroeconomic 
stabilization, especially since the early 2000s (see, e.g., Appendix 4, p. 174). 
The clearest example is the DR Congo, where inflation rates were brought down 
from over 300 percent in the 1990s to under 10 percent by the 2010s.  
 With regard to policies related to rural sector development and 
economic freedom for peasants, there is some indication that SEA performs 
better relative to SSA, based on data from the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFD). The IFD assesses rural policy environment in 
terms of the following areas: policy and legal framework for rural organizations, 
enabling conditions for rural financial services development, investment 
climate for rural businesses, access to agricultural input and product markets, 
access to land, and access to water for agriculture. A comparison of SSA and 
SEA data on these policy areas suggests some variations between the two 
regions (see Appendix 5, p. 175). This study thus suggests that differences in 
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policies for rural sector development as well as the economic freedom for 
peasants may help explain the differential performance between SSA and SEA.   
 Accordingly, it is argued here that the backwardness of SSA relative 
to SEA may not be caused by regional location (i.e., geographic factors) per se, 
but by the poor adoption of the three policy features highlighted above. More 
investigation is needed using advanced analytical tools such as panel data 
techniques, to examine the actual impact of these three policy features and their 
interactions with regional location on economic and social outcomes in the two 
regions.  
7.2.2. Explaining the varying impact of Regulatory Quality on 
socioeconomic performance between SSA and SEA  
 As pointed out earlier, both SSA and SEA on average have lower 
measured level of institutional quality compared to more advanced economies. 
At the same time, findings from the empirical analysis have suggested that 
improvement in Regulatory Quality is beneficial to socioeconomic 
performance for all countries, regardless of whether they are located in SSA or 
SEA. Among the countries with better Regulatory Quality, however, those 
located in SEA perform somewhat better than their counterparts located in SSA.  
 According to Andrews (2010), countries reflecting similar level of 
governance may in fact have varying characteristics “in terms of the very 
dimensions that institutional indicators imply” (p. 7). For instance, countries 
that have similar scores on the WGI Regulatory Quality indicator may in fact 
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differ in terms of particular rules or practices that are used to construct this 
measure (i.e., price controls, trade policy, regional integration, or ease of 
starting a new business). That being said, SSA and SEA countries may have 
lower Regulatory Quality scores, but it is their performance in specific rules or 
practices that in fact may influence their economic and social outcomes. 
 In the current study, the WGI Regulatory Quality indicator has been 
utilized as the institutional quality measure. Recall that the Regulatory Quality 
is in fact a composite indicator that captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. Note also that a range of 
variables are used to construct this indicator, including business regulations (see 
p. 94). The quality of a country’s business regulations may in turn be assessed 
in terms of a set of objective measures affecting business lifecycle from starting 
to operating and closing (e.g., time, procedures, and costs for starting and 
operating a business as determined by local law, prevalence of trade barriers, 
tax burden, contract enforcement, buying a property and obtaining an electric 
connection). 
 A comparison between SSA and SEA on these objective measures (see, 
Appendix 6, p.176) suggests substantial differences on three areas of business 
regulations: trade policy, tax burden, and electricity.  
 First, better trade policy in SEA may reflect a better regional 
integration (i.e., ASEAN), compared to SSA. In fact, most of the SEA countries 
offer better regulations for international trade (e.g., time, cost, procedures 
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associated with exporting and importing a standard shipment of goods by sea 
transport). By contrast, despite efforts to further sub-regional integration, SSA 
as whole remains a poorly integrated region. Trade facilitation thus remains a 
challenge in most of the SSA countries (see, Appendix 6.2, p. 177). Empirical 
evidence suggests that greater international trade is strongly correlated with 
economic growth (World Bank 2016). It is thus possible that variation in trade 
facilitation between SSA and SEA may explain the differential impact of 
Regulatory Quality on economic and social outcomes between the two regions.  
 Second, a comparison of SSA and SEA data on tax regulations 
suggests some noticeable variation between the two regions (Appendix 6.4, p. 
179). For instance, lower tax rates as well as the few number of tax payments 
per year are indicative of better regulations in SEA relative to SSA. These 
differences are of important interest, in particular because keeping tax rates at 
a reasonable level in addition to simple tax rules can contribute to promoting 
the private sector as well as economic growth. For instance, a recent study 
shows that countries where it is easier to pay taxes, in terms of the number of 
tax payments per year, are likely to register more new business entries 
(Braunerhjelm and Eklund 2014). Evidence also suggests that an increase in tax 
rates leads to a decrease in GDP growth over the following 3-year period 
(Romer et al 2010). Imposing high tax rates is particularly detrimental to SSA 
economies because it not only adds little to government revenue,9 but also 
                                            
9 It has been pointed out that more than 90 percent of (registered) taxpayers in SSA 
are small and medium-size enterprises (SME). However, their effective contribution 
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discourages new business entry and increase the likelihood of businesses to 
become informal (Hibbs et al 2010). A comparison of SSA grouped by tax rates 
indicates that low tax rate countries experience greater domestic and foreign 
investment, have higher per capita GDP growth, and better social indicators 
compared with high tax rate countries (see Appendix 6.4, p. 180). One can thus 
attribute the differential impact of RQ on socioeconomic performance to 
variation in tax regulations (i.e. heavy tax burden in SSA versus light tax burden 
in SEA).  
 Finally, poor electricity services have been recently reported as one of 
the top obstacles to private sector development (World Bank 2016). Countries 
offering a more reliable and cheaper priced supply of electricity are likely to 
register greater amounts of private capital (foreign and domestic) (Perre and 
Martin 2010) and achieve economic growth (World Bank 2016). A simple 
comparison of SSA and SEA data on the electricity supply and tariffs suggests 
that SEA countries are more competitive in terms of reliability, time, and cost 
of electricity supply (see Appendix 6.7, p. 183). Again, differences in electricity 
services may in turn explain the differential impact of RQ on socioeconomic 
performance between SSA and SEA.  
 Overall, countries that exhibit similar measured level of Regulatory 
Quality can have very different regulatory rules and practices. This in turn can 
explain the differential impact of Regulatory Quality on socioeconomic 
                                            




performance between SSA and SEA. The discussion in this sub-section and data 
around Appendices 6.1-6.9 has shown that SSA and SEA vary on some 
variables used to construct the Regulatory Quality indicator. This was shown 
here with regard to business regulations as measured by the World Bank’s 
Doing Business Index. More attention should be paid to the importance of 
specific regulatory rules or practices in shaping the impact of Regulatory 
Quality on economic and social outcomes. 
7.2.3. Explaining the effects of abundance in natural resources 
 This study has shown that abundance in natural resources, measured 
as the share of natural resource exports (oil and minerals) in percentage of total 
merchandise exports, has contributed to higher economic growth and larger FDI 
inflows in SSA. Specifically, per capita GDP growth and the flow of inward 
FDI for resource-abundant countries have been higher than for other SSA 
countries over the period from 1995 to 2015. 
 Surprisingly, the same factor that have driven economic growth and 
FDI inflows had adverse or no impact on the indicator capturing social progress. 
In effect, findings show a significant and positive association between natural 
resources and infant mortality rate. Put more simply, abundance in natural 
resources does not necessarily bring improvements in social welfare. This is 
particularly relevant for SSA countries.  
 A study by the IMF also highlights the contrast in economic and social 
outcomes between resource-abundant and resource-scarce countries in SSA 
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(Lundgren et al 2013). The study shows large disparities between performance 
in GNI per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI) among the SSA 
resource exporters. Put differently, higher income level in a SSA resource 
exporter does not necessarily reflect higher standard of living or social welfare. 
The clearest example is Equatorial Guinea, where the main indicators of social 
progress such as child mortality, primary school enrolment, and fertility rates 
have not improved in spite of the sustained growth of per capita income since 
the 1990s (see chapters 3-4).   
 Possible explanations to the adverse effects of resource abundance on 
measures of social progress may include factors such as institutional weakness, 
violent conflict, the crowding out of manufacturing (Dutch Disease), and 
volatility (see chapter 2): 
 First, countries with abundant natural resources tend to display 
cronyism, corruption, or less accountability. Government officials of these 
countries are likely to engage in inefficient decision-making (i.e., wasteful 
spending) that impedes the ability of resources to benefit the citizenry at large 
(Venables 2010).  
 Second, violent conflict (i.e., civil war) is related to reduction in life 
expectancy, child malnutrition, and infant mortality. Since many resource-
abundant countries in SSA have been afflicted by civil war (or other forms of 
violence), it is not surprising that abundance in natural resources adversely 
affects their social outcomes. 
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 Third, the crowding out of manufacturing due to a sharp rise in natural 
resource exports (Dutch Disease) may cause currency appreciation, increase 
domestic prices, further unemployment, among others. Such effects may in turn 
exacerbate underperformance in other social indicators, including infant 
mortality, malnutrition, and so forth.   
 Finally, volatility in government revenues, due to fluctuations in 
commodity prices could indirectly hurt social welfare by impeding the ability 
of the state to consistently provide public services (e.g., health care).  
 In SSA, resource-abundant countries are 20 times more likely to 
experience violent conflict relative to their resource-scarce counterparts (see 
Appendix 7, p. 185). Further, resource-abundant countries in SSA on average 
have poorer institutional quality (i.e., Control of Corruption) comparing with 
countries that are resource-scarce. Similarly, the share of the manufacturing 
sector in GDP is on average greater in resource-scarce countries than in 
resource-abundant countries. Surprisingly, there seems to be no major 
difference in volatility between resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
countries.  
 There is a wide array of studies that prescribe policies that can help 
countries to avoid the negative effects of natural resource endowments. A 
discussion of such policies is beyond the scope of the current study. Future 
studies could perhaps investigate which of the four factors highlighted above 
significantly explains poor social outcomes in SSA resource-abundant 
countries.    
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7.3. Unanswered questions and concluding remarks 
This study is significant for being the first analysis applying panel data 
to examine the role of institutional quality and natural resources in explaining 
socioeconomic performance in SSA and SEA. Findings contribute to 
understanding how regions that somewhat display similar measured level of 
institutional quality may experience different economic and social outcomes. 
The theory proposed in this study suggests that countries that exhibit similar 
measured level of Regulatory Quality may in fact vary in terms of regulatory 
rules and practices; and such differences may in turn moderate the effects of 
Regulatory Quality on economic and social outcomes.  
Further empirical work is needed to assess the extent to which 
particular rules or practices influence a country’s institutional quality. Such 
exercise would avoid the ‘misleading’ approach which consists in simply 
regressing an economic performance variable (i.e., GDP growth) on a 
composite institutional variable (i.e., Regulatory Quality, Economic Freedom, 
Quality of Government), and neglect the fact that countries differ on specific 
practices or rules used to construct those composite indicators. Also, and 
perhaps more importantly, such analysis would contribute to identifying 
particular practices and rules that are critical for sound regulatory reforms and 
thus for economic success. This idea is relevant not only for the Regulatory 
Quality indicator, but also for other institutional dimensions such as corruption 
(i.e., rules and practices for fighting corruption), quality of the public 
administration (i.e., rules and practices for hiring civil servants), or government 
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accountability (i.e., rules and practices for controlling decisions made by 
politicians), and so forth. 
On the other hand, contrary to the resource curse thesis, findings have 
shown that natural resources do not necessarily have adverse effects on 
economic performance, especially in SSA. It has been argued that by improving 
their institutions—i.e., having better Regulatory Quality—resource-abundant 
countries can be able to achieve better development success compared to their 
resource-scarce counterparts. Further research is also needed to identify 
particular policies that have succeeded in SEA (i.e., Malaysia and Indonesia) 
and SSA (i.e., Botswana) resource-abundant countries, and which can be 
proposed to countries experiencing the resource curse (i.e., DR Congo, Nigeria, 
among others). 
Finally, there is a need to empirically assess the existing explanations 
according to which SSA’s backwardness relative to SEA is due to differences 
in the adoption of three policy features: macroeconomic stability; rural sector 
development; and economic freedom for small entrepreneurs and peasants. 
Such analysis would address the question of why SSA failed to adopt such 
policies. One possible answer to such question could be that policy failure is 
itself a consequence of a poor institutional development. That having been said, 
one way to gain leverage over such research would be to investigate how 
interactions between institutional quality/governance and other factors (i.e., 
geography and/or external shocks) influence the adoption of these three policy 
features in the two regions.   
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 Overall, putting together the pieces of the SSA development puzzle 
will often require understanding and explaining whether, why, and how SSA 
responds differently to particular variables (economic, institutional, geographic, 
and social) compared to other regions. This study has contributed to such 
















Appendix 1: Findings from Sachs and Warner (1995) 
versus Others 







































Interaction term  15.4* 
 (2.40) 
 
Rule of law   0.11  
(0.15) 
Rule of law*Resource 
abundance 
  2.64**  
(1.26) 




  0.26  
(0.47) 
Number of observations  87 67 
Adjusted R^2  0.50 0.75 
Estimation technique OLS OLS OLS 
Source: Sachs and Warner (1995); Mehlum et al. (2006: 15); Kolstad (2009: 441) 
 
Appendix 1 shows empirical results from three studies on the relationship 
between economic growth and natural resource abundance. First, Column (1) 
reports the main findings from Sachs and Warner (1995) suggesting that 
abundance in natural resources adversely affects economic growth. In other 
words, countries that are rich in natural resources experience poor economic 
performance.  
 Second, column (2) reports results from Mehlum et al. (2006), 
suggesting that institutional quality reverses the adverse effects of natural 
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resources on economic growth. In other words, by improving the quality of their 
institutions (i.e. good governance, low corruption), resource-abundant 
countries can achieve better economic performance, compared to resource-
abundant countries where institutions are poor (i.e., poor or bad governance). 
 Finally, Colum (3) reports results from Kolstad (2009), suggesting that 
only economic institutions (i.e., property rights, rule of law) are important in 
reversing the adverse effects of natural resources on economic growth. Political 
institutions (i.e., democracy), by contrast have no effects in removing the 
resource curse. In other words, economic institutions matter more than political 












Appendix 2: Estimation using alternative institutional 
variables  
 A number of institutional indicators (Control of Corruption, 
Governance Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability) are used to estimate the 
effects of institutional quality on the three performance measures (per capita 
GDP growth, FDI, and infant mortality). Using several institutional indicators 
allows capturing whether institutional quality has the same effect on 
performance, regardless of the aspect or dimension of institutions considered. 
 Appendices 2.1 through 2.5 reports results using control corruption, 
governance effectiveness, and voice and accountability, respectively. Annual 
data for these institutional indicators are obtained from the World Bank’s WGI 
for the period extending from, 1996 to 2015. Marginal effects of these 
institutional variables on the three performance measures suggest that 
institutional quality has the same effect on performance in both SSA and SEA, 









Appendix 2.1: Pooled OLS, using Control of Corruption as the institutional 
variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES GDP FDI Infant 
mortality 
SSA -0.056 -0.484 0.450*** 
 (0.065) (0.367) (0.067) 
Control of Corruption 0.021*** 0.025** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) 
Natural resources -0.009** -0.016** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Interaction between SSA 







Interaction between SSA 








Inflation  -0.120 -0.472 0.086 
 (0.079) (0.316) (0.069) 
ODA per capita -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Government expenditure 







Population growth -0.155*** 0.853*** -0.037*** 
 (0.026) (0.079) (0.0114) 
Urban population in % 
of total population 
0.028*** 0.030*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.001) 








Constant 5.803*** 1.319* 4.427*** 
 (0.181) (0.656) (0.101) 
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 
R-squared 0.645 0.284 0.720 
Number of groups 54 54 54 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix 2.2: Marginal effects of control of corruption and EXP on GDP, FDI, 
and infant mortality for SSA versus SEA 
  GDP FDI Infant 
mortality 
SSA Control of 
Corruption 
0.018 0.021 -0.008 
 Natural resources 0.008 0.005 0.004 
SEA Control of 
Corruption  
0.021 0.025 -0.015 
 Natural resources -0.009 -0.016 0.009 









Appendix 2.4: Marginal effects of Governance Effectiveness and EXP on 
GDP, FDI, and infant mortality for SSA versus SEA 
  GDP FDI Infant 
mortality 
SSA Governance effectiveness 0.018 0.021 -0.008 
 Natural resources 0.008 0.006 0.004 
SEA Governance effectiveness  0.021 0.025 -0.015 
 Natural resources -0.009 -0.016 0.009 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES GDP FDI Infant mortality 
SSA -0.052 -0.477 0.440*** 









Natural resources -0.009** -0.016** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Interaction between 

















Inflation  -0.120 -0.472 0.086 
 (0.079) (0.316) (0.069) 
ODA per capita -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Government 








Population growth -0.155*** 0.853*** -0.038*** 
 (0.026) (0.079) (0.011) 
Urban population in % 







    








Constant 5.773*** 1.284* 4.448*** 
 (0.181) (0.654) (0.099) 
    
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 
R-squared 0.645 0.284 0.720 
Number of groups 54 54 54 
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Appendix 2.5: Pooled OLS, using Voice and Accountability as the institutional 
variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES GDP FDI Infant mortality 
SSA -0.051 -0.476 0.439*** 









Natural resources -0.009** -0.016** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Interaction 




















Inflation -0.120 -0.472 0.086 
 (0.079) (0.316) (0.069) 
ODA per capita -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Government 








    
Population growth -0.155*** 0.853*** -0.038*** 
 (0.026) (0.079) (0.011) 
Urban population 


















Constant 5.768*** 1.278* 4.451*** 
 (0.181) (0.654) (0.099) 
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 
R-squared 0.645 0.284 0.720 
Number of groups 54 54 54 
Appendix 2.6: Marginal effects of Voice and Accountability and EXP on GDP, 
FDI, and infant mortality for SSA versus SEA 
  GDP FDI Infant 
mortality 
SSA Voice and Accountability 0.018 0.021 -0.008 
 Natural resources 0.008 0.006 0.004 
SEA Voice and Accountability 0.021 0.025 -0.015 







Appendix 3: Regression using alternative dependent 
variables 
 
 Appendix 3 uses the Log of GDP per Person employed (constant 2011 
PPP $) and the Prevalence of undernourishment (% of total population) as 
alternative measures for per capita GDP growth and infant mortality rate, 
respectively. This allows capturing whether the effects of institutional quality 
and abundance in natural resources are robust to the use of different measures 














Appendix 3.1: Pooled OLS  
 (1) (2) 






(% of total 
population) 
SSA -0.898*** 5.575*** 





Natural resources 0.0229*** -0.149* 
 (0.00382) (0.0852) 












Inflation -0.129** 5.171*** 
 (0.0568) (1.011) 
ODA per capita -0.00282*** 0.0123* 
 (0.000320) (0.00590) 
Government expenditure 





   
Population growth -0.184*** -0.863** 
 (0.0134) (0.412) 






   






Constant 8.922*** 38.49*** 
 (0.111) (2.501) 
Observations 1,107 985 
R-squared 0.657 0.422 
Number of groups 53 47 
 
 
Appendix 3.2: Marginal effects of RQ and natural resources on GDP per 
person employed and Prevalence of undernourishment (% of total population) 
for SSA versus SEA 
  Log of GDP per  
Person employed 
(constant 2011 PPP $) 
Prevalence of 
undernourishment 
(% of total population) 
SSA RQ 0.018*** -0.221 
 Natural resources 0.007*** 0.080*** 
SEA RQ 0.0292*** -0.173** 
 Natural resources 0.0229*** -0.149* 





Appendix 4: Inflation rate in SSA and SEA, 1995-
2015 
 
 Country 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2015 
SSA (forty-five 
countries) 
50.87 13.82 8.77 6.2 
DR Congo 334.37 189.88 23.03 7.06 
Ethiopia 3.88 3.01 19.06 15.18 
Nigeria 25.46 13.54 11.12 10.39 
South Africa 7.35 5.49 6.76 5.22 
Tanzania 16.92 4.84 8.21 9.25 
SEA (nine countries) 15.09 5.95 7 4.1 
Indonesia 20.55 7.98 9.01 5.61 
Myanmar 26.24 23.92 16.36 6.14 
Philippines 7.27 4.35 5.48 3.36 
Thailand 5.10 1.7 3.21 2.21 
Vietnam 7.56 2.64 10.82 8.05 













Appendix 5: Rural sector performance in SSA and SEA, 
2004-2015 






















0.577 0.492 0.495 0.507 0.525 
DR Congo 0.619 0.459 0.475 0.429 0.378 
Ethiopia 0.594 0558 0.623 0.707 0.621 
Nigeria 0.587 0.445 0.464 0.553 0.573 
South 
Africa 
0.63 0.585 0.593 0.56 0.688 
Tanzania 0.706 0.653 0.695 0.633 0.631 
SEA (nine 
countries) 
0.641 0.557 0.537 0.575 0.594 
Indonesia 0.601 0.526 0.518 0.566 0.551 
Myanmar 0.374 0.336 0.364 0.343 0.336 
Philippines 0.759 0.627 0.614 0.693 0.611 
Thailand 0.813 0.694 0.637 0.686 0.842 
Vietnam 0.729 0.601 0.638 0.582 0.646 
Source: International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rural Sector Performance 
Assessments; Author’s calculation.  
Note: Each of these dimensions is based on a 10-point scale for the period 2004-2015. 
 Appendix 5 compares SSA and SEA in terms of their rural sector 
environment. Assessment of the rural sector environment is provided by the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFD) in a range of areas 
including policy and legal framework for rural organizations, enabling 
conditions for rural financial services development, investment climate for rural 
businesses, access to agricultural input and product markets, access to land, and 
access to water for agriculture. A simple comparison highlights substantial 
variation between SSA and SEA in terms of rural sector performance. First, 
aggregates of the two regions indicate that SEA outperforms SSA in all of the 
five dimensions highlighted in the table above. Second, disaggregation to 
individual countries also suggests that rural sector performance is better in SEA 
countries (in the exception of Myanmar), compared to SSA.   
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Appendix 6: Comparing of Business Regulations between 
SSA and SEA 
 Appendix 6 utilizes the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators to 
compare the quality of business regulations between SSA and SEA.  
Appendix 6.1: Starting a Business in SSA versus SEA, 2004-2015 















10 45 131.52 159.77 
DR Congo 13 101 786.52 117.43 
Ethiopia 12 31 146.34 820.57 
Nigeria 8 30 111.63 0 
South Africa 7 49 5.2 0 
Tanzania 10 30 81.03 0 
SEA (nine countries) 12 65 53.99 588.61 
Indonesia 12 93 63.05 50.88 
Myanmar 14 76 145.8 6883.83 
Philippines 17 42 21.91 4.24 
Thailand 8 32 12.79 0.03 
Vietnam 10 40 17.43 0 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 Appendix 6.1 compares SSA and SEA in terms of the number of 
procedures required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an 
industrial or commercial business; time and cost required to complete these 
procedures; and paid-in minimum capital that companies must deposit before 
registration. It can be observed that on average in SEA it takes more procedures 
and time (days) for starting up a business relative to SSA. Further, minimum 
capital requirements are greater in SEA. On the other hand, the cost for 
completing business start-up procedures in SSA is higher relative to SEA. 
Overall, appendix 6.1 suggests that it is relatively easier to start-up a business 
in SSA compared with SEA. 
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8 335 1922.86 9 40 2440.1 
DR Congo 7 347 2937 10 3039 3519 
Ethiopia 8 57 2181.8 11 668 2729 
Nigeria 9 135 1195.8 13 1077 1411 
South 
Africa 
6 100 1445.4 7 657 1671.5 
Tanzania 7 96 1150.7 12 1350 1441.7 
SEA (nine 
countries) 
6 52 754.51 8 22 830.59 
Indonesia 4 48 590.9 8 384 653.3 
Myanmar 9 144 653.33 9 367 643.33 
Philippines 6 42 699.2 7 580 773.3 
Thailand 6 51 658.6 7 233 827.5 
Vietnam 5 60 545.7 8 392 612.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 Appendix 6.2 compares SSA and SEA in terms of the Trading-Across-
Borders indicators. This indicator measures the time and cost associated with 
exporting and importing a standard shipment of goods by sea transport, and the 
number of documents necessary to complete the transaction. In contrast with 
the Starting-a-Business indicator, it can be seen here that SEA on average 
performs better than SSA. For instance, the time and cost for exporting or 












(% of property 
value) 
SSA (forty-five countries) 6 77 10.31 
DR Congo 7 48 13.15 
Ethiopia 8 53 6.94 
Nigeria 13 81 21.01 
South Africa 7 23 8.23 
Tanzania 9 72 4.69 
SEA (nine countries) 7 79 4.37 
Indonesia 5 33 10.63 
Myanmar 6 85 6.53 
Philippines 9 35 4.3 
Thailand 4 6 6.64 
Vietnam 5 61 0.93 
Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 Appendix 6.3 compares SSA and SEA in terms of the procedures 
necessary for a business to purchase property from another business and 
transfer the property title to the buyer’s name. Overall, there is no major 
difference between the two regions. While in SSA it takes fewer procedures and 





































54 61.157 49.74 402.02 117.31 18.47 
DR Congo 41 323.6 254.8 43.2 10.35 14.4 
Ethiopia 30 233 31.47 26.6 3.4 3.4 
Nigeria 50 998 31.58 21.75 10.75 0.5 
South 
Africa 
9 242 32.47 23 4.05 3.2 
Tanzania 48 174 44.31 20.45 17.75 6.1 
SEA (nine 
countries) 
34 318.46 33.33 18.09 8.56 3.54 
Indonesia 56 323.7 30.57 16.7 11.3 3.4 
Myanmar 31 240.5 35.3 26.4 0 6 
Philippines 45 194.4 45.59 20.8 9.65 14 
Thailand 25 264 39.23 23.9 5 2.7 
Vietnam 39 974.8 38.93 14.3 23.15 0.1 
Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 Appendix 6.4 compares SSA and SEA in terms of tax regulations. SEA 
on average has lower tax rates relative to SSA. Further, looking at the number 
of tax payments per year suggests that paying taxes is easier in SEA relative to 
SSA. These differences are of important interest, in particular because keeping 
tax rates at a reasonable level in addition to simple tax rules can contribute to 







Appendix 6.4: High tax rates and socioeconomic indicators in SSA 
 Low total 
tax rate 
countries 




total tax rate 
countries 
(>=30 & 




total tax rate 
countries 
(>=50 & 





(>=70 % of 
profit) 
Gross fixed capital 
formation (% of 
GDP) 
28.87 22.36 22.25 25.49 
Access to 
electricity, rural (% 
of rural population) 










deaths per 1,000 
live births) 
35.6 52.97 67.95 64.28 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
2.76 2.26 1.7 0.62 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank, Doing Business; 
WDI 
 Appendix 6.4 creates four hypothetical groups of SSA countries based 
on their respective total tax rate in 2015. The first group includes countries 
whose total tax rate is less than 30 percent of profit (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, and Zambia); the second group 
includes countries whose total tax rate ranges between 30 and less than 50 
percent of profit (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe); the next group 
comprises countries with total tax rate ranging between 50 and less than 70 
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percent of profit (Angola, Benin, Chad, DR Congo, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Guinea, and Togo); and the final group includes countries whose total 
tax rate exceeds 70 percent of total profit (Central African Republic, Comoros, 
Eritrea, and Mauritania). The four groups are then compared on a range of 
economic and social indicators (e.g., gross fixed capital formation, access to 
electricity in rural areas, FDI inflows, infant mortality rate, and GDP per capita 
growth). The table seems to indicate that in SSA high tax rate leads to poor 
socioeconomic performance. Specifically, low tax rate countries experience 
greater domestic and foreign investment, have higher per capita GDP growth, 






















SSA (forty-five countries) 14 191 12.92 
DR Congo 8.2 182 3.01 
Ethiopia 9.2 126 18.86 
Nigeria 17 116 119.31 
South Africa 17 139 0.88 
Tanzania 18 205 12.72 
SEA (nine countries) 17 193 2.28 
Indonesia 17 195 6.63 
Myanmar 14 95 6.3 
Philippines 27 97 2.21 
Thailand 17 143 0.1 
Vietnam 10 166 1.11 
Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 Appendix 6.6 compares SSA and SEA in terms of the regulations in 
the construction sector. These include all the procedures, time and costs 
required for a business in this sector to obtain all the necessary approvals to 
build a warehouse, connect it to basic utilities and register it. A comparison 
between SSA and SEA on these regulations shows no major difference between 
the two regions. One should note, however, that the cost to comply with 






















5 139 5450.16 19.87 
DR Congo 6 103 33297.32 11.5 
Ethiopia 4 88 3006.48 4.7 
Nigeria 9 211 1158.32 15.7 
South Africa 5 222 830.62 9.9 
Tanzania 4 155 2095.85 16.6 
SEA (nine countries) 5 88 1232.31 14.02 
Indonesia 6 90 740.13 14.2 
Myanmar 6 98 2920.03 12.3 
Philippines 4 42 297.98 20 
Thailand 5 37 57.7 17.1 
Vietnam 6 115 2335.85 12 
Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 Appendix 6.7 compares the reliability of electricity supply and tariffs 
in SSA and SEA. This can be measured in terms of all procedures required for 
a local business to obtain a permanent electricity connection and supply for a 
standardized warehouse, as well as time and cost to complete each procedure. 
Based on averages for the period 2004-2015, a number of differences between 
the two regions can be highlighted. First, in SEA fewer procedures are required 
for a business to obtain electricity relative to SSA. Second, the cost for 
obtaining a permanent electricity and connection supply in SSA are about five 
times higher relative to SEA. Third, electricity in US$ per kWh is cheaper and 
more reliable in SEA. Finally, SSA and SEA are quite similar with regard to the 
other aspects, including mechanisms for monitoring outages, restoring service, 
and communication of tariffs and tariff changes. Appendix 6.7 thus suggests 
that SEA on average is more competitive in terms of reliability, time, and cost 
of electricity supply. 
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SSA (forty-five countries) 667 59.52 
DR Congo 637 139.58 
Ethiopia 610 15.2 
Nigeria 524 87 
South Africa 600 33.2 
Tanzania 515 14.3 
SEA (nine countries) 594 51.99 
Indonesia 496 134.95 
Myanmar 1160 51.5 
Philippines 855 26.53 
Thailand 469 15.37 
Vietnam 410 29.88 
Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 A country’s regulatory quality is also assessed in terms of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial system (i.e., time, cost and 
procedural complexity of resolving a commercial lawsuit involving two 
domestic businesses). There is empirical evidence that enhancement in contract 
enforcement is associated with the development of the private sector (Islam 
2003) as well as economic growth (Feld and Voigt 2004). Appendix 6.8 shows 
that SSA and SEA are quite similar in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency 
of contract enforcement. In both regions on average it takes about a year and 


















SSA (forty-five countries) 18.95 3 23.5 
DR Congo n.a n.a n.a 
Ethiopia 31.02 3 14.5 
Nigeria 27.41 2 22 
South Africa 33.72 2 18 
Tanzania 21.62 3 22 
SEA (nine countries) 24.79 3 19.14 
Indonesia 24.11 2 21 
Myanmar 14.03 5 18 
Philippines 7.15 3 37 
Thailand 51.09 2 30 
Vietnam 17.82 5 15 
Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
 In addition to the contract enforcement, a country’s regulatory quality 
can be assessed in terms of the strength of the legal framework for dealing with 
bankruptcy. This is covered by the Resolving Insolvency index, which also 
measures the time, cost and outcome of insolvency proceedings involving 
domestic legal entities (World Bank 2017). A good insolvency regime 
contributes to improving businesses’ access to credit (Haselmann 2010), which 
in turn can positively affect the growth of the private sector. Appendix 6.9 
shows that some areas of insolvency regimes are slightly better in SEA 
compared to SSA. For instance, the average debt recovery rate in SEA is higher 
relative to SSA. On the other hand, the time it takes for resolving an insolvency 






Appendix 7: Comparing institutional weakness, 
prevalence of violent conflicts, Dutch disease, and 
volatility between resource-abundant and resource-scarce 
countries 
 
 Resource-abundant Resource-scarce 
Institutional 
weakness (Control of 
Corruption) 
28.14 34.29 
Violent conflict 0.67 0.03 
Dutch Disease 9.12 11.8 
Volatility 0.44 0.48 
Notes: (1) institutional weakness is measured in terms of the mean value of Control of 
Control for the period 1996-2015, taken the World Bank WGI; (2) violent conflict is 
the mean value of the Magnitude of episodes of civil warfare in the period 1990-2015, 
taken from Polity IV; (3) Dutch Disease is measured in terms of the mean value for 
each country’s value-added in the manufacturing sector (measured as a fraction of GDP) 
during the period 1990-2015; data are obtained from the World Bank’s WDI; and (4) 
Volatility is the Standard deviation of government revenue for the years 1990-2015 
(measured as a fraction of GDP), divided by the mean for the same period; data are 
obtained from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. 
Resource-abundant countries include Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, DR Congo, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia.  
Resource-scarce countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi Central African 
Republic, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.  
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사하라 이남 아프리카와 동남아시




Ben Katoka Kasongo 
행정대학원 정책학 전공 
서울대학교 
 
본 연구는 사하라 이남 아프리카 지역의 발전이 늦어지는 이유로 
지목되는 낮은 제도의 질, 혹은 거버넌스 수준과 풍부한 천연자원의 
문제가 동남아시아 지역에서도 동일하게 발견된다는 문제의식에서 
시작됐다. 국제투명성기구의 부패인식지수에 따르면 두 지역에 위치
한 많은 국가들은 세계에서 가장 부정부패가 심각한 상황이고, 두 
지역 모두 석유 및 천연가스 매장량이 풍부하다. 제도 및 천연자원
과 같은 요인들이 두 지역의 경제적, 사회적 성과에 어떤 영향을 미
쳤는지에 대한 시계열적 비교 연구가 그동안 이루어지지 않았다는 




본 연구는 (1) 경제성장은 근본적으로 제도의 우수성에 달려있다는 
관점 (2) 광물 및 석유 등 천연자원의 풍부한 매장량 및 그에 대한 
의존성이 경제성장에 악영향을 미친다는 관점 등의 두 관점에 초점
을 맞추고 분석을 진행하였다. 이와 함께 본 연구는 사하라 이남 아
프리카지역을 중심으로 어떠한 사회경제적 성과가 물리적, 혹은 지
리적 원인과 연관되어 있는 지에 대해 설명하고자 했다. 
본 연구가 다루는 질문은 다음과 같다. (1) 경제 및 사회 지표 상에
서 사하라 이남 아프리카 지역의 성과는 동남아 지역과 비교하여 
어떠한 모습을 보이고 있는가 (2) 천연자원의 매장량 및 제도의 질
은 얼만큼, 그리고 어떻게 두 지역의 사회경제적 성과 패턴에 영향
을 미치는가 (3) 천연자원의 매장량과 제도의 질 사이의 상호작용은 
경제 및 사회에 어느 정도의 영향을 미치는가. 위의 질문들에 답하
기 위하여 본 연구는 1990년과 2015년 사이의 기간을 중심으로 사
하라 이남 아프리카 지역의 45개국과 동남아시아 지역의 9개국을 
분석하였다. 
사회경제적 성과를 분석하기 위하여 본 연구는 (1) 1인당 GDP 성장
률 (2) 해외직접투자(FDI) 수입 (3) 유아사망률 등 세 가지 지표를 
활용하였다. 제도의 질을 평가하기 위한 수단으로는 세계은행의 규
제의 질(RQ) 지표를 활용하였고, 전체 수출품 중 천연자원이 차지하
는 비율을 통해 천연자원의 매장량을 평가하였다. 분석을 위해 위의 
지표들에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 물가상승률, 정부 지출, 공적개발원
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조, 인구증가, 전체 인구 중 도시 인구가 차지하는 비율 등은 통제
하였다. 
본 연구의 주요 결론은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 제도의 질과 천연자원의 
매장량 및 기타 요인들이 동일할 때, 사하라 이남 아프리카 지역의 
국가들은 동남아시아 지역의 국가들보다 낮은 수준의 1인당 GDP 
성장률 및 해외직접투자 수입을 보였고, 유아사망률은 더 높았다. 
즉, 제도의 질이 동일할 때, 동남아시아 지역의 국가들은 사하라 이
남 아프리카 지역의 국가들보다 우월한 경제적, 사회적 성과를 냈다.  
둘째, 국가가 위치한 지역에 상관 없이 규제의 질(RQ) 수치를 기준
으로, 제도의 질을 향상시킨 국가는 높은 수준의 1인당 GDP 성장률 
및 해외직접투자 수입을 보였고, 유아사망률은 더 낮았다. 사하라 
이남 아프리카 지역에서나 동남아시아 지역에서나 우수한 성과를 
보여주고 있는 국가들은 저조한 성과를 내고 있는 국가들에 비해 
규제의 질(RQ) 측면에서 높은 점수를 받았다. 그러나 규제의 질(RQ) 
측면에서 높은 점수를 받은 국가들 중에서는 동남아시아 지역에 위
치한 국가들이 사하라 이남 아프리카 지역에 위치한 국가들보다 우
수한 성과를 보이는 경향이 있었다. 
마지막으로, 풍부한 천연자원은 경제성장에 악영향을 미치지 않는 
것으로 보인다. 동남아시아 지역의 경우, 천연자원 매장량이 많은 
국가들은 자원 매장량이 적은 국가들에 비해 1인당 GDP 성장률과 
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해외직접투자 모두 높았다. 또한, 천연자원의 매장량이 많고 규제의 
질(RQ)에서 높은 점수를 받은 국가들은 천연자원이 많고 규제의 질
(RQ)에서 낮은 점수를 받은 국가나 천연자원이 적고 규제의 질(RQ)
에서 높은 점수를 받은 국가, 혹은 천연자원이 적고 규제의 질(RQ)
에서 낮은 점수를 받은 국가보다 높은 경제성장률을 보였다. 
본 연구의 가장 중요한 의미는 비슷한 수준의 제도의 질, 혹은 거버
넌스 수준을 가진 국가들도 전혀 다른 경제적, 사회적 결과물을 만
들어낼 수 있음을 보였다는데 있다. 이와 같은 연구결과는 규제의 
질과 그것이 국가의 경제적, 사회적 성과에 미치는 영향에 대한 향
후 연구가 필요함을 보여준다. 
키워드: 사하라 이남 아프리카, 동남아시아, 규제의 질, 제도, 자원 
매장량, 패널 데이터 
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